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Every system of resolving disputes must, in some form and under
some name, provide for at least these two things: its own power to
preserve the orderliness of the decision-making process and its own
power to enforce decisions once made. Unhappily, the performance of
these disparate tasks has been accomplished in the Anglo-American
system of law through disparate powers under the single term "contempt." Some of the resultant confusion is documented in succeeding
portions of this article.
The power to preserve courtroom order is clearly essential. Unfortunately, it is easy to shade the need for order into a requirement
of dignity. An authoritarian system is perhaps more interested in the
trappings of respect for order than it is in whether the respect is
deserved or the order in reality maintained. The Russians provide for
correctional labor of up to a year for insulting a "representative of
authority" engaged in the maintenance of public order and up to
six months imprisonment for insulting a policeman.1 Even judges
reared on Anglo-American concepts of freedom are capable at times
of an insistence on more than courtroom order-of a demand for dress,
dignity, a mode of address, even a cultural air from another era-all
enforced through the massive power of contempt. When the authority
of law is in doubt and subjected to question, as when the crown sits
lightly on the king's head or the frontier is a lawless place, the law
is apt to demand symbols of obeisance as well as order. This is natural
enough. Yet in a law-oriented society this kind of overkill must somehow be avoided.
The power to enforce decrees, once made, is likewise essential
and important, though often enough this is done through execution
of sentence rather than through the contempt power. Where contempt
powers are used, however, extremes are again possible. One court may
deny a man his day in court as a punishment for some disobedience,
1

RS.F.S.R.

1960 UGOL. KOD. (Criminal Code) § 192.
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while another may fear, like the French with their astreintes, to enforce
its own orders at all.2
The trick, both in enforcing courtroom order and in enforcing
judicial decrees, seems to be to avoid extremes. But our system has few
doctrines precise enough to permit adequate control of immoderate
impulses. The law of contempt is largely judge-made law,3 and indeed
judges have spoken often of their "inherent" powers to punish for
contempt notwithstanding any legislative regulation.4 This judicial control over contempt cases has tended to close the conceptual system off
from legislative reform, while the small number of contempt cases has
tended to prevent the judiciary from acquiring an overview and an adequate experience to generate its own reform, or even to generate much
clarity in basic concepts. Lacking these, it is not easy to avoid extremes.
This article critically surveys some of those areas central to an
understanding of the contempt power and most suitable for legislative
restructuring, with the hope that, in the future, extreme results may be
avoided.

ACTs OF CONTEMPT
A. Generally
Contempt of court consists of an act or omission substantially
disrupting or obstructing the judicial process in a particular case. This
2 The astreinte is an in terrorem fine; e.g., "You must pay $10,000 for each day you
continue to violate the court's order." In the past, the French permitted this in form but

refused to permit actual collection of the fines. Now, at least partial collection is the rule.
See P. HERzoG, CIVM PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 563 (1967); Catala, Astreintes in French Law:
The Conclusive Case, 6 JuRm. REv. (ns.) 53 (1961); Catala, Astreintes in French Law, 4

JuRm. REV. (ns.) 163 (1959).
8 There is an ancient statute that seems as remote from the modern power of contempt

in logic as it is in time. The Statute of Westminster II, 13 Edw. 1, c. 39 (1285), provided
that a sheriff might in some instances imprison those who resisted his process. This resembles contempt power, but much as the acorn resembles the oak: no one would ever
have recognized the resemblance in advance. See J. Fox, Tn HISTORY OF CON-MPT OF
CoUtr 11 (1927).
4 Eg., LaGrange v. State, 238 Ind. 689, 153 N.E.2d 593 (1958).
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in every court of superior
jurisdiction in Indiana. This power is essential to the existence and functioning of
our judicial system, and the legislature has no power to take away or materially
impair it.... However, the legislature may regulate the exercise of the inherent
contempt power by prescribing rules of practice and procedure.
Id. at 692-93, 153 N.E2d at 595.
Ex parte McCown, 139 N.C. 95, 51 S.E. 957 (1905).
[A]s the power to attach for a certain class of contempts is inherent in the courts
and essential to their existence and the due performance of their functions, the
Legislature cannot, as to them, deprive the courts of this power or unduly interfere
with its exercise.
Id. at 105, 51 S.E. at 961.
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may include behavior during a trial, such as disruption of the proceedings, or it may include obstructive behavior outside the courtroom
itself. Contempt may also include disobedience of judicial orders, as, for
example, where a defendant violates an injunction or where a witness
refuses to answer a question when ordered to do so by the judge.
Clearly enough, all of this covers a wide range of conduct and,
just as clearly, not all this conduct should be treated alike, even though
it all goes abroad under the umbrella of "contempt." It is important to
recognize at the outset that several classifications are made in determining what constitutes contempt.
Courts commonly distinguish contempts at two levels. First, they
distinguish civil from criminal contempts. This is a matter that can be
reserved for later treatment since the present inquiry concerns only
whether any given conduct constitutes contempt. Second, courts distinguish contempts that are "direct" from those that are "indirect."
This dichotomy is more significant for immediate purposes. Roughly
speaking, a contempt is direct if it is in the presence of the judge
and indirect otherwise, though it must be understood that such a
simple distinction cannot stand without qualification, and it must also
be understood that terminology may differ in various jurisdictions.
Contempts are typically classed in both tiers-that is, first as either
civil or criminal and second as either direct or indirect; thus a contempt
might be criminal and direct, or civil and indirect, and so on. The
significance of these classifications lies in the powers and procedures
that attend them. Generally speaking, judges have more immediate
power over direct contempts than over indirect ones and, in some
important respects, more power in civil than in criminal contempts.
The details of this are taken up later.
Perhaps one word of warning is necessary. No classification of
factual patterns can be an absolute one; each situation shades into
others, and a disobedience of a court order may shade into, or even
be identical to, a disruption in court. To classify may be to obscure
such shadings. Yet if all contempts are treated alike, important differences may be ignored. Thus, classification is used with the hope that
it will allow one to see relevant policy differences in different factual
situations; it is not intended to suggest that all cases necessarily fall
squarely into one category alone.
B. Acts Constituting Contempt
1. Disruption in Court
Definitions of contempt tend to be extremely broad. They are
replete with the desire to avoid interruption of, and insult to, the judi-

CONTEMPT OF COURT

1971]

cial process." The two things, of course, are rather different. An obstruction or disruption of the court may be intolerable, but insult might be
borne if need be.
Any judicial system must find means of protecting itself from
disruptions so that parties may be heard, and the common law system
is not alone in seeking to protect itself against such practices. What
constitutes a disruption is another matter. 6 Simple noisemaking might
serve admirably to prevent a trial or to delay it substantially, 7 and
there is no doubt that any serious disruption during a judicial proceeding is a contempt and punishable as such. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, for example, had no difficulty in deciding that a defendant who
threw a World Almanac at the judge and expressed a murderous emotion was in contempt.8 This form of contempt is ancient. In the summer
of 1631 at the Salisbury assizes, a prisoner aggravated at his sentence
"ject un Brickbat a le dit Justice que narrowly mist ....

"

An indict-

ment was immediately drawn and "son dexter manus ampute & fix
al Gibbet sur que luy mesme immediatement hange in presence de
Court."9
Interruptions carried out almost continuously during a trial,
though not so dangerous as brickbats, are also effective, and also contempts.' 0 A disruption almost as effective-perhaps more so-occurred
in one case. A number of defense counsel, as a protest, walked out of
the trial in a body, leaving their clients unrepresented and halting the
trial for several hours. The attorneys were held in contempt, and
5 E.g., South Dade Farms v. Peters, 88 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 1956) (any despising of
authority); People v. Gholson, 412 Ill. 294, 298, 106 N.E.2d 333, 335 (1952) ("any act which
is calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct a court in the administration of justice, or
which is calculated to lessen its authority or dignity').
6 The French Code of Civil Procedure provides for a 24-hour summary commitment
of those who create disturbances in court, but a prison term may be meted out to one
who insults an officer of justice, and criminal conduct in court is punished as other
criminal conduct. C. PRo. Cm. arts. 89-92 (63e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1966-67). See P.
HErzOG,

supra note 2, at 285.

7 Commonwealth v. Reid, 123 Pa. Super. 459, 187 A. 263 (1936) (noisy and "boisterous"
defendant shackled).
8 Commonwealth v. Mayberry, 435 Pa. 290, 255 A.2d 548 (1969), cert. granted, 597 U.S.
1020 (1970).
9 Anonymous, Dyer 188b (note) (1688 reprint). A later report carries the translation

from law French as follows:
[The prisoner] threw a brickbat at the said Judge, which narrowly missed; and for
this an indictment was immediately drawn by Noy against the prisoner, and his
right hand cut off and fixed to the gibbet, upon which he was himself immediately

hanged in the presence of the Court.
73 Eng. Rep. 416 n. (1631).
10 Mayberry Appeal, 434 Pa. 478, 255 A.2d 131 (1969). See also Illinois v. Allen, 397

US. 337 (1970).
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of course this is entirely proper.1 Actually, courts often go further and
punish attorneys for their mere absence or even their tardiness without
excuse,' 2 though there are no doubt valid excuses that will operate as
defenses in some cases. 13
Disruptions may be less spectacular. An attorney may insist on
arguing his point after the judge has ruled on it, and to keep proceedings moving the trial judge may, if need be, hold him in contempt, 14
though there are at least some cases where the attorney has an absolute
right to insist upon being heard. 1 Perhaps a court is even justified in
holding an attorney in contempt when his fist fight spills over from the
corridor into the courtroom and disrupts, although unintentionally, a
trial in progress. 16
One might expect some disruptions to be more tolerable than
others. The disruption caused by a moment's anger might seem tolerable where it is neither part of a planned scheme of harassment nor a
substantial interruption. Yet even some of these relatively understandable and tolerable disruptions have been thought to justify contempt
punishments. During the Nuremberg war crimes trials, a witness was
asked to identify a man who had performed criminal experiments
upon him at Auschwitz. The witness not only identified the man but
also attempted to assault him. He apologized to the court, explaining
that he was "very excited" and that the man had ruined his life. The
judge sentenced the witness to ninety days in jail for contempt, but
later relented and "paroled" the contumacious witness to the custody
of his wife. Even so, the witness apparently served more than three
1
weeks in confinement at the Nuremberg Military Prison.
11 United States v. Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, Case No. 10, 15 TRIALS
OF WAR CuMiNAL-s BFoRE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 996-1013 (1949) (excerpts

from transcript and contempt ruling).
12 E.g., Chula v. Superior Ct., 57 Cal. 2d 199, 368 P.2d 107, 18 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1962);
Knajdek v. West, 278 Minn. 282, 153 N.W.2d 846 (1967) (late appearance by 20 minutes
could be contempt, but attorney is entitled to jury trial since guilt would be determined
not only by absence, but by the reasons for the absence, which the judge could not know
firsthand); see Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 431 (1964).
13 See, e.g., In re Marshall, 423 F.2d 1130 (5th Cir. 1970) (attorney absent to contact
witness sent another attorney to be at court; contempt conviction reversed).
14 Holman v. State, 105 Ind. 513, 5 N.E. 556 (1886).
15 In re Abse, 251 A.2d 655 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969) (attorney was not in contempt for
insisting on right to be heard after trial; judge had accused him of unprofessional conduct
in open court); cf. In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230 (1962) (mere statement by lawyer that
he will continue to press questions against court's order is not contempt).
16 Young v. State, 275 P.2d 358 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954).
17 United States v. Brandt, Case No. 1, 15 TRLS OF WAR CRImmS BEFORE THE
NUERNBRG MILITARY TRuBUNALs 967-72 (1949) (excerpts from transcript and contempt

rulings).
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In the late 1940's, in the famous trial of eleven persons accused of
a conspiracy to overthrow the government, the judge sentenced one
defendant for contempt for refusing to answer a question. This angered
the others and they stood up with their lawyers and began "shouting"
at the judge. Some of them took several steps forward. Additional
marshals were called in to restore order, and the judge immediately
remanded the defendants to the custody of the marshal for the duration
of the trial. Later this act was characterized by the judge as an informal
conviction of and sentence for contempt; his action was approved by
the Second Circuit. 8 The case is interesting for several reasons. One
is that the defendants do not appear to have acted with the intention
of affecting the jury, which was not present, or with the intention of
deliberately disrupting the trial. They were not, for instance, engaging
in the more contemporary pastime of chanting at the judge, nor for
the most part were they even reported to have been insulting. It seems
clear that the judge felt somewhat threatened, but it is not clear why
his sentence-jail for the duration of the trial-was thought to be
correlative to the offense.
Although something short of contempt punishment might have
been successful in handling the situation, and although some other
form of sentence might have been more desirable, the case did involve
conduct that could fairly be characterized as disruptive of an' actual
judicial proceeding. A number of other cases fall in a different zone
of behavior and create different problems.
2. Obstruction of the Court's Processes
Actual disruption of judicial proceedings by noisemaking, assaults,
or other physically disruptive acts is a relatively small problem in the
total contempt picture. Probably more common is the challenge presented to the administration of justice through distortion or blocking
of its processes-obstruction rather than disruption. The distinguishing
characteristic of obstruction cases is that the contemptuous act tends to
subvert fairness or efficiency without the direct challenge of disruption.
In general, this may include such acts as bribery, interfering with
execution of process, and other subversive rather than confrontative
acts.
One kind of obstruction may occur when the court's processes are
blocked. This might happen where the defendant induces prosecution
witnesses to leave the jurisdiction; 19 where one interferes with property
18 United States v. Hall, 176 F.2d 163 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.s. 851 (1949).
19 See, e.g., State v. Jones, 111 Ore. 295, 226 P. 433 (1924).
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custody; 20

where a debtor's property is concealed in
in the court's
violation of a court order, so that it cannot be levied upon; 21 or where
a judgment debtor conveys his property to a purchaser in violation
22
of a court order.
Another kind of obstruction involves conduct that prejudices the
fairness and procedural safeguards of the judicial process; for example,
intimidation of judges or jurors. Such conduct is not necessarily a
physical disruption of the trial, but neither judge nor jury can decide
according to conscience, law, and fact if their decisions can be threatened by the abuse of those who disagree.
An assault on a judge, though outside the courtroom, may constitute a contempt of court. This seems appropriate enough when the
assault is committed by a party to some proceeding and when it may
have an intimidating effect. 23 Similarly, an assault or other abuse of a
juror may constitute contempt, even though the juror has been discharged.24 A threatened assault on a witness while he is on the stand
is also a contempt, even if provoked by the witness's conduct or testimony.25
There are, of course, many ways in which a judicial proceeding
might be improperly influenced, and contempt may be used to punish
such influences even though they fall far short of intimidation.26 A
20 Gottwals v. Manske, 60 Nev. 76, 99 P.2d 645 (1940) (creditor and attorney attached
debtor's money in hands of receiver; held contempt).
21 Commonwealth ex rel. Messer v. Mickelson, 196 Pa. Super. 464, 175 A.2d 122
(1961) (concealment, re-concealment upon discovery). See also Drake v. National Bank of
Commerce, 168 Va. 230, 190 S.E. 802 (1937).
22 See Ex parte Coffelt, 239 Ark. 324, 389 S.W.2d 234 (1965) (attorney gave money

to wife before turnover order; contempt for evading judgment). There are limits to this
kind of contempt power. For example, one who is not a party to a receivership proceeding
may withhold property from the receiver and is not in contempt by so doing; the receiver
must by plenary action sue to get the property. See, e.g., Ex parte Harvill, 415 S.W.2d 174
(rex. 1967).
23 Weldon v. State, 150 Ark. 407, 234 S.W. 466 (1921) (assault on judge during vacation by man charged with crime; conviction by another judge for contempt affirmed).
24 In re Fountain, 182 N.C. 49, 108 S.E. 342 (1921). The court said in part:

There would be small assurance of the impartial and fearless administration of
justice if the judges only are to be protected from such misconduct as is here
shown, but the jurors who are much more liable to be thus called in question
should be left to defend themselves by physical strength or by indictment or

prosecution of the offenders.
Id. at 53, 108 S.E. at 343.
25 Cohran v. Sosebee, 120 Ga. App. 115, 169 S.E.2d 624 (1969) (attorney drew back

fist and presented threat to witness on stand when witness made reference to attorney's
"lying"; contempt conviction affirmed).
26 See City of Macon v. Massey, 214 Ga. 589, 592, 106 S.E2d 23, 25 (1958) (contempt
to call judge on phone to discuss judge's sentence of son; contempt again to go to judge's
office and demand apology: "The time has not yet arrived in Georgia when a person
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man was held in contempt because he said, in the presence of a jury
' 27
that was deliberating on a case, "Don't convict my friend Ruef.
Attempted bribery of either juror2 8 or witness 29 is likewise punishable
by the contempt power.30
Several somewhat unusual cases raise questions about improper
influence on jurors. In People v. Higgins,3 1 a deputy sheriff was held
in contempt on two counts, first for purchasing liquor for a jury (and
becoming drunk himself), and second for having sexual intercourse
with a woman juror. This case is troubling because there seems to have
been no need for the immediate reaction involved in a contempt
charge-the deputy's conduct was less likely to obstruct the judicial
process than to affect public opinion about it. An ordinary criminal
charge might have been more appropriate.
A second case, People v. Gholson, 2 involved a rather direct attempt to influence jurors. Gholson, a chiropractor, was charged with
criminal violation of the Illinois Medical Practice Act. 83 Shortly after
his case was set for trial, he sent a reprint of the ChiropracticNews to
a number of persons, including some prospective jurors. This contained laudatory material about Gholson. He then published an advertisement referring to his great success in treating a polio victim in two
papers of general circulation a few days before trial. Finally, on the day
of the trial, a "motor caravan" of several hundred supporters attended
the trial. Contempt was held proper here, and this seems justified since
the use of contempt operated to prevent defendant from attempting
to further influence the trial.
dissatisfied with the results of a judicial proceeding may with impunity require the judge
to discuss the matter ....2.
27 Ex parte Creely, 8 Cal. App. 713, 716, 97 P. 766, 767 (1908).
28 State v. Weinberg, 229 S.C. 286, 92 S.E.2d 842 (1956). "[AIl willful attempts, of what-

ever nature, seeking to improperly influence jurors in the impartial discharge of their
duties, whether it be by conversations or discussions, or attempts to bribe, constitute
contempts." Id. at 293, 92 S.E.2d at 846.
29 Ex parte Savin, 131 U.S. 267 (1889).
30 It is not even necessary to bribe or intimidate in traditional fashion. An employer
who discharged an employee because the employee was absent on jury duty was held in
App. 2d 171, 199 N.E.2d 78 (1964).
contempt by an illinois court. People v. Vitucci, 49 Ill.
A juror himself may be held in contempt for giving misleading responses on voir dire.
Once his misstatements or misleading answers on voir dire are shown, then even his misconduct in the jury room, otherwise privileged from disclosure, may be considered in the
contempt. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933). On the other hand, not every unethical
act relating to witnesses or evidence is a contempt, and it is no contempt, though it is

certainly unethical and perhaps illegal, to obtain a witness's presence by misrepresentation.
Cancellieri v. De Modica, 57 NJ. Super. 598, 155 A.2d 167 (1959).
31 173 Misc. 96, 16 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
32 412 III. 294, 106 N.E.2d 533 (1952).
33 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91, §§ 1-16x (Smith-Hurd 1966).
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A third case 84 seems arguable. An attorney for the plaintiff in a
civil trial responded to a ruling of the trial judge with the words, "I
think it demonstrates your prejudice without doubt."36 He was held
in contempt the next day. The appellate court thought this justified
in principle because the
immediate and obvious results [of the statement] were to disrupt
the trial, to inject in the minds of the jurors strong resentments
incompatible with the dispassionate determination of the issues
before them, and to deprive both plaintiff and defendant of an
early resolution of their litigation. A more extended harm to be
expected from such an accusation on the part of an officer of the
court is a lessening of public respect for the bench, the bar and the
judicial process. 8 6
This is the kind of case that easily shades into mere insult or insolence
without any obstructive effect. The appellate court's theory was that
fair trial became impossible once the accusation was made before the
jury. The court may have overdramatized the effect on the jury, but
given its premise, the insult became an obstruction. It must be remembered, however, that a claim of judicial bias made incident to a
motion to disqualify would be constitutionally protected, even if made
8
vigorously and impertinently. 7
If judges are warranted in expediting judicial procedures to prevent delay and obstruction, that warrant does not justify any plenary
police power. If the summary power of contempt-the power to punish
without information, indictment, or jury-is not needed to protect the
processes of the court, aggressive conduct should be dealt with under
ordinary criminal statutes.
A number of cases, however, seem to assume that the precincts of
the court are hallowed, and perhaps that even the judge himself carries
an aura of privilege. In a Washington case, 8 the court was in recess
34 Alexander v. Sharpe, 245 A.2d 279 (Me. 1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 924 (1970).
85 Id. at 281.
36 Id. at 288.
87 Holt v. Virginia, 881 U.S. 131 (1965). In this case a lawyer read to the judge a
written motion for change of venue based on the judge's alleged prejudice. The motion
stated that the judge was "in effect and/or in fact acting as police officer, chief prosecution
witness, adverse witness for the defense, grand jury, chief prosecutor and judge." Id. at
188. The right to a hearing on the issues was held to include the right to make motions
alleging such bias. Any insult was inherent in the charge of bias. This is similar to the
rule in defamation cases, which holds that statements made in court are absolutely
privileged if pertinent. Pertinency is given a liberal interpretation. E.g., Irwin v. Ashurst,
158 Ore. 61, 74 P.2d 1127 (1938). The policy seems similar to the one that should obtain
in contempt cases-to encourage full argumentation and disclosure in judicial hearings
rather than risk artificial limits in the name of decorum.
38 State v. Bucldress, 68 Wash. 26, 114 P. 879 (1911).
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and the judge was leaving for his chambers, where he was to sign an
order at the request of the defendant, Buddress. In the clerk's office,
and in the presence of the judge, Buddress got into a fight with one
Trumbull. The judge summarily punished them for contempt. The
Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the conviction, saying that
since the contempt was in the judge's presence, it was not necessary
that it be committed in court. There certainly seems nothing wrong in
punishing the misbehavior of Buddress. But since he does not appear
either to have disrupted or obstructed any judicial proceeding, it
would seem more desirable to use ordinary criminal processes than the
summary contempt power.3 9
Somewhat more distressing is a recent Iowa case4" in which state
district court Judge Paradise was disturbed by some boys making noisy
and obscene comments late at night outside the judge's home. They
also spoke to a girl "about sex and intercourse," and Judge Paradise
dressed and went out. He told them to quiet their loud, offensive, and
disturbing voices and to go home. When challenged, he told them he
was Judge Paradise "and what I just said to you is an order of
court." Two of them threatened to "get the son-of-a-b[itch]." 41 Three
struck the judge and someone said, "To hell with the judges and
courts." They ran away but were caught, and it turned out that two
of the young men were the subjects of juvenile proceedings then pending in Judge Paradise's court. A show cause order was issued and
counsel appointed to represent them at the contempt hearing. Judge
Paradise presided at the contempt hearing and sentenced each of the
four young men to six months in jail and a fine of $500.
The contemnors sought review by certiorari. The Supreme Court
of Iowa affirmed the conviction, subject only to a reduction in the
sentence. The court held that the boys' conduct was contemptuous
because it was "insolent and it tended to impair the respect due" to
Judge Paradise's authority, and it further held that the contempt was
committed toward a court "while engaged in the discharge of a judicial
duty."2
39 Chief Justice Dunbar of the Washington court dissented from the majority decision
on a ground in accord with this conclusion. He said in part:
I am unable to divest my mind of the idea that, in the interest of liberty and
in harmony with the genius of our government, every citizen should have a
right at some time and in some place to defend himself against a charge of crime
a conviction of which works a deprivation of his liberty or his property rights.
Id. at 34, 114 P. at 883.
40 Newby v. District Ct., 259 Iowa 1330, 147 N.W.2d 886 (1967).
41 The last word appears only incompletely in the somewhat maidenly opinion.
42 259 Iowa at 1337, 147 N.W.2d at 891.
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It is difficult to see why a contempt charge-rather than a charge
of crime or tort or both-should have been permitted here. There is
no more justification for taking courts to the streets than there is for
taking the streets to the courts. Certainly, where a criminal action is
possible and there is no immediate need for action to aid the progress
of a trial, the ordinary criminal law processes are preferable to the
summary processes of contempt, especially where the same judge who
was assaulted sat in judgment-something that would hardly be per43
mitted in a criminal case. The bare citation to other judge-assault cases
does not prove very much, for surely there is a distinction between
assaults that may intimidate judges in their work and that grow out
of their work, and assaults that are unrelated, do not delay trial, and
can be criminally punished.
3. Perjury, Forgery, and Alteration of Records
The judicial process may be substantially impaired when the
decision-making process itself is compromised, as in the cases where
attempts are made to influence or intimidate the judge or jurors. They
may also be compromised when the merits of the controversy are somehow distorted, as in cases where there is perjury by a witness, forgery
of a document, or alteration of a record.
These problems are somewhat peculiar. The lying witness is one
of the things the system is designed to cope with through devices such
as cross-examination. Whether the witness speaks the objective truth is
"intrinsic" to the trial-a matter in issue. We expect trials to involve
issues of fact and, pretty regularly, a certain amount of lying under
oath. We can cope with it by cross-examination, the use of other testimony, and the common sense of the trier of fact. Thus, direct perjury
is quite different from the kind of contempt involved in disruptive
behavior that prevents the jurors from hearing a witness. The system
cannot work at all with disruptions (nor could any system designed to
achieve truth or justice), but the system can and does work with per44
jury and in fact is designed to do So.
Another distinction between perjury and disruptive behavior
43 Id. at 1337-41, 147 N.W.2d at 891-93.

44 All this is quite similar to the policy involved' where a losing party seeks to set
aside a final judgment for fraud. In such cases, the same notions expressed in the text are
at work and lead courts to refuse modification of judgments for fraud, except the so-called
extrinsic fraud-the kind the system is not designed to catch and the kind that prevents
the system from coming into operation in the first place. See United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878); Dobbs, Recent Developments in the Law of Judgments in
Arkansas, 10 ARK. L. REv. 468, 472-77 (1956).
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should be sketched. It seems perfectly sound to encourage participants
in a trial to expect punishment for disruptions. On the other hand,
punishment for perjury may be easily misinterpreted to mean punishment for being on the losing side. In other words, any system that
regularly punishes those who are disbelieved runs the serious risk
of communicating to honest as well as to dishonest witnesses a serious
warning. This warning may be read to require not so much telling the
truth as telling a story"that will be believed. Thus, the use of the contempt power to punish perjury may create special problems not involved in pure disruption or even in other obstruction cases. 45
Some courts and writers apparently think of perjury as fitting into
a continuum that begins with a simple refusal to answer. A refusal to
speak, absent privilege, obstructs the judicial process in a procedural
way; it cannot succeed where those who know the truth will not speak,
for then it cannot even ascertain whether they are truthful, lying,
or mistaken. Thus, there is little difficulty in holding a witness in contempt for a flat refusal to answer.46 But this flat refusal shades very
quickly into an evasive answer, and an evasive answer shades further
into a lie: "I don't know, I don't recall, I can't remember." Repeated
enough, these phrases compel the feeling that the witness is refusing
to answer. Hence, in some cases, the evasive answer may be treated as
simple refusal to answer and punished as a contempt.4 7 Judge Learned
Hand, then a district judge, took this view when he said:
It is indeed impossible logically to distinguish between the case
of a downright refusal to testify and that of evasion by obvious
subterfuge and mere formal compliance.
The rule, I think, ought to be this: If the witness' conduct
shows beyond any doubt whatever that he is refusing to tell what
he knows, he is in contempt of court. That conduct is, of course,
beyond question when he flatly refuses to answer, but it may appear in other ways. A court, like any one else who is in earnest,
ought not to be put off by transparent sham, and the mere fact
that the witness gives some answer cannot be an absolute test. For
45 This point seems to have been completely overlooked in some writings. See, e.g.,
Note, Jury Trial for Criminal Contempts: Restoring Criminal Contempt Power and
ProtectingDefendants' Rights, 65 YALE LJ. 846 (1956).
46 Brown i. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958). Where the refusal to answer is not
in the judge's presence, as where it is a refusal to answer in a grand jury proceeding or a
proceeding before a master, it may be that summary contempt is not proper, and a full-

scale hearing is required. See Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965); Galyon v. Stutts,
241 N.C. 120, 84 S.E.2d 822 (1954). As to summary and plenary contempt hearings, see
Section 11(A) infra.
47 See, e.g., People v. Gilliam, 83 IM. App. 2d 251, 227 N.E.2d 96 (1967) (witness
recalled nothing prior to arrest, though he had normal intelligence; held contempt).
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instance, it could not be enough for a witness to say that he did
not remember where he had slept the night before, if he was sane
and sober, or that he could not tell whether he had been married
more than a week. If a court is to have any power at all to compel
an answer, it must surely have
power to compel an answer which is
48
not given to fob off inquiry.
It is perhaps easy to believe that if a court can hold a man in contempt for giving no answer and if a court can hold a man in contempt
for giving a sham answer, it must equally be permitted to hold him in
contempt for giving a false answer. Judge Hand did not feel this way,
however, for he added, no doubt with decisions of the Supreme Court
in mind, that the contempt power "must not be used to punish perjury."'49 Thus, under some decisions, whenever the witness's conduct
becomes not a refusal to answer but a lie, a different policy applies,
and contempt is not properly used to punish such behavior.
A leading case is Ex parte Hudgings,50 where the trial judge, after
a witness repeatedly asserted he could not recall a certain event, held
the witness in contempt for perjury. The witness was also indicted for
perjury. Imprisoned in punishment for the contempt, the witness
sought habeas corpus relief. The United States Supreme Court, in hearing the habeas petition, first pointed out that although perjury was a
crime, it might nevertheless furnish the basis for contempt charges
"when exceptional conditions so justify." 51 The Court then went on
to insist that perjury in the presence of the court was punishable as a
contempt only when it operated to obstruct the court in the performance of its duty. False swearing, the Court said, is not necessarily
obstructive. The Court then alluded to what perhaps were the more
pressing reasons against the use of contempt in cases like the one
before it:
[I]t would follow that when a court entertained the opinion that
a witness was testifying untruthfully the powr would result to
impose a punishment for contempt with the object or purpose of
exacting from the witness a character of testimony which the court
would deem to be truthful; and thus it would come to pass that
a potentiality of oppression and wrong would result and the freedom of the citizen when called as a witness in a court would be
gravely imperiled. 52
Tested against these considerations, the conviction was held to be "void
United States v. Appel, 211 F. 495, 495-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
Id. at 496.
50 249 U.S. 378 (1919).
51 Id. at 382.
52 Id. at 84.

48
49

CONTEMPT OF COURT

1971]

for excess of power"53 since there was no special circumstance giving
the perjury any obstructive effect. The witness was therefore released
from custody.
In a more recent decision, the Supreme Court again held that a
contempt conviction for perjury was improper. In In re Michael,5 4
the trial judge concluded that a witness had perjured himself before
the grand jury. The witness had answered willingly and unequivocally,
but the trial judge disbelieved him, believed contrary witnesses, and
accordingly held him in contempt. Justice Black, writing for the Court,
held this was improper. He said in part:
All perjured relevant testimony is at war with justice, since it
may produce a judgment not resting on truth. Therefore it cannot
be denied that it tends to defeat the sole ultimate objective of a trial.
It need not necessarily, however, obstruct or halt the judicial process. For the function of trial is to sift the truth from a mass of
contradictory evidence, and to do so the fact-finding tribunal must
hear both truthful and false witnesses. 55
Justice Black then went on to repeat what had been the message in
Hudgings-namely, that perjury alone would not be a sufficient basis
for contempt, and that something further would have to be found if
contempt convictions were to be sustained. And he added:
Only after determining from their testimony [that of other witnesses] that petitioner had wilfully sworn falsely, did the Court
conclude that petitioner was "blocking the inquiry just as effectively ... as refusing to give any [answer] at all." This was the
equivalent of saying that for perjury alone a witness may be punished for contempt. 56
Although it is not clear, the Court apparently believes that in any
situation where the only "obstruction" found is false testimony, the
falsity of which is in issue because of other evidence, no contempt will
lie, and the prosecution must rely on a statutory criminal charge.
Some state courts share the reluctance of the United States Supreme Court to use the contempt power to punish perjury;5" other
courts, however, do not. In Handler v. Gordon," a judgment debtor
repeatedly answered questions falsely (or so the judge thought) in a
proceeding to discover his assets. He was held in contempt, and the
53

Id.

54 326 U.S. 224 (1945).
55 Id. at 227-28.

56 Id. at 229.
57 See People v. Shapolsky, 8 App. Div. 2d 122, 185 N.Y.S.2d 639 (1st Dep't 1959).
See also Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 1258 (1963).
58 111 Colo. 284, 140 P.2d 622 (1943).
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Colorado Supreme Court approved, saying the perjury was "manifest"
and that it had necessarily operated as an obstruction to finding property. It suggested that obstruction could be found, if needed, in the
time required to discover falsity, or merely because lying was itself an
obstruction.
Some perjury contempt cases have arisen in either pre-trial discovery proceedings or supplemental proceedings to discover assets. 9
These proceedings do differ in some important respects from a trial
before a jury. For one thing, a judge's decision that a witness (who is
apt to be the defendant himself) is lying in a discovery proceeding is
not a usurpation of the jury's function, as it tends to be in a jury trial.
For another thing, a contempt citation, or even the threat of it, may
be a more effective way to secure an answer in discovery proceedings
than it would be in a trial. On the other hand, if the judge is mistaken about the perjury, and the witness in fact knows no more than
he reveals, or is speaking truthfully, the witness might be compelled
either to spend his life in jail or to invent some falsehood if an indeterminate "civil" contempt sentence is imposed.60 Imposition of a
determinate "criminal" contempt sentence, however, may have relatively little effect as coercion; it may be punishment and nothing else.
If so, the ordinary processes of law are preferable.
In any event, it seems sufficiently clear that at least two divergent
attitudes can be found concerning the use of contempt powers to
punish perjury. Some courts are clearly reluctant to punish perjury
if it is a part of the merits of the controversy-that is, if it is "intrinsic"
to the case. Other courts show no such reluctance and seem entirely
willing to use summary contempt powers to punish perjury freely.
Other factual situations may be grouped with these cases. In
Butterfield v. State,61 an attorney removed a page of a pleading and
substituted another that was materially different. Under the circumstances the substitution was important to the merits of the case. The
court had little difficulty in holding the attorney in contempt.
Manipulation of documents, and what is quite similar, the subornation of perjury, may be distinguished, at least in degree, from the
case of direct lying on the witness stand. It may well be that a court
unwilling to punish simple perjury as a contempt would be willing to
so punish subornation of perjury or the forgery or other manipulation
59 See, e.g., United States v. Appel, 211 F. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); Handler v. Gordon, II1
Colo. 234, 140 P.2d 622 (1943); Galyon v. Stutts, 241 N.C. 120, 84 SXE.2d 822 (1954).
60 See Section IV infra.
61 144 Neb. 388, 13 N.W.2d 572 (1944). See Annot., 151 A.L.R. 750 (1944).
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of documents. The distinction in some cases is fairly dear. For example, if a lawyer changes a document that affects the procedure but
not the evidence offered to the jury, the process of trial may be defeated
because it is not really designed to expose such deception; lawyers are
not put on the witness stand and examined about such matters. Hence,
in this kind of document manipulation, contempt may be an acceptable
sanction, even where it is regarded as inappropriate for perjury.62
Even manipulation or forgery of documents that are used as evidence in the trial may be regarded as distinct in some way from simple
perjury and hence not subject to any rule protecting perjury from the
contempt powers. It might be said, for example, that although the
truth of the document is an intrinsic issue in the case (where it is
offered as evidence), the question of how the document was procured
or manipulated is not an intrinsic issue, except in some indirect or
remote way. The document is subject to scrutiny, but the party who
has manipulated it may not be, for he may not happen to be a person
testifying.
The same is true with the analogous case of subornation of perjury. The truth or falsity of the witness's story is intrinsic to the case,
but the question whether that story was manipulated by an outsider is
only indirectly involved, and the outsider who manipulates a witness's
story may himself never come under examination on the witness stand.
Thus, it can be said that manipulation of documents and subornation
of perjury are different from perjury itself, and that this difference
justifies use of the contempt powers for punishing such behavior. The
reasoning admittedly rests on differences in degree, but most courts
do punish subornation of perjury without the reluctance displayed as
to perjury itself. 3 And in the relatively few decisions on document
manipulation, courts have not displayed any hesitation in imposing
contempt punishments. 4
62 In People v. Gerrard, 15 Il. App. 2d 301, 146 N.E.2d 229 (1957), an attorney
received a transcript from the reporter and suggested that the reporter change it to be
more accurate. The reporter changed it to conform to the attorney's recollection of what
was more accurate. On these facts the court assumed that contempt punishment would
be proper, but refused to approve it on the ground that a wilful contempt had not been
proven against the attorney.
03 In re Estate of Melody, 86 IMI. App. 2d 437, 229 N.E.2d 873 (1967), rev'd on other
grounds, 42 Ill. 2d 451, 248 N.E.2d 104 (1969) (procuring forged will and suborning witnesses to it); Osborne v. Purdome, 244 S.W.2d 1005 (Mo. 1951) (attorneys bribed witness);
see Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 1157 (1953).
04 In addition to Butterfield v. State, 144 Neb. 388, 13 N.W.2d 572 (1944), see the
interesting case of contempt by defense counsel Marx and Mrs. Huppertz in United States
v. Altstoetter, Case No. 3, 15 TR Ls oF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MIxrTARy
TRmuAus 972-95 (1949) (excerpts from transcript and contempt ruling). There, someone
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Finally, there is the unusual situation in which the contumacious
party does not commit perjury by testifying falsely, or by manipulating
a document, or even by refusing to answer, but only by failing to volunteer information to the court, where (perhaps) he has a duty to do so.
In In re Estate of Wright,65 an attorney represented the estate being administered in the court. He was entitled to a statutory fee for his representation. Without informing the judge, the attorney also undertook
to represent a claim against the estate. The judge discovered this state
of affairs and disallowed his fee and also held him in contempt of
court. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed this conviction, saying it
was a direct contempt as a "fraud upon the court." 66
If the attorney was under a duty to disclose, contempt might seem
proper, even though a failure to disclose can be viewed as a falsehood
by silence covered by the rule against punishment of perjury by contempt powers. Perhaps, however, there is a difference between failure
to disclose and ordinary perjury, which is once again the difference
between substantive lying that the system is designed to disclose and
extrinsic lying that the system is not expected to discover. If a witness
began discussion of a subject on the stand, but omitted an important
qualification to his answers so that they were misleading, this might
be perjury and subject to the rule prohibiting contempt as punishment.
On the other hand, if an attorney simply did not perform his duty as
a court's officer to inform it of a collateral matter, punishment by contempt may be entirely permissible.
It must be added, however, that other procedures might be much
more suitable. This kind of misconduct can be characterized in advance
of its occurrence and probably should be made a crime. If so treated,
the powers of contempt would not be required, and the perjurer, or
manipulator of documents, or the attorney with a conflict of interest
could be tried on a criminal charge.
4. Symbolic Acts
A number of contempt cases involve neither an actual disruption
of the trial nor an obstruction of judicial processes, but rather an invasion of the court's claims to respect and dignity. Such cases raise
removed the first page of a questionnaire signed by a Dr. Gerstaecker and filed in the case.
Then Dr. Gerstaecker was given an opportunity to rewrite his answers, perhaps with the
implication that he should change them. He did not change his answers, and a blank first
page was then substituted in the court's file for the page originally answered by Gerstaecker. Two persons were held in contempt of court.
65 165 Ohio St. 15, 138 N.E.2d 850 (1956).
66 Id. at 25, 133 N.E.2d at 857.
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several questions. How much respect is it right for the judicial branch
of the government to demand from citizens, and why is respect demanded and even ritualized as it is? Is a showing of respect either
necessary or desirable to maintain a good judicial system, or is it merely
a cultural bias?
There are a few cases in which either an attorney or a witness has
been held in contempt for failure to follow a dress code in a judicial
proceeding. In one case 0 7 an attorney was held in contempt for entering the courtroom in an open-necked shirt with no tie and no coatat least, that conduct appears to have been a part of the basis of the
contempt charge. In a New York case,(" a trial judge's attempt to prohibit a woman lawyer from wearing a mini-skirt was overruled on
appeal. These cases may represent the tip of a large iceberg, for conversations with attorneys occasioned the recall of a number of dress
code incidents.6 9
The dress cases are especially problematical. It is reasonable that
lawyers and other judicial personnel be required by court rule to wear
clothing appropriate to a serious search for truth and justice. It seems
probable that the kind of attire worn will have some effect on the
attitudes of all concerned, although any effect is apt to be remote and
important only if other means of ensuring a serious trial also break
down. Thus, the dress code of a local court may infringe personal
freedom for relatively small gains. This is especially so when it is considered how easily dress can shift to "appearance": judges have been
known to demand haircuts of parties-surely an unwarranted invasion
70
of personal freedom by the state.
67 Champion v. State, 456 P.2d 571 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969). Much of the detail must
be gleaned from related cases, Bearden v. State, 458 P.2d 914 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 960 (1970), and Crumb v. State, 458 P.2d 909 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969).
68 Peck v. Stone, 32 App. Div. 2d 506, 304 N.Y.S.2d 881 (4th Dep't 1969).
69 Several interesting cases were reported to the author. In one, a divorce hearing
was scheduled during the lunch hour for the convenience of the husband, who drove a
delivery truck. The divorce was uncontested and the husband appeared with his attorney
as scheduled, but wore his uniform. The judge refused to hold the hearing and insisted
that the husband take time off from work and come to court in a suit.
70 A case reported to the author involved a traffic court judge who required all men
brought before him to wear very short hair and required those with long hair to go to a
nearby barber. At times he sent them back to the barber for a further haircut.
Reports of judicial criticism and sarcasm at dress of parties are fairly widespread. One
newspaper editorial, headlined "Judicial Tyranny for Today's Youth," reported that Judge

Woodrow Hill met long-haired parties in his court with the remark: "Now let me get this
straight. Do I address you as Miss, Mrs., or Mister?" Chapel Hill (North Carolina) Weekly,
May 24, 1970, at 2, col. 1. The Associated Press recently reported the appeal of a juvenile
who had been found in contempt and jailed by a judge as a result of his "weird and undesirable appearance" in court. The judge had likened his coiffure and beard "to a cross
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The form of dress of a participant in the trial is not likely to inhibit
the ongoing work of the court, except in extreme cases or where the
mode of dress used has a threatening aspect, such as a Nazi Party uniform. Thus, the issue becomes the validity of a dress rule. Perhaps the
sensible approach to resolution of these conflicts is simply to adopt a
"reasonable dress" rule and to allow wide variations in it. Certainly
this seems desirable as to parties, jurors, and witnesses, but even such
a rule has the defect of failing to specify in advance what kind of dress
will not be approved, and thus may permit authoritarian and capricious
judges-who certainly exist, as many contempt cases show-to impose
their highly personal standards.
Dress is a symbolic mode of expression and a means of permitting
or forcing one into a role appropriate to the dress. 1 Other formal acts
in a judicial proceeding may serve similar purposes, and similar considerations may apply. In United States v. Malone,72 some nuns sitting
in a courtroom refused to rise when the judge entered. They were held
in contempt, even though the court might have no power "to require
. . . purely ceremonial or symbolic acts," because it was thought that
rising on the judge's entrance "probably serves to remind all that attention must be concentrated upon the business before the court .... and
[that] there must be silence ....-73
The issues here are similar to the dress violation issues, with added
overtones of historical notions about the propriety of religious submission to state authority. Religious problems aside, there is, on the one
hand, the need for some sort of solemnity to the occasion of a trial (as
anyone who has spent time in justice of the peace courts will know),
and, on the other hand, the matter of individual freedom. Once again,
the problem of providing a suitable atmosphere seems relatively remote,
and it is not likely to be a problem at all if the other mechanisms of
trial do not break down. Surely it is doubtful whether the court in approving such a contempt conviction has given a very strong reason for it.
between an Angora goat and a baboon." The appeal is based on the legal premise that
Anglo-American jurisprudence provides no "standards or judge's opinions" as to what
constitutes improper appearance. It is also founded on the historical fact that President
Van Buren's hair resembled a "koala bear" and Justice Holmes's "a cross between a moose,
a yak and an European aoudad." Ithaca (New York) J., Oct. 17, 1970, at 2, col. 1.
71 See M. RoKscAcu, THsi OPEN AND CLosED MIND (1960). This book deals largely with
intolerance of the "belief systems" of others as distinct from intolerance of race or class
of others. However, a person's dress or demeanor may (reasonably) lead others to think he
holds certain fairly well-defined beliefs. The judge's robe, the nun's habit, the hippie's
beard may all convey in symbolic shorthand the main outlines of the subject's beliefs and
values.
72 412 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1969).
73 Id. at 850.
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In some cases it may be that the judge's social or ideological bias
leads him to classify an act as contempt, even though there is nothing
inherently contemptuous involved. It may lend perspective to consider Voltaire's report of the ancient case of George Fox, founder of the
Quakers, who was taken before a justice of the peace in England in the
middle of the seventeenth century. Fox committed two acts of contempt, neither of which could conceivably have hindered or distorted
a fair proceeding: he failed to remove his cap, and he used the familiar
words "thee" and "thou" rather than the more formal and respectful
word "you." 74 He was taken to prison and flogged3 5
The judge was a part of a social system that did not embrace
democratic values, one that distinguished between those who might
become judges and those, like Fox, who might be only the sons of silkweavers. In this system respect was expected, not because it was important to a fair and efficient trial, but because the social distinction
was carried into the courtroom just as it was carried everywhere else.
The point is an important one, for it may be that in both the symbolic
act cases and in the insult cases, social or class distinctions are being
carried into the courtroom. It may well be that those who refuse to
make obeisance by rising or doffing their caps are protesting, not the
judge's authority as such, but the social distinctions that obeisance seems
to imply.
A modem example of this problem occurred in Johnson v. Virginia,7 6 where a Negro sat in a traffic court in a place theretofore reserved
for whites. He refused to move when instructed to do so and was held
in contempt. The United States Supreme Court reversed his conviction since, in substance, it was a conviction for violating the constitutionally-impermissible policy of segregated seating.
This case illustrates how a symbolic act may be regarded as very
74 The following colloquy occurred during the Chicago Conspiracy Trial:

MR. DELLINGER: Mr. Hoffman, we are observing the moratorium.
THE COURT: I am Judge Hoffman, sir.
MR. DELLINGER: I believe in equality, sir, so I prefer to call people mister or
by their first name.
THE COURT: Sit down.
CONTENPT:

TRANsCRIPT OF THE CONTMPT CrrATiONS, SENTENCES, AND It.sPONSES OF THE

CHICAGO CONSPIRACY 10, at 45 (1970).
75 VOLTAIRE, PHILOSOPHICAL LEiTrs 11-12 (E. Dilworth transl. 1961). It seems reasonably dear that Fox was indeed mistreated, and also that there was much judicial trouble
for all Quakers. See note 87 infra. On the other hand, Sewel's account of these incidents,
though it reports trouble over "thee" and "thou," does not specifically report a contempt
conviction before the justice. See I.W. SEWF.L, THE HISTORY OF THE RISE, INCREASE AND
PRoREss OF Tam CHRISTIAN PEOPLE CALLED QUAKERS 74-75 (1856).

76 373 U.S. 61 (1963).
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important by both the judge and the contemnor. For each it will express social values. To a large extent this is inevitable and not altogether
undesirable. But in a pluralistic society where differing values coexist
in the community at large, judges act inappropriately when they enforce their own values by requiring symbolic acts not directly related
to the needs of judicial administration. A judicial system that seeks
conformity to the judge's values in trivial matters will eventually fail;
it will necessarily alienate large numbers of people by ethnocentric
attitudes, and ultimately respect for the legal process will suffer. It
seems especially important, then, that judges act most moderately in
these symbolic act cases.
5. Insult and Insolence
It is generally assumed, both in the common law and non-common
law systems, that in at least some circumstances the insult of an official,
such as a judge, is properly punishable. The system of law under the
United States Constitution, however, puts careful limits on the power
to punish for mere insult. The first amendment guarantees free speech
and may prevent the use of contempt power to punish critical speech,
even when it is critical of judges and courts.77 Similarly, the first amendment permits to public officials an action for defamation against their
critics only when criticism of their official conduct is knowingly or
recklessly false.7 8 More authoritarian systems may reject these limits
and see insult of officials as a threat rather than as a prized right of
79
citizens.
When insult occurs in the course of judicial proceedings, the impact of the first amendment may be minimized by the need for a fair
and speedy trial. On the other hand, a passing insult that does not
hinder the operation of the trial is probably not a sufficiently important
matter to merit elaborate attack through use of the contempt powers.
If it is believed that the judicial system cannot bear insults and
that whenever reasonably possible insults should be punished, there
remain problems. It is very easy in the heat of trial to make statements
in anger and frustration that one would not consider making elsewhere.
And since the trial judge may be personally involved and feel personally
77 See text accompanying notes 92-96 infra.

78 See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730-32 (1968); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-83 (1964).
79 The Russian Code, R.S.F.S.R. 1960 UGOL. KOD. (Criminal Code) § 192, provides in
part: "Publicly insulting a representative of authority... who is fulfilling duties for the
protection of public order ... shall be punished by correctional tasks" for a term of no
more than one year or a fine. Article 192-1 imposes punishment not to exceed six months
confinement for insulting a policeman.
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insulted, it may be very difficult for him to achieve any reasonable perspective on the "insulting" statements.
80 the following colloquy took place in a trial
In In re Hallinan,
in which Mr. Hallinan, a lawyer, represented a defendant charged with
a battery on a police officer:
[petitioner]: And I move for a mistrial.
There have been too many comments by this court as to what
is-I ask for a mistrial now upon the ground that the Court had
no right to state that there was an assault upon Officer Gutierrez.
THE COURT: Maybe if you'd listen once, Mr. Hallinan,MR. HALLINAN: That is what you said.
THE COURT: If you listened to what I said, I said "the alleged
assault."
MR. HALLINAN: I like to hear it-to have that read back.
THiE COURT: Read it, Mr. Reporter.
(Record read by the Reporter: "THE COURT: It doesn't explain the
alleged assault upon Officer Gutierrez. This man wasn't involved
MR. HALLINAN

with that, Mr. -- ")
MR. HALLINAN: I see I am sorry. I apologize on that.
THE COURT: Your apologies are accepted, Mr. Hallinan.
MR. HALLINAN: But I do say, if the Court please, that the

rulings
of the Court have been such that I have contemplated several
times asking for a mistrial, and I'm going to do it if they are continued in this fashion.

THE

COURT: Well, Mr. Hallinan, if you are inferring that this

Court is siding with anybody here, I cite it as contempt.
MR. HALLINAN: No, I'm not saying that at all. But I say that the
restrictions that have been imposed upon the evidence are unfair
to the defendant.
THE COURT: Well, I cite that as contempt also, Mr. Hallinan.
MR. HALLINAN: Well, I'm sorry. I did not intend it as such. I have
known you for a long time. I have great respect for you.81
Reading a cold record, it is a little difficult to find insolence in the
words spoken by Mr. Hallinan. Yet the trial judge found contempt
here and sentenced the attorney to five days in jail. The California
Supreme Court reversed the contempt conviction, with the observation
that where the language itself is not insolent, a mere recital in conclusory terms that the contemnor spoke in an insulting tone of voice is
not enough to support conviction. The court went on to point out
that attorneys must be given substantial freedom of expression if they
are to work in an adversary proceeding, and it noted further that in the
"heat of courtroom debate" a certain amount of persistence by attor80 71 Cal. 2d 1179, 459 P.2d 255, 81 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969).
81 Id. at 1181 n.2, 459 P.2d at 256 n.2, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 2 n.2.
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neys is to be expected. Thus, the court said, where the words used are
pertinent, "it is not unnecessarily burdensome to require the judge
first to warn the attorney that his tone and facial expressions are
offensive .

*..."82

Mr. Hallinan won his case, but only after going to the Supreme
Court of California. What may be most significant, however, is not
that he won, but that he was charged in the first instance. This is not
an uncommon pattern,83 though in some cases even an appeal does not
yield protection, and a lawyer is fined not only for such conduct as
persistent requests for recess but also for "the manner in which he
[made them]." 8 4
There are cases in which attorneys have rather clearly gone too far,
even considering the strong policy reasons for allowing the attorney
wide latitude in the forceful representation of his client. A Mr. Schiffer,
in a famous trial involving charges of jury tampering against James
Hoffa and others, accused the trial judge of acting as an affiliate of the
prosecution and implied that he suppressed important evidence for the
defense. He referred to a "drum head court martial" and a "star chamber proceeding," saying "justice is finished in America." The court
had no difficulty in finding this to be contempt,85 and no doubt was
correct in doing so. At some point there is more involved than insult;
there is a demeanor that converts serious search for truth and justice
into a rally run on rhetoric. And it is this, not insult, that justifies the
contempt sentence in such cases.
82 Id. at 1185, 459 P.2d at 258, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 5, quoting Gallagher v. Municipal Ct.,
31 Cal. 2d 784, 797, 192 P.2d 905, 913-14 (1948).
83 See Offutt v. United States, 232 F.2d 69 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 988 (1956).
In this case, a lawyer was charged with making insolent and insulting remarks to the
trial judge and with asking witnesses questions which were highly prejudicial and without
foundation. The trial judge found the lawyer in contempt, refused to permit evidence that
the lawyer was not insulting or insolent or that the questions were relevant, and refused
to permit evidence that the judge was antagonistic toward the lawyer and his client. The
contempt conviction was reversed, and the evidence was required to be admitted.
84 In re Osborne, 344 F.2d 611, 615 (9th Cir. 1965). Mr. Osborne, attorney for a man
accused of forging government checks, repeatedly requested a recess and complained that
the court was not using normal hours. He argued that by not allowing a recess the court
was depriving him of time needed for seeing witnesses and hence depriving his client of a
fair trial. His manner was clearly aggressive and the judge described it as surly, defiant,
and contemptuous. The trial judge also said he thought all of this was done deliberately
for the purpose of making the jury believe the court was prejudiced toward counsel and
his client. But in the two pages of fine print constituting the record and judgment of
contempt, nothing more than irritating requests and spirited advocacy for recess appear.
The court apparently did not ask Mr. Osborne to cease this behavior or conduct any inchambers colloquy with him.
85 United States v. Schiffer, 351 F.2d 91, 94 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 1003
(1966).
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Several points in these cases are worthy of comment. First, it is
often extremely difficult to ascertain what went on in the courtroom
or why the contemnor is being charged. In contrast with the detailed
reporting of the proceedings in the Hallinan case, a number of cases
merely report in general terms that the alleged contemnor was "argumentative and arrogant" or that he was guilty of "open defiance" or
"disorderly conduct.""" Second, the cases that are adequately reported
often reflect misbehavior by the judge. Sometimes it is behavior that
would be regarded as contempt if committed by others.8 7 At other times
judges provoke irritable responses from attorneys by their own hostility
or unprofessional conduct. At still other times judges seem willing to
find misbehavior by attorneys or others where it simply does not exist.
Appellate courts have frequently been forced to consider the provocation factor. In In re A bse, 8 a trial judge accused an attorney of unprofessional conduct. The attorney sought to be heard on the issue
thus raised and insisted on this right until he was held in contempt.
The appellate court reversed his conviction, emphasizing his right to
be heard after a personal attack. Similarly, the judge's hostility to an
attorney has been considered relevant in judging whether an attorney's
response is contemptuous or whether it might be, under the circumstances, understandable and permissible.8 9
These two points-that contumacious behavior is often not specifi80 In In re Du Boyce, 241 F.2d 855 (3d Cir. 1957), Mrs. Du Boyce, who was attempting
to represent herself, was charged with contempt since she had a "complete misconception
of judicial procedure" and refused to retain counsel. The conviction was affirmed.
87 Judges have been known to berate juries for verdicts of which the judges disapproved, surely a contempt if committed by others.
According to William Penn's account, the judges severely menaced the jury in Penn's
case, threatening to lock up the jury "without meat, drink, fire, and tobacco" when it
brought in a not-guilty verdict. One of the judges said he would cut the foreman's throat,
and another said he recognized for the first time the "prudence of the Spaniards, in
suffering the inquisition among them: And certainly it will never be well with us, till
something like unto the Spanish inquisition be in England." When the jury refused to
vote "guilty," each juror was imprisoned for contempt, as was William Penn. Trial of
Penn & Mead, 6 How. St. Tr. 951, 965-70 (1670). The jury, however, was released on
habeas corpus. See id. at 969.
Max Radin commented bitingly that
[e]vidently a court must have dignity or it will be a bad court, although not
necessarily an impotent one. There have been truculent and brutal judgesBraxfield, Jeffreys, Kenyon-without much sense of dignity but terrible enough to
the hapless litigants and practitioners before them.
Radin, Freedom of Speech and Contempt of Court, 36 ILL. L. REv. 599, 609 (1942) (footnote
omitted).
88 251 A.2d 655 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969).
89 People v. Pearson, 98 Ill.
App. 2d 203, 240 N.E.2d 337 (1968) (the statement "your
bias is showing," in response to judicial hostility, was held not contemptuous under the
circumstances).
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cally described in the appellate opinions, and that it is often induced
by judicial misbehavior-are of special importance where the contempt
consists of non-obstructive disrespect. The necessity for proceeding
with trial no doubt justifies dealing with both obstruction and disruption by the contempt power, even though this may risk misjudgment
by the trial court. Where nothing more than disrespect or discourtesy
is involved, however, the dangers of abuse of contempt power may outweigh the benefits of using that power. The readiness of some judges
to find contempt in perfectly respectful conduct, and readiness of others
to induce it by behavior on the bench, suggest these dangers of abuse.
Finally, it should be emphasized that mere personal insult or irritating
conduct should not readily be accepted as contempt. The nature of the
trial as an honest human effort to reach a just result must be preserved and enhanced, and no person by his conduct should create an
atmosphere that makes this impossible. But personal discourtesy or
insult is on an altogether more trivial plane, and a certain amount of
that should be tolerated when it falls short of interfering with the
nature of the trial. 90
6. Out-of-Court Publications
Publications made in court will usually involve situations already
mentioned-disruption, obstruction, or insult-and will be dealt with
as such. However, a publication can also be made out of court, by
advertisement, news story, editorial comment, or otherwise. These outof-court publications are obviously not disruptive. Nevertheless, they
may obstruct the fair application of the judicial processes. For example,
if one comments strongly about what should be done in a pending case,
this may tend to influence the judge or jurors involved. It may operate
as a form of social pressure that approaches intimidation. Every judicial
system that tries to ensure both fair trial and free speech must cope
with this problem. 91
90 Judicial dignity is an important element of our system and serves a real
legal function.... It is, however, not a legal duty to be well mannered and it may
even be said that it would be unconstitutional to make it one.
But there is no reason why the dignity of the court should take such dimensions or assume such a character that it demands awe or veneration. There is no
crimen laesae maiestatis in the United States ....
Radin, supra note 87, at 610-11 (footnote omitted).
91 The French Penal Code, C. PLN. art. 227 (61e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1964), provides punishment for anyone who publishes comments tending to exert pressure on the
testimony of witnesses or on decisions of trial judges before final judicial decision. Similar
provisions appear in 452 of the 1962 German Draft Penal Code. 11 AMERicGA SERIES OF
FOREIGN PENAL CoDEs 237 (N. Ross transl. 1966).
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One solution would be to insist that all comment be reserved until
cases have been finally decided. This approach has been rejected by the
Supreme Court's holding that certain contempt citations are unconstitutional as abridging freedom of speech or of the press.9 2 Although
fair trials represent a primary value, free criticism is considered to be
the ultimate guarantor of the fair judicial process. If the press were
required to comment only after a proceeding was finally terminated,
journalists would become historians, with little to say about the judicial system to ordinary people. Thus, it has been thought that comment
on pending cases could not be automatically foreclosed.
The opposite approach would be to allow comment outside the
courtroom without any threat of contempt citations whatever. This
approach is required by statute in the federal courts, 93 although of
course it does not affect state courts.
For the state courts, unless they are regulated by state statute,
neither course is available; they may not automatically punish for published comments, even about pending trials, nor are they bound to
permit all such comments. Rather their power to punish for contempt
committed by published comment is limited by the constitutional free
speech requirement, balanced by fair trial considerations. The Supreme Court decisions hold that comment on pending cases may be
punished by contempt sanctions if, but only if, it presents a clear and
94
present danger to fair trial.
The danger, the Court has said, must not be remote. It is not even
enough that it be probable. To justify use of the contempt power to
shut off free speech, the danger must be immediate. 95 Under this standard, it seems reasonably clear that out-of-court publications expressing
disrespect for the judiciary-insult cases-are not enough to justify
use of the contempt power. Out-of-court criticism concerning a case
pending or concluded is hardly likely to hamstring the fair administration of justice.9 6 In addition, the Court has pointed out that the
protection of the judiciary from disrespect may backfire:
92 E.g., Craig v. Harney, 31 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1946); Bridges v. California, 814 U.S. 252 (1941).
93 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1964) limits the power of federal courts to punish for contempt and
specifically requires that any contempt punishments must be only for misbehavior in the
presence of the court or "so near thereto" as to obstruct administration of justice. This
in effect forbids use of contempt punishments to regulate out-of-court comment on trials.
See Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
94 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 334-36 (1946).
95 Craig v. Harney, 31 US. 367, 376 (1947).
90 In re Bozorth, 38 N.J. Super. 184, 118 A.2d 430 (1955) (clergyman's letter to news-

paper implied judge was improperly influenced in liquor matter; held no contempt, the
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The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by
shielding judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the
character of American public opinion. For it is a prized American
privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect
good taste, on all public institutions. And an enforced silence,
however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of
and
the bench, would probably engender resentment, suspicion,
97
contempt much more than it would enhance respect.
Not all of these cases are so easy, however. Some criticism goes
beyond insult and disrespect to exert social pressure and perhaps
political pressure on the judge or juror. To some extent, any serious
criticism about a pending case will have this effect. In Bridges v. California,98 one of the defendants in a contempt trial had published an
editorial saying it would be a terrible mistake if convicted union "gorillas" were put on probation. At the time, the judge had scheduled a
hearing to consider probation for the convicted men. The publisher's
contempt conviction was justified on the ground that this kind of
editorial-which was certainly very strong and in very crude tastewould reasonably tend to influence a judge's decision. The other defendant in the case, Harry Bridges, had sent a telegram to a federal
official, in effect threatening a strike in the event a certain judicial decision went against him. He too was held in contempt. The Supreme
Court reversed both convictions, however, setting forth the clear and
present danger test and concluding that no immediate danger to the
judicial process was presented that would justify curbing free speech.
In considering the probable effect of these publications on the thenpending cases, the Court pointed out that in both the judges could
not have been unaware of the points of view expressed, and would have
expected their existence in the community even if they had not been
expressed by the defendants.
A few years later the Supreme Court reaffirmed its position in
reversing contempt convictions of a newspaper publisher and writer
who had been extremely critical of certain judicial behavior.90 Here,
the Court pointed out that one should not indulge an assumption
"against the independence of judicial action" in determining the existence of a clear and present danger to the administration of justice. 100
clear and present danger test applies to writings published after decision as well as while
case is pending).
97 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1941) (footnote omitted).
98 814 U.S. 252 (1941).
09 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
100 Id. at 349.
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This same position was expressed in Craig v. Harney,10 1 where a
paper, in criticizing a local judge and reporting efforts to force him
to grant a new trial, inaccurately reported the facts. Even so, its contempt conviction was reversed. The Court thought inaccurate reporting was probably endemic to the journalistic tribe. And as to the criticism, the Court thought that "vehemence of the language used is not
alone the measure of the power to punish for contempt. The fires which
it kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to
the administration of justice." 10 2
More recently, in Wood v. Georgia,0 3 a sheriff, in a press release,
criticized a trial judge's charge to the grand jury, characterizing it as
"either... a crude attempt at judicial intimidation of negro voters
and leaders, or, at best.... agitation for a 'negro vote' issue ....
The sheriff was convicted of contempt, but the Court reversed the conviction, once again stating the requirement of clear and present danger.
Some state courts have utilized the same standard. In a recent
Virginia case, 105 an editorial criticized a court on a redistricting matter,
saying that "Judge Jones didn't have the guts to order a redistricting"
and that any judge who "can't see the inequity in such a spread in population as Rocky Mount district's 8880 and Snow Greek's 2540" is
blind.10 The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the summary
contempt conviction on the ground that, though "intemperate and unwarranted," the editorial would not clearly endanger the course of
justice and that the contempt conviction could not stand without a
showing of clear and present danger. 07
A number of other decisions seem in accord with this attitude.
Thus, an advertisement referring to an important pending test case
and expressing a point of view on it was not a clear and present danger. 00 In a Colorado case, 0 9 a newspaper editor published an attack
on the Supreme Court of Colorado. Understandably, since he did not
investigate, he had his facts distorted, and said some unpleasant things
about the court. Nevertheless, the Colorado court held him not guilty
of contempt, even though the statements were inaccurate and grossly
unfair. The court said that it was "absurd" to think that the editorial
101 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
102 Id. at 376.
103 370
104 Id.

U.S. 375 (1962).
at 379.
105 Salyer v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 662, 166 S.E.2d 110 (1969).
100 Id. at 663, 166 S.E.2d at 111.
107 Id. at 665, 166 S.E2.d at 112.
108 Crosswhite v. Munidpal Ct., 260 Cal. App. 2d 428, 67 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1968).
109 In re Jameson, 139 Colo. 171, 340 P.2d 423 (1959).
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comments would affect the court's ability to render an impartial- decision.1 n ° In a Georgia case,"' a newspaper published statements about
the accused in a criminal trial that would not have been admissible in
evidence and that were clearly prejudicial. But since these statements
were published after the jury had been empaneled, and since the primary responsibility for keeping publicity from the jurors lay with the
trial judge, a contempt conviction was set aside.- 2
Other decisions, however, seem to be unsympathetic to the constitutional standards. And, because neither the Federal Constitution
nor the Supreme Court decisions are cited in some of these cases, one
suspects that the lawyers and judges may be unaware of their relevance.
In an Arkansas case, Tupy v. State,- 3 a citizen published and distributed a pamphlet referring to a "Set-up Grand Jury." From the context,
this apparently was meant as a criticism of the circuit judge for selecting the jury commissioners by consulting with courthouse officials.
There were other charges in the pamphlet, the thrust of which was
not so clear; for example, a plot to "white wash the accused" was
alleged, without an indication of who the plotters were. 1 4 The citizen's
complaints netted him a conviction for contempt of court. Not only
does the result seem at odds with the United States Supreme Court
decisions, 1 5 but the Arkansas court's attitude seems basically unconcerned with the free speech considerations involved. The state
court did not demand proof of clear and present danger but rather
appears to have assumed such a danger existed. Moreover, the opinion
makes it clear that the court believed any critical and degrading
comments about courts would be punishable. 116
Although mere criticism of judges or abstract denunciations of the
"system" seldom if ever pose any substantial threat, some publications
may well have strongly intimidating effects, particularly on the non110

Id. at 181, 340 P.2d at 428.

III Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 216 Ga. 399, 116 S.E2d 580 (1960).

112 On quite similar facts the same result was reached in Worcester Telegram &
Gazette, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 354 Mass. 578, 238 N.E.2d 861 (1968), where the court
pointed out that a mistrial was properly granted at defendant's request. However, "[flrom
the mere fact that a written publication has resulted in a mistrial ... it does not necessarily follow that the publishers of the article are automatically

. . .

in contempt ....

"

Id. at 581, 238 N.E.2d at 863. The court, noting that petitioners had no wilful design to
affect the trial, held that a clear and present danger did not exist and that a contempt
conviction was unwarranted. But see Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. v. State, 193 Md. 300, 67
A.2d 497 (1949), cert. denied, 38 U.S. 912 (1950).
113 234 Ark. 821, 354 S.W.2d 728 (1962).
114 Id. at 823, 354 S.W.2d at 729.
115 E.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
116 234 Ark. at 823, 354 S.W.2d at 729.
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professional personnel of the judicial processes-jurors and witnesses.
No doubt there is room for some latitude in judgment in such cases. In
Dawkins v. State," 7 a grand jury apparently had been convened to consider charges that police officers were "having improper relations with
female prisoners at the jail." Mr. Dawkins circulated a mimeographed
handbill near the grand jury room which alleged that the grand jury
investigation was "fixed" in an effort by whites to smooth over the
charges. The handbill went on to say that the grand jury "is just as
racist and klan infested as the police department," and that when it
"got through lying, fixing, framing, and denying-nothing was going
to be donel" The handbill then suggested that some "Uncle Toms"
would be put on the grand jury and ended by saying that the "so-called
Negro-leaders in Gainesville" were afraid to stand up and were "a
part of white oppression." 118 The trial judge found in the contempt
hearing that the handbill was distributed in the corridor where witnesses were waiting their turn to testify, and that it could be expected
to influence their testimony. He also concluded that the reference to
"Uncle Toms" was a veiled threat to Negro grand jurors, indicating
that unless they voted "right," they would suffer the censure of the
black community. Grand jurors testified that in fact the handbill did
intimidate them. The contempt conviction was affirmed with the comment that the handbill represented not "mere criticism" but the equivalent of jury-tampering.
This set of facts represents the kind of situation in which reasonable people might well find a clear and present danger to the judicial
process, though it may be possible to conclude otherwise. The publication here was no abstract criticism, no mere defamation; it could well
have operated to intimidate, and there was in fact evidence that it did so.
Although intimidation could be found in Dawkins and contempt
therefore seems proper, the case illustrates one of the fundamental defects of the use of contempt punishments. Dawkins may well have
thought he was acting legally; no order requiring him to move was
given." 9 Few other crimes exist without a statute, and not only a statute,
but one that dearly states what is forbidden. Yet Mr. Dawkins had no
such warning, either by statute or by court order, and he may well have
believed that he was simply stating "the truth"--crusaders usually do
believe that-and that he was acting within his rights.
17 208 So. 2d 119 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 211 So. 2d 211 (Fla.), cert. denied,

393 U.S. 854 (1968).
118 Id. at 121.
319 Cf. In re Hennis, 276 N.C. 571, 173 SE.2d 785 (1970).
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In some cases the question is one of judgment: did the publication
represent a clear and present danger to the judicial process or to fair
trial? This alone is a difficult question. Other cases, however, raise more
complex issues.
United States v. Tijerina 20 is one of the latter. A man named
Reies Tijerina had dssumed leadership of a group of Spanish-Americans
in New Mexico. His group asserted that land had been taken from its
former owners in violation of the treaty terminating hostilities with
Mexico. 121 Tijerina, apparently believing that all or part of the national
forest belonged to him and his followers, led them into that forest,
asserted sovereignty over it, and, with the aid of a threatening mob,
arrested United States forest rangers for trespassing.122 He and others
were charged with assault on the rangers and conversion of certain government vehicles, probably fairly mild charges against one who claims
to have set up a rival "kingdom." Tijerina and his followers had been
involved in other political activities in New Mexico, and there is not
much doubt that they had had a considerable impact on the state, with
a good deal of attendant publicity. 12 The trial judge held a pre-trial
hearing to discuss the problem of pre-trial publicity with counsel
412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969).
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo with- Mexico, March 16, 1848, 9 Stat. 922, T.S.
No. 207. Article VIII specifically provided that Mexicans established in ceded territories
would be allowed to remain and retain the property they possessed.
Tijerina's contention seems rather dubious. The Mexicans specifically retained title
in all lands in New Mexico if they had previously owned them. When Congress subsequently donated 160 acres to every adult white man in New Mexico, provisions were made
for the Surveyor General to ascertain Mexican ownership and to set aside such lands.
Act of July 22, 1854, ch. 103, §§ 2, 8, 10 Stat. 308-09. This task seems to have been carried
out at great length and in great detail. See, e.g., the Surveyor General's work on these
claims in H.R. ExEc. Doe. No. 58, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. (1861) (recommending confirmation
of certain claims).
122 United States v. Tijerina, 407 F.2d 349, 351-53 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
843 (1969). This opinion was reported separately from the contempt conviction under
discussion.
123 For instance, the previous summer Tijerina was reported to have led a raid on
a courthouse in which two lawmen were critically wounded and a deputy sheriff and a
reporter were taken hostage. The Governor of New Mexico ordered out several hundred
National Guardsmen. Tanks were used in an effort to capture Tijerina, and the Guard
took hostages of its own, with an unusually casual dismissal of civil rights. ("Let's don't
talk about civil liberties now.') NEwvswEEK, June 19, 1967, at 37-38. In this "manhunt,"
some 50 people were herded into a "dung-filled cowpen" and held for two days without
food, clothing, or sanitary facilities. THE N~w REPUBLIC, July 1, 1967, at 10-11. According
to another report, a huge area of New Mexico was under virtual "siege" by SpanishAmericans who cut miles of fence, poisoned wells, killed cattle, and burned crops. TIME,
Nov. 29, 1968, at 17. There were further events, notably a long state court trial, but they
occurred after the events involved in the federal contempt charge. See NxvswEEK, Dec. 23,
1968, at 30.
120
121
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for all the parties. Defense counsel had previously suggested an order
prohibiting extrajudicial statements, and the court made such an order,,
submitting the proposed draft to counsel in advance. It forbade any
party or counsel to
make or issue any public statement, written or oral, either at a public meeting or occasion or for public reporting or dissemination in
any fashion regarding the jury or jurors in this case, prospective
or selected, the merits of the case, the evidence,
actual or antici124
pated, the witnesses or rulings of the Court.
No objection was made to this order. Nevertheless, Tijerina and a codefendant both made speeches at a Convention of Free City States,
which was public and which was fully reported by television and other
news media. Tijerina said, among other things:
We know that the Judge has taken the power in his own hands.
We know that the Judge is using the law to take vengeance and
drink blood and humiliate our race. In this case we can advise
the Negro pueblo of what is going on and they can come out and
march around the court house. This is their business. 125
A co-defendant advocated a war with the United States, to commence
at the beginning of the trial, and argued for a scorched-earth policy:
"We must burn every tree, every blade of grass, every building within
the kingdom."' 126 The speakers were held in contempt, and their convictions were affirmed.
This case raises a troublesome point that is also involved in disruption cases. What is to be done about the defendant who by his
own actions makes a fair trial impossible or unlikely? 27 It seems probable that Tijerina's statements, though apt to incite his supporters,
would be unlikely to prejudice the government's case at trial. Since
most jurors would probably react adversely to these statements, fair
trial may well have been prejudiced, but prejudiced against the speakers. That being so, could Tijerina appropriately be held in contempt
for prejudicing himself? 28 The court discussed the contempt question
124 412 F.2d at 663 n.1.
125 Id. at 665.
126 Id.

127 The significance of this problem has been illustrated by the current trial of Charles
Manson and his cohorts for the grotesque and widely-publicized murders of a prominent
movie starlet and several socialites. President Nixon, in a speech to law-enforcement
officials in Denver, had intimated that Manson was dearly guilty. Despite elaborate efforts
by the trial judge to shield the jurors from possible prejudice, Manson himself intentionally
displayed a banner headline of the story within the view of the jury. N.Y. Times, Aug. 5,

1970, at 1, col. 2.
128 It is conceivable, of course, that his statements prejudiced the government's case,
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only in connection with the defendants' violation of the silence order,
and did not concern itself with the separate question of whether the
defendants could be held in contempt for prejudicing their own fair
29
trial.1
Another point in Tijerina is of much broader concern. The court
used a pre-trial order to forbid publications outside the court. Assuming the publications were permissible if no order had been issued,
would the defendants' violation of the order present grounds for contempt sanctions that would not otherwise exist? This really involves
two questions: was the order a valid one? And if it was not, is it nevertheless permissible to impose sentences for violation of an invalid
order?
The court in Tijerina took the last question first. It pointed out
the black-letter rule: "When a court has jurisdiction of the subject
matter and person, its orders must be obeyed until reversed for error
by orderly review."' 130 This view has, indeed, been the law of criminal
contempt. 3 1 The Supreme Court has said that even where jurisdiction
of the subject matter was lacking, the court's order must be obeyed
until it is set aside. 132 In other words, there are situations in which it
has seemed more important to insist on orderly judicial processes than
upon validity of the court's order. In such cases, contempt sentences
have been imposed even when the defendant's only wrong was to violate
an order that itself was wrong. But in other instances it may be important to limit judicial power and correspondingly to preserve individual freedom. Thus, in some cases, not at all well-defined, courts have
refused to permit contempt convictions for the violation of improper
court orders, presumably in the belief that enforcement of an unlawful
order is itself more unlawful than its violation and more apt to lessen
13
respect for the process.
but, given the requirement that the threat of prejudice be clear and immediate, this does
not seem to have been proven.
129 What the court said in connection with the silence order, however, implies that
its answer would have been in the affirmative:
The theory of the defense seems to be that because the order was entered for
their protection, they cannot be charged with a violation. We do not agree.
The public has an overriding interest that justice be done in a controversy between
the government and individuals ....
412 F.2d at 666.
180 Id.
131 E.g., Friedman v. Friedman, 224 So. 2d 424 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Green v.
Griffin, 95 N.C. 50 (1886).
132 United States v. UMW, 830 U.S. 258 (1947). See Dobbs, The Validation of Void
Judgments: The Bootstrap Principle (pts. 1-2), 53 VA. L. REv. 1003, 1241 (1967).
133 See Ex parte George, 371 U.S. 72 (1962) (refusing to apply the bootstrap principle
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Is Tijerina the kind of case in which a court's order must be
obeyed even if it is wrong? The Tijerina court, although recognizing
an argument on the subject, assumed it was. It implied contempt
sanctions were appropriate even if a pre-trial silence order was erroneous. 134 This may be correct, but there are at least indications that
the Supreme Court might view the matter differently. Where primary
constitutional rights are involved, the Court has been careful to develop
special rules or procedures to avoid any limit on free speech that is not
absolutely necessary. For example, the Court recently struck down an
ex parte injunction of the sort generally authorized in other cases,
solely because it enjoined a rally and thus interfered with free speech. 3 5
The Court said that "within the area of basic freedoms guaranteed by
the First Amendment" an ex parte order cannot be justified where
there is no showing that it is impossible to give opposing parties a
chance to be heard.1 36 This result not only expresses the Supreme
Court's concern with the protection of first amendment rights, but it
also suggests rather strongly a situation in which a party will probably
be free to violate an invalid order. It is difficult to imagine the Court
upholding a contempt sentence where the only act of contempt was
the violation of a constitutionally-forbidden ex parte order. If a contempt sentence were permitted to stand, the rule against such ex parte
orders would have little force behind it.
It seems at least possible, then, that a contempt charge based on
violation of a court's silencing order will be upheld only if the order
itself is valid. One other case is illustrative here. In Johnson v. Vir3 7 a Negro refused to obey a judge's instruction to respect a
ginia,1
racially-segregated pattern of seating in the courtroom. The Supreme
Court reversed his contempt conviction, pointing out that the essence
of the contempt was a failure to comply with an illegal requirement
of racial segregation. In other words, the presence of an invalid order
was not sufficient to justify a contempt conviction that would not be
justifiable without the order. This decision is highly instructive. At
the very least, it shows that disobedience of an order does not per se
amount to contempt where the order itself interferes with underlying
used in United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947)); In re Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1952). Cases
often describe an error of law as a jurisdictional defect and by this device are able to
describe the court order involved as "void." By then refusing to use the bootstrap principle,
these courts can sanction disobedience of the order. See Dobbs, Trial Court Error as an
Excess of Jurisdiction,43 TExAs L. REv. 854 (1965).
134 412 F.2d at 666-67.
'35 Carroll v. President 9- Comm'rs., 393 US. 175 (1968).
1s6 Id. at 180.
'87 378 U.S. 61 (1963).
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constitutional rights. 138 This suggests that one must go further and
examine the validity of a silence order. Interestingly enough, the
Tenth Circuit must have had similar feelings, for this is exactly what
it did despite its implication that validity of the order was irrelevant.
The Tijerina court implicitly held that a silence order, followed
by contempt proceedings, could cover broader ground than could contempt proceedings alone. It apparently believed that even if Tijerina's
statements would be protected from contempt sanctions under the clear
and present danger test in the absence of a silence order, the order was
nevertheless valid. The court indicated that the clear and present danger
test did not apply where a court order forbidding speech existed, and
that such an order might properly issue even in the absence of a clear
and present danger. 13 9
Where a silence order is used, opportunity should be given in
advance to argue the issue of clear and present danger and to object
if the order is too broad or otherwise defective. On the other hand,
where an opportunity is given to all parties to be heard on the proposed
silence order, no objection is made to it, and there is no effort to vacate
it later, enforcement by contempt may be justified. A silence order
issued without this opportunity may not furnish a sound basis for a
contempt citation, but when the issue is dealt with in an adversary
proceeding, it seems reasonable to deem the issue foreclosed unless
review is sought. It at least serves as a warning, which all too often does
not exist in contempt cases because contempt is not defined adequately.
Moreover, review of such orders should be readily available, 140 espe138 Of interest here is Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). In that
case a state circuit court issued a temporary injunction forbidding an Easter civil rights
parade without a permit as required by a city ordinance. The injunction and the ordinance
were both subject to serious constitutional challenge, but the persons interested did not
attempt a challenge in the courts nor did they attempt to comply by applying for a permit.
Instead, they carried out the forbidden march and were held in contempt of court. This
conviction was upheld in the Supreme Court, but the Court implied that a different result
might have been obtained had the defendants first attempted a court challenge. "This case
would arise in quite a different constitutional posture if the petitioners, before disobeying
the injunction, had challenged it in the Alabama courts, and had been met with delay or
frustration of their constitutional claims." Id. at 318.
189 We believe that reasonable likelihood [of danger to fair trial] suffices. The
Supreme Court has never said that a clear and present danger to the right of a
fair trial must exist before a trial court can forbid extrajudicial statements
about the trial.
412 F.2d at 666.
140 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1964) authorizes interlocutory appeals from preliminary
injunctions. Possibly a silence order would be regarded as part of internal trial administration and not an "injunction," but even so, it is possible that review could be obtained
by mandamus or otherwise. See Miller v. United States, 403 F.2d 77, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1968). If
review is not readily available, perhaps-the case should be treated like an ex parte injunction case.
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cially when the court may issue a silence order using a less demanding standard than the clear and present danger test.
The contempt cases involving out-of-court publications are troublesome. They raise a difficult conflict of values, with free speech pitted
against fair trial, but indicate that where those values are in substantial
conflict with one another, the fair trial concerns should prevail. At the
same time, the cases insist that if we can reasonably hope to have both
free speech-however offensive--and fair trial, we must refrain from
contempt punishments for speech.
This resolution of the problem is not as complete as one might
like. The absence of statutory regulation of some acts continues here,
as elsewhere, to subject a complaining citizen to the danger that what
he considers legitimate activity will be regarded as a contempt by
someone else.141 The tendency of courts to react strongly when derogatory remarks are made about them still exists and may color their
decision whether or not a clear and present danger exists.
7. Disobedience of Court Orders
Disobedience of a court order can come about in several ways,
some of which have already been discussed; for example, disobeying
a court order to answer questions during trial, or violating a pre-trial
silence order. Apart from these ways, however, there is an important
group of cases involving disobedience to a more or less substantive
order.
In such cases, the moving party usually has sought an in personam
order as part of the main relief in the case. The court order is often an
injunction in some form or a specific performance order. For example,
it may be an order to turn over property to the court or to another
party, or to convey land, or, perhaps more commonly, a prohibitory
order forbidding a demonstration, a march, the continuance of a
nuisance, or the violation of a trademark or copyright.
Contempts of this kind rarely offer the serious and difficult questions presented in other cases. The element of personal insult that may
offend a judge and impair his deliberate judgment is not present here
as it is in many disruption and obstruction cases, and the free speech
142
element of the out-of-court publication cases is seldom involved.
The danger that a citizen can be held for the "crime" of contempt without knowing what is proscribed is minimal. 143
141 See Section VI(A) infra, as to the intent required.

142 When a demonstration or a march is enjoined and the free speech issue is in-,
volved, serious questions may be presented. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 US.
807 (1967), and discussion in note 138 supra.
143 Vague court orders do constitute a problem for the party who must try to comply.
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The kind of contempt proceeding used when a court order is disobeyed-other than one made during the course of a trial-is usually
a relatively safe proceeding. It often is merely a way of compelling
compliance or getting the opposing party what he is entitled to by way
of relief. In such cases, the contempt power is used much the way a writ
of execution might be used, though usually with more effect. The courts
do run the risk, however, that the contemnor did not intentionally
violate the court order, or that, in any event, he is unable to comply
with the order. This may require a court to try his subjective state of
mind-always a danger as well as something of a problem. It may also
require a court to assume that compliance is possible even though
this is not shown. In Commonwealth ex rel. Messer v. Mickelson,144 a
party who had been ordered to pay certain sums contended he had
spent the money and no longer had it.145 The court disbelieved him and
held him in contempt. There is no way to be sure that the debtor was
not being jailed for failure to pay money he did not have. By comparison, an ordinary execution writ is much safer, for property could
not be executed upon and sold unless it were actually found.
What is needed here is a more serious concern than has yet been
given to the element of wilfulness and ability to comply with court
orders. If the burden is put squarely on the complaining party to show
that the court order is being wilfully violated and that, in fact, the
contemnor has the ability to comply with it, much of the danger of
contempt would be removed. 46 But the use of the contempt power
in this class of cases remains far more acceptable than it is in many
of the cases that do not involve disobedience of a substantive order.
Happily, it was held in International Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1291 v. Philadelphia
Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 US. 64 (1967), that one could not be held in contempt unless
the court order was clear enough to be understood.
344 196 Pa. Super. 464, 175 A.2d 122 (1961).
145 It is true that the stories told on these occasions sometimes lack verisimilitude. In
Drake v. National Bank of Commerce, 168 Va. 230, 190 S.E. 302 (1937), Mr. Drake explained that he was unable to turn over $18,000 of corporate money to a receiver because,

after collecting it, he had gone hunting and lost it. Witnesses testified to Drake's good
reputation for truth and veracity, but this reputation had no doubt been formed before
Mr. Drake testified to the loss of $18,000 in cash while bird-hunting.
146 Wilful violation is generally said to be required to establish criminal (but not
civil) contempt. See McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949); United
States ex rel. Porter v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 163 F.2d 168, 177 (7th Cir. 1947).
Some cases put the burden of proof on the complaining party to show wilfulness (where
required as an element) beyond a reasonable doubt but others do not. Compare Chicago v.
Hart Bldg. Corp., 116 Ill. App. 2d 39, 253 N.E.2d 496 (1969), with Tusing v. State, 241
Ind. 650, 175 NE.2d 17 (1961). See generally Sections IV &VI infra.
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II
THE MODE OF TRiAL iN CONTEMPT CASES

A. Summary and Plenary Trials
There are traditionally two basic modes of proceeding in contempt cases. One way of proceeding is a summary hearing in which
there are ordinarily none of the trappings of the usual criminal trial:
there is no indictment, no information, no jury, and sometimes not
even testimony. This kind of hearing is typically triggered by an act of
contempt committed in the courtroom, and it is tried, usually on the
spot, by the judge who is on the bench. This may be done quite
147
informally with the announcement, "I find you in contempt."
The plenary hearing is usually more formal and more extensive.
It is typically triggered by the filing and service of some document
that operates to charge a contempt. A show cause order may be used
for this purpose, and it usually requires the defendant to appear at a
148
time certain to "show cause" why he should not be held in contempt.
Ordinarily, evidence is introduced to prove the alleged contempt. The
plenary hearing will involve a jury trial in certain serious cases, but
generally all issues will be decided by the judge.
If a full hearing is accorded, the judge who decides the case may
be a stranger to the contempt; that is, he may be a judge to whom no
contempt or disobedience was shown. However, it is quite common to
find that the judge to whom contempt was shown is also the judge
who sits in the contempt hearing. A rather mild provision of the federal
criminal rules requires the judge to disqualify himself when the contempt involves "disrespect to or criticism of" the judge personally.149
Apart from this requirement, the judge who is offended by alleged
misconduct may serve in the roles of prosecutor and judge, and this
remains true even in the relatively formal procedure of a plenary
hearing.
Generally speaking, the summary contempt power may be used
when the contempt is direct, that is, in the presence of the court, 150
147 See, e.g., In re Hallinan, 71 Cal. 2d 1179, 1184, 459 P.2d 255, 258, 81 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4

(1969).
148 See, e.g., Holt v. Virginia, 881 U.S. 181 (1965). As in that case, the state's attorney
is frequently asked by the judge to prepare the order and prosecute the contempt case.
Private attorneys as members of the bar and officers of the court may also be asked by the
judge to perform this task.

149 FED. R. C m . P. 42(b).
160 Hancock v. Bell, 274 Ala. 890, 891, 149 So. 2d 842, 848 (1968) (contempt committed
"in the face of the court"; offender "may be instantly apprehended and punished . . .
without any further proof or examination").
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or so near thereto as to obstruct the judicial processes. 151 These rules are
frequently codified in both state 52 and federal statutes. 15 3 Where the
alleged contempt occurred outside the court's immediate presence or
151 E.g., People v. Higgins, 173 Misc. 96, 99, 16 N.Y.S.2d 802, 307 (Sup. Ct. 1939)
(deputy sheriff's seduction of woman juror a contempt "in the presence of the court').
152 Arkansas:

Contempts committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, may
be punished summarily; in other cases, the party charged shall be notified of the
accusation, and have a reasonable time to make his defense.
ARsK. STAT. ANN. § 34-903 (1962).
California:
When a contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of the
court, or of the judge at chambers, it may be punished summarily. ....
When the contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence
of the court, or of the judge at chambers, an affidavit shall be presented to the
court or judge ....

CAL. Civ. PRo. CODE § 1211 (West 1955).
New York:
Where the offense is committed in the immediate view and presence of the
court, or of the judge or referee, upon a trial or hearing, it may be punished
summarily. For that purpose, an order must be made by the court.., stating the
facts which constitute the offense and which bring the case within the provisions
of this section, and plainly and specifically prescribing the punishment to be inflicted therefor ....
N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 755 (McKinney 1968).
North Carolina:
Contempt committed in the immediate view and presence of the court may be
punished summarily, but the court shall cause the particulars of the offense to be
specified on the record ....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5-5 (Repl. 1969).
Wisconsin:
Contempts committed in the immediate view and presence of the court may be
punished summarily; in other cases the party shall be notified of the accusation
and have a reasonable time to make his defense.
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 256.04 (1957).
153 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 401-02 (1964). FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a) provides for summary
punishment of contempt where the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting contempt. Otherwise, under rule 42(b), notice and hearing are required.
18 U.S.C. § 401 (1964) is derived from an 1831 statute (Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 99, § 1,
4 Stat. 487), which provided that the power of the United States courts to inflict summary
punishments for contempts was limited to the cases specified. The present statute, § 401,
dropped the word "summary" and purports on its face to limit the contempt power to the
specified cases and not merely to limit the summary contempt power. The change was
probably inadvertent, occurring as it did in the Revision of 1873, which was generally
intended to clarify and codify, not to change. See REPORT OF THE COmmISxSONFRS ApPOINTED UNDER ACT OF JUNE 27, 1866 To PROvIDE FOR THE RE ISION AND CONSOLIDATION OF
THE STATUTE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Misc. Doc. No. 101, 40th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1868). A number of mistakes were made, some of which were later corrected by Mr.
Thomas Jefferson Durant, but his report is not available, and he clearly did not fully
correct the earlier mistakes of the revisors. See Dwan & Feidler, The Federal StatutesTheir History and Use, 22 MINN. L. REV. 1008, 1013-14 (1938). Probably, then, § 401 is
intended to restrict the summary contempt power only, with the implication that in
other cases notice and hearing must be provided.
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view, it is usually denominated as constructive or indirect, and a more
formal hearing, with notice and presentation of evidence, must be
furnished. 154 In a fair number of cases, the trial judge appears to have
given at least an informal hearing to the contemnor, even where the
contempt is a direct one. 55
Although direct contempts may be punished summarily, with
virtually no trial, review is of course possible. One protection built into
many statutes is that the trial judge must state in his contempt order
the essential facts found constituting the contempt. If he does not do
so, the contempt order must be reversed. 50 The requirement that the
judge certify or specify the acts of contempt is a good one, aimed at
protecting those charged. But the certificate of the judge can be exceedingly unclear and vague even when it is quite minutely detailed, and
it is often very difficult to be sure what the judge had in mind as the
precise act of contempt.'5 7 Thus, though the certificate and specifica154 People v. Vitucci, 49 Ill. App. 2d 171, 199 N.E.2d 78 (1964) (employer discharged
juror because juror could not be at work while in court; employer in contempt, but it was

indirect and had to be instituted by show cause order).
'55 See, e.g., Taylor v. Gladden, 232 Ore. 599, 377 P.2d 14 (1962).
156 Garland v. State, 99 Ga. App. 826, 110 S.E.2d 143 (1959); Ponder v. Davis, 233
N.C. 699, 65 S.E.2d 356 (1951). In the latter case the court said in part:
There is no finding of contempt in Judge Rudisill's judgment . . . hence
it is without sufficient foundation to support the imposition of the fines.
In contempt proceedings it is essential that the facts upon which the contempt is based should be found and filed in the -proceedings, especially the
facts concerning the purpose and object of the contemner ....
Id. at 707, 65 S.E.2d at 361. See note 152 supra.
157 In United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1950), the court affirmed contempt convictions on a number of specifications made by Judge Medina in the trial of
eleven persons for violation of the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964). Judge Medina's
specifications were included in his certificate as required by FED. R. CaIM. P. 42(a). 182 F.2d
at 430-53. A few specifications of contempt were found too vague by the appellate court,
but the remaining ones were affirmed. Something of the vagueness of the specifications,
when they are subjected to analysis, is indicated in Harper & Haber, Lawyer Troubles
in Political Trials, 60 YALE L.J. 1, 10 passim (1951).
More recently, Judge Julius Hoffman specified a number of acts of contempt on the
part of seven persons charged with conspiracy and other crimes alleged to have taken
place during the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago. A number of these specifications consisted entirely of extended quotations from the trial transcript. Usually there
was an exchange between the judge and the contemnor, but Judge Hoffman did not
specify what portion of the exchange constituted contempt, nor did he indicate what
there was in the exchange that made him believe it was contemptuous. In other instances,
there was at least an arguable possibility that an earnest, honest effort was made by one
of the defendants, Mr. Seale, to argue his own case. The certificate ought to have made
dear precisely what he said and did that was contumacious. Judge Hoffman's extensive
quotations from the transcript, without other indication of his views on the conduct,
merely obscure the issue. See CONTEMPT: TRANSCaRT OF THE CoNTEMr CITATIONS, SENTENCES, AND RESPONSES OF THE CHICAGO CoNsPu.AcY

10 (1970).
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tion may tend to protect those charged with contempt and may also
facilitate review, this procedure is not always an adequate substitute
for a full hearing and n adversary process.
B. The Direct-Indirect Test
In many cases classification of contempts as direct is easily made.
Contemptuous conduct in open court stands as the classic illustration.1 8
And of course the contempt is no less direct if it comes in written form
as a part of papers filed in the case, 159 although not every improper
writing is a direct contempt. 160 Another example of direct contempt is
a witness's refusal to answer a question when ordered to do so in the
course of trial. 161
Classification of indirect contempts can also be easily made. The
disobedience of a judicial order to be performed outside the court-for
example, an order to make child support payments or to cease picketing-is clearly an indirect contempt, and the party charged is entitled
162
to a hearing in which he can deny the charge or explain his behavior.
Even refusal to obey an order to produce documents in court, though
in a sense committed in the court's presence, may be explainable if
the witness does not have the documents, and a hearing should be
158 E.g., Mayberry Appeal, 434 Pa. 478, 255 A.2d 131 (1969) (disruption, insults);
Taylor v. Gladden, 232 Ore. 599, 601-02, 377 P.2d 14, 15-16 (1962):
THE COURT: Mr. Taylor, I find you in contempt of Court.
MR. TAYLOR: How much do I owe you?
THE COURT: I find you in contempt of Court and you will be here next
Monday morning for contempt proceedings.
MR. TAYLOR: I can't express my contempt for you.
159 Whiteside v. State, 148 Conn. 77, 167 A.2d 450 (1961); In re Estate of Melody,
86 Ill. App. 2d 437, 229 N.E.2d 873 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 42 IlI. 2d 451, 248
N.E.2d 104 (1969) (the filing of an allegedly forged document said to be indirect contempt unless forgery was admitted, in which case it could be tried as a direct contempt).
160 The Supreme Court has said that a letter to the judge as to pending matters,
if contemptuous at-all, is not a disruption in open court and therefore must be tried as
an indirect contempt. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
It may be best if forgery is not treated as contempt at all. See Section I(B)(3) supra.
Likewise, there may be limits on the use of contempt to punish written or spoken
motions to disqualify the judge. Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131 (1965) (right to trial
indudes right to make such a motion); Ponder v. Davis, 233 N.C. 699, 65 S.E.2d 356
(1951) (a different judge must hear contempt charges arising out of such a motion, at
least under some circumstances).
161 See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958).
162 In re S.L.T., 180 So. 2d 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (child support); Clausen v.
Clausen, 250 Minn. 293, 84 N.W.2d 675 (1957) (alimony payments); Upper Lakes Ship.
ping, Ltd. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union of Canada, 22 Wis. 2d 7, 125 N.W.2d 324 (1963)
(injunction against picketing; though picketing was admitted, there remained issue
whether injunction applied to alleged contemnor and he was entitled to hearing).
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afforded when contempt is charged in such a case. 1 3 A juror who discusses the case on which he is sitting outside of court is surely in contempt, but he is surely entitled to a hearing on the question whether
he did in fact discuss the case, and the contempt should be classified
as an indirect one.1 4 Publications outside court may at times constitute
contempts; 0 5 if so, they are ordinarily considered indirect, and the
publisher, if punishable at all, is punishable only after a hearing.0 6
These easy cases aside, it is often difficult to know whether a
contempt can be classified as direct (and hence subject to summary
punishment) or not. If an attorney for an accused in a criminal case
leaves the courtroom without permission from the trial judge, he necessarily stops the proceedings and has no doubt committed a direct
contempt in the court's view or presence, and is summarily punishable. 6 7 But what is to be said of the attorney who arrives late or not
at all? Is his contempt committed in the court's presence? A number
of courts have said not and have held that such attorneys are entitled
to plenary contempt hearings, with notice and an opportunity to
defend,'0 while a few others have considered the contempt of non163 See Galyon v. Stutts, 241 N.C. 120, 84 S.E.2d 822 (1954), where the witness offered,
and the reviewing court accepted, such an explanation. See also In re Shapolsky, 8 App.
Div. 2d 122, 185 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Ist Dep't 1959), where a contempt conviction was reversed
after the court pointed out that proof would be required that subpoenaed records were
in fact in the defendant's possession before contempt would be proper.
164 State ex rel. Geary v. Kelly, 137 So. 2d 262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962). But cf.
People v. Higgins, 173 Misc. 96, 16 N.Y.S.2d 902 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
105 See the discussion of contempt by publication in Section I(B)(6) supra.
166 LaGrange v. State, 238 Ind. 689, 153 N.E.2d 593 (1958) (radio broadcast about
alleged plea bargaining during trial indirect contempt).
Under the federal statute, 18 US.C. § 401 (1964), conduct not in the geographical
presence of the court, or "near thereto," may not constitute a direct contempt (although
it may be conduct otherwise punishable through ordinary criminal procedures). This was
the holding in Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 52 (1941) (based on predecessor to § 401),
where two persons were charged with contempt for improperly influencing a plaintiff
to dismiss his claim. Conviction was held invalid since the act was not done in the geographical proximity of the court. In some cases it is difficult to be sure whether the court
is holding, on the basis of this kind of statute, that no contempt exists at all, or only
that a full rather than a summary hearing must be granted for such contempt charges.
The difficulty stems from the word "summary." All contempt cases are more "summary"
than are fall-scale criminal trials. On the other hand, the plenary trial in a contempt
charge does offer counsel opportunity to be heard, and so on, while the summary contempt hearing does not. When a court says the summary contempt powers of a court
cannot be invoked, it is not always clear which sense is involved, and it may mean "contempt is not a valid charge here," or it may meah "contempt is a valid charge, but a fall
hearing must be afforded." See Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 101 Ga. App. 105, 113
S.E2d 148 (1960) (full hearing required; contempt "not so near" court as to permit
summary proceeding).
167 Thorne v. Municipal Ct., 237 Cal. App. 2d 249, 46 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1965).
168 E.g., Rogers v. Superior Ct., 2 Ariz. App. 556, 410 P.2d 674 (1966).
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appearance direct and summarily punishable. 1 9 The California courts
have, at least in some cases, treated the attorney's absence at trial as a
hybrid situation, neither direct nor indirect, with the result that,
although the attorney is not entitled to a show cause order and a formal
17 0
hearing, he is entitled to an opportunity to explain his absence.
If the attorney-absence cases illustrate the difficulties of meaningful
application of the direct-indirect test, other cases illustrate the ease
with which the test may be subverted or ignored. A loosely-linked line
of cases involving some form of tampering with judicial personnel will
7 a deputy sheriff, charged
illustrate this point. In People v. Higgins,1'
with guarding a jury, took the opportunity to perpetrate an "act of
sexual intercourse with a woman juror" and was cited in contempt
for his conduct. It was held that, though the act took place in private,
it was nevertheless "in the immediate view and presence of the court,"
since the court is comprised of jurors as well as judges. 7 2 Hence, summary proceedings for direct contempt were proper.
A number of other acts are given the same treatment. The attempted bribery of a juror, though done in utmost secrecy, is in the
immediate view and presence of the court. 7 3 An assault on the judge,
though not in the courthouse nor disruptive of any proceeding, is
a direct contempt "committed during the sitting of any court," with
the result that the victim of the assault is also the judge of his own
case.' 7 4 The same may be true where the "contempt" is nothing more
than a scuffle of lawyers in the presence of the judge strolling through
a corridor. 7 5

These cases illustrate how readily the direct-indirect classification
can be subverted. One technique is to treat the word "direct" as a term
of art that does not mean what it says except through an artificial and
contrived re-definition of words: an act is said to be in the presence
'69 E.g., In re Clawans, 69 N.J. Super. 373, 174 A.2d 367 (1961), cert. denied, 370
U.S. 905 (1962).

170 Where counsel fails to appear, however, the offensive conduct, to wit, the
absence, occurs in the presence of the court. Thus, when an absent attorney
reappears in the courtroom, due process should be satisfied if the judge confronts him with the charge and offers him a reasonable opportunity to explain.
Arthur v. Superior Ct., 62 Cal. 2d 404, 409, 398 P.2d 777, 780, 42 Cal. Rptr. 441, 444
(1965). The "hybrid" designation was applied to this situation in Morales v. Superior Ct.,
239 Cal. App. 2d 947, 49 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1966).
171 173 Misc. 96, 16 N.Y.S2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
172 Id. at 99, 16 N.Y.S.2d at 805.
173 Ex parte Savin, 131 U.S. 267 (1889).
174 Newby v. District Ct., 259 Iowa 1330, 147 N.W.2d 886 (1967); Ex parte McCown,
139 N.C. 95, 51 S.E. 957 (1905).
175 State v. Buddress, 63 Wash. 26, 114 P. 879 (1911).
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of the court and the court is said to be sitting whether this is actually
so or not. A different technique is to insist that the power to punish
for contempt is "inherent" in courts and cannot be materially altered
by legislation. 16 Frequently, both techniques are used together, each
11
reinforcing the other. An example occurred in a North Carolina case 7
where the contemnors assaulted a judge near the judge's boarding
house. This was said to be a direct contempt in spite of statutory
requirements that direct contempts be committed during the sitting
of the court and that they directly disrupt the proceedings. This result
was accomplished by a broad construction of the statute, accompanied
by the alternative suggestion that if the statute were not so construed,
the court would nevertheless "not hesitate to declare the statute in
that respect unconstitutional and void.... .,178
C. Right to a Hearing
The direct-indirect dichotomy has not only been hard to apply
in many cases, it has been more or less deliberately subverted, either
by broad statutory interpretation or by a flat refusal to be bound by
the statute. Since what is involved is an accused's right to a hearing,
the results are too often bad ones.
All this suggests that a different test should be used. If one's
right to a due process hearing is to be curtailed, surely it ought to
be only on a showing of clear need, and where there is apt to be no
genuine dispute on facts. The Supreme Court, interpreting the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, seems headed toward such a conclusion.
In Harris v. United States,17 9 a witness refused to answer questions
before a grand jury. Even when the district court judge afforded the
witness immunity from prosecution based upon his answers, he continued to refuse to testify. The judge thereupon swore the witness,
asked him to answer, and on his refusal held him in contempt and
sentenced him to one year in prison. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that although this was a summary procedure, the actual contempt had not been committed in the presence of the judge. It reasoned that the refusal to testify in the judge's presence was not the
essence of the contempt because the whole proceeding served no purpose other than to comply with rule 42; thus, the "real" act of contempt
176 LaGrange v. State, 238 Ind. 689, 692, 153 N-E.2d 593, 595 (1958): "[T]he legislature has no power to take away or materially impair [the court's inherent contempt
powers] . . . :'

171 Ex parte McCown, 139 N.C. 95, 51 S.E. 957 (1905).
178 Id. at 100, 51 S.E. at 959.
119 382 U.S. 162 (1965).
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was committed before the grand jury, not the judge4 The Court held,
therefore, that the witness was entitled to a hearing on the contempt
charge, proper notice, and an opportunity to defend. 80 It pointed out
that even where, as here, the facts seemed not in dispute, a hearing
might reveal matters important on the issue of sentencing: "Whatv
appears to be a brazen refusal to cooperate with the grand jury may
indeed be a case of frightened silence."' 1
This decision seems to beat a narrower path for the direct contempt cases and stands in contrast to the broad swath cut by the earlier
decisions. If this decision is followed in the state courts, one presumesthat a great many contempts now treated as direct and subject to
summary punishment would be afforded a plenary trial. The briber,
the suborner of perjury, and the forger may all wish to dispute the
charges against them; the deputy sheriff who seduces jurors may wish
to plead extenuating circumstances or contributory temptation.
Parallel to this notion that direct contempts ought to be defined
more narrowly is the idea that the direct-indirect test itself fails to
trigger the appropriate considerations. The question, after all, is
whether a summary trial or a full hearing is to be granted; yet the
relation of this issue to the direct-indirect test is only accidental.
A good example for the proposition that a contempt committed
in the presence of the court sometimes ought to be dealt with by a
full rather than a summary hearing occurs in Panico v. United States. 8 2
In that case, the contemnor was a defendant in a criminal trial who had
been found guilty of criminal contempt for his conduct during the
trial in summary proceedings. The defense to the contempt charge was
based upon the contemnor's alleged insanity, and, in fact, he was independently found to be insane; hence, his guilt of criminal contempt
was in doubt because his intent was in doubt. The acts constituting
contempt were unquestionably committed in the presence of the court,
but it was nevertheless held that he was entitled to a hearing on the
issues he raised.
The law should be more alert to recognize the principle of Panico.
For example, there are a number of cases in which motive or intent is a
relevant issue, at least on the question of punishment. The lawyer or
party who disrupts a trial may justifiably be punished immediately in
many cases, and the "need for speed" in punishment to protect the
ongoing trial may also justify its summary inffiction. However, in
180 Id. at 166 nA.
181

Id. at 166.

182 375 US. 29 (1963). See also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
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several cases, the trial judge. has waited until the end of the trial to
punish for contempt, having saved up contempt citations: 8 3 Again,
punishment may well be proper, but if the judge can wait until the
end of the trial, it is clear there is no "need for speed" in punishment,
and a hearing ought to be afforded if those charged with contempt
wish to have one. Even if the external facts are clear because they took
place in the presence of the judge, the issue of motive or intent is
subject to exploration. 84
An appropriate response to both the difficulties and the inadequacies of the direct-indirect test may be legislative substitution of new
rules. The policies seem fairly clear. First, a full hearing should be
afforded on any disputed issues, unless for some demonstrable reason
a summary hearing is urgently needed. This should carry with it the
same rights as any other criminal trial. Particularly, it should carry
with it the disqualification of the offended or even exasperated judge.
Second, a summary power is genuinely and urgently needed for cases
in which the immediate judicial process is interrupted. It is not necessary that the contempt power be utilized in every instance of disruption; at times the trial judge will be wiser to hold the sword of contempt
over the contemnor's head than to wield it mightily. 85 This must be
left to the trial judge's discretion, but, nevertheless, the need for use
of summary procedures should be shown, and the lack of factual
issues should be clear.
The appropriate statutory language is not here important. What
is important is that the present approach be altered. A better approach
would not ask whether the contempt is direct, but whether there is
any factual dispute that would require a hearing and whether, even
in the absence of such a dispute, there is a demonstrated need for the
use of summary contempt powers. Only after those questions have been
answered can both the citizen and the judicial process receive the
protection both must have.
This shift in statutory approach would reflect what are, after all,
basic due process considerations. It is not clear how far these considerations control contempt cases under existing precedents. It is certain,
188 CONTEMPT: TRANsCaRPT OF TE CONTEMPT CITATIONS, SENTENCES, AND RSPONSES
oF TE CmCArO CONSPmACy

10, at 39-44 (1970).

184 See Harper & Haber, supra note 157, at 16-29.
185 For instance, removal 6f a contumacious defendant from the trial (with due
protection for his confrontation rights via television and electronic communication with
his attorney). See Mayberry Appeal, 434 Pa. 478, 255 A.2d 131 (1969). An alternative of
this sort has the approval, when need is shown for it, of the Supreme Court. Illinois v.
Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
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however, that they do control some cases, and that in those cases an
individual may not be convicted of contempt without a hearing any
more than he can be convicted of any other crime without a hearing.
In In re Oliver,',6 a witness was called before a state circuit judge, who
functioned in Michigan as a one-man grand jury. After hearing his
testimony, the judge-grand juror concluded the witness was lying and
accordingly held him in contempt. Both the secrecy of the trial and the
lack of a hearing concerned the Supreme Court. Although the perjury
or evasion by the witness-if it existed-was committed in the judgegrand juror's presence, the Court held that the witness was entitled to
a hearing, with a charge, notice, and an opportunity to secure counsel
and defend. The Court recognized that this contempt was in a sense
"direct" because committed in the presence of the judge. It pointed out,
however, that the need for summary punishment was not present here
as it would be in the case of a heckler in court. 87 In this situation,
where the need for immediate punishment was absent, the Court
thought that a full adversary hearing was a requirement of due process.
And it seems reasonably clear that a hearing would be required any
time the contempt is predicated upon evidence obtained from other
persons since in such cases the right to confront adverse witnesses would
come into play. 88 With these constitutional requirements in mind, it
seems appropriate to reformulate the direct-indirect test in order to
achieve easier and fairer application.
III
RIGHT TO JURY TRIA,

It is usually said that, historically, a jury trial was neither required
nor used in criminal contempt cases.' 8 9 The point has been disputed, 9 0
188 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
187 Id. at 274.
188 See id. at 275; Morales v. Superior Ct., 239 Cal. App. 2d 947, 49 Cal. Rptr. 173

(1966).
189 See 4 W. BLACmSrONE, COmmENTARIs *286-87; 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISrORY OF
ENGmSH LAw 391-94 (5th ed. 1942). The exact historical development is sometimes obscure
and sometimes disputed. But it is clear that at many times the jury was not a part of
the contempt trial at common law, either for civil or criminal contempt.
190 See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 203 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
However, there is agreement that contempts in the face of the court have always been
summarily punishable and that for several hundred years the practice has been to try
all contempts without a jury. See Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress over Pro-

cedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of
Powers, 37 HI- v. L. REv. 1010, 1042-48 (1924).
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but the Supreme Court repeatedly refused to alter this historic usage,
holding until very recently that the constitutional jury-trial requirement did not apply in such cases. 191
In 1966 the Supreme Court decided Cheff v. Schnackenberg,192
holding that when the contempt punishment in a criminal contempt
case was something more than a petty sentence, the federal courts were
required to grant a jury trial. The decision was made under the
Court's supervisory power over federal courts, not under the Constitution. The Court laid down six months as the dividing line between
petty sentences and more serious ones.
The next step was taken in Duncan v. Louisiana,93 where the
Court held that the right to jury trial for serious offenses, as guaranteed
in federal courts by the sixth amendment, was also required in state
courts under the fourteenth amendment. This decision meant that any
constitutional rule concerning jury trial in contempt cases would apply
equally to the states and to the federal government.
The final step was to decide in Bloom v. Illinois9 4 that the Constitution did after all require a jury trial in contempt cases where the
offense was more than a petty one. Whether the offense is petty or not
is judged by the maximum sentence authorized by the legislature, or,
in the absence of legislative authorization, by the sentence actually
imposed. Under the rule in Cheif, a sentence of up to six months in
jail would presumably be authorized without a jury. 195 The Court in
Bloom called attention to this possibility, remarking that many courtroom disturbances could be handled summarily since, unless very
lengthy sentences were contemplated, they would constitute petty
offenses and no jury would be required.
As with any new legal rule, a number of uncertainties are apt to
arise. One problem is whether the jury trial requirement will be
applied to civil as well as to criminal contempt cases. Probably it will
not. The sixth amendment, of course, does not apply to civil cases at
all. The seventh amendment does apply to civil cases and requires a
jury trial in those involving more than twenty dollars, but it speaks
only of suits at common law. Since the civil or coercive kind of con191 United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964); Green v. United States, 356 U.S.
165 (1958).
192 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
193 391 US. 145 (1968).
294 391 US. 194 (1968).

195 As the Court subsequently pointed out in Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co.,
391 U.S. 216 (1968), sentences shorter than six months are, under Cheff, considered to be

"petty." It is not clear whether a somewhat longer sentence would also be considered
petty. See also 18 US.C. § 1(3) (1964).
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tempt is usually thought of as equitable in nature and not part of the
common law, the seventh amendment, even if applicable to the states,
would not seem to be controlling. Of course, it would be possible for
the Court to hold that the fourteenth amendment's due process requirement imposes the jury trial obligation upon states quite apart from the
seventh amendment's terms. Because civil contempt sentences can be
quite harsh, in some ways worse than criminal contempt sentences, 196
some argument could be made for such a rule. On the other hand,
there seems to be much agreement that a jury trial is not required in
civil contempt cases, and not much pressure for a change in this rule
has arisen. 197 Even Justice Black, who championed the right of jury
trial in criminal contempt cases long before Bloom arrived, seems to
have believed that a non-jury trial was acceptable in civil contempt
cases. 198 Probably there are many civil contempt cases in which a jury
trial would be feasible and desirable; for example, the purely privateparty litigation where time is not an essential factor. On the other
hand, the injunctive order and even the specific performance decree are
often valuable and effective because they do not subject the plaintiff
to delay. Indeed, in some instances the injunctive order is the only
hope in an emergency, and this is why a temporary restraining order
is authorized. In cases of this sort, the delay of a jury trial on a coercive,
civil contempt hearing might well defeat the central purposes of the
equitable procedure. And so it might, too, in cases where coercive
contempt is used in the midst of a trial to quell a disturbance or to
elicit testimony. Coercive contempt to quiet a haranguing defendant is
probably a sound and desirable sanction, probably more desirable than
a punitive contempt sentence. Such sanctions should be available, and
they might not be available if a jury were required in civil contempt
cases across the board. On the whole, then, it seems better to retain
196 Consider, for example, the case of the man who is ordered to turn over specific
property to the court or to another party. He does not do so and defends against the
contempt charge on the ground that because the property is lost or destroyed he cannot
comply. If the judge disbelieves his testimony, the judge may put the man in jail until
he complies-which may be never if he has in fact been telling the truth. In such a case
the sentence could theoretically run the man's lifetime. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Messer
v. Mickelson, 196 Pa. Super. 464, 175 A.2d 122 (1961); Drake v. National Bank of Commerce, 168 Va. 230, 190 S.E. 302 (1937).
197 See R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 175 (1963).
198 See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 197 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting). Since
that time, Justice Black has been instrumental in increasing the right of jury trial in
federal equity cases (on a non-constitutional basis). As this right expands through judicial
construction, it seems entirely conceivable that it will even reach civil contempt. The
notable cases in which the Court expanded jury-trial rights are Beacon Theatres, Inc. v..
Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), and Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 US. 469 (1962).
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the non-jury trial for civil contempt, at least until a more detailed
classification scheme is worked out.
A different realm of difficulty arises in determining what criminal
contempt punishment is sufficiently serious to require a jury, and what
is merely "petty." As indicated, the basic dividing line will probably be
the six-month sentence, although possibly some sentences in excess of
this will be considered petty under some circumstances. However, to
draw this line is merely to open new questions. One of these quickly
reached the Court-how to treat a contempt sentence of three years
where the sentence was suspended and the offender put on probation. 199
It was clear that a three-year sentence without probation would indicate an offense requiring a jury trial.200 On the other hand, the offender,
who had violated an injunction obtained by the SEC, was serving no
time at all, and would not be expected to do so unless he further
misconducted himself. Still, the in terrorem effect of three years probation might be more serious than a six-month definite jail sentence.
In the hands of the worst sort of judge, the suspended sentence may
become a tool of control and oppression even to the details of the
offender's life, and to avoid this oppression the offender may be forced
to regulate his own conduct in ways that the law could not constitutionally do. The Court rejected this kind of thinking, however. 201
Chief Justice Warren lodged a dissent, expressing the fear that this
decision could be used to control unpopular views through probation
202
conditions.
This kind of problem raises a serious issue for states and perhaps
the Congress. If the contempt procedure is to be reformed, one of the
central problems lies in the uncertainty of both the "crime" and the
sentence. It may well be that the majority of the Court was correct
as a constitutional matter, but that as a matter of legislative policy at
either the state or federal levels, a different rule should be laid down.
This would, of course, be constitutionally permissible since the decision only holds that the Constitution does not require a jury trial;
it does not forbid one.
Another problem in determining whether the nature of the sen199 Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969).

200 The sentence in Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968), was two years, and this
required a jury trial.
201 Frank v. United States, 395 US. 147, 151-52 (1969).
202 Id. at 153. A paroled individual does not share all the constitutional rights
enjoyed by the general citizenry. For example, a person on parole may be liable to have
his home broken into and searched by officials without the full protections of the search
and seizure provisions of the fourth amendment. People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d
143, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965).
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tence requires a jury trial arises in cases where multiple contempts
and multiple sentences are handed down at once. Something like this
happened in the famous Chicago Conspiracy Trial presided over by
Judge Hoffman. 203 It certainly happened in Mayberry Appeal,204 where,
for a long series of contempts in the course of a trial, a defendant was
sentenced to a maximum of twenty-two years-not for the offense with
which he was charged, but for his contempts. In cases of this sort,
should the contempts be regarded as separate offenses so that the judge
could, without jury, impose sentence of up to six months for each one?
Or should the entire trial be viewed as one large contempt, with a jury
trial required if the one sentence exceeds six months?205 Would it not
be significant to this issue to determine whether each contempt was
sentenced at the very time it arose, or, as seems more common, whether
all contempts were sentenced together at the end of the trial?
Perhaps these questions will suggest to judges the possibility of
coercive contempts in courtroom disruptions. By and large the coercive
(that is, civil) contempt seems well suited at many stages of the trial,
06
and the now-authorized removal of the defendant from the courtroom
may also serve well in such cases. Criminal penalties assessed immediately upon a disruptive contempt may also have a sound effect in
avoiding future disturbances. If such penalties are assessed immediately, the issue concerning aggregation of sentences at the end of a
trial does not arise. With these alternatives available to the trial judge
confronted with disruptions, it seems reasonable to suggest that a
series of contempts committed during trial be regarded as unitary
and a jury trial be granted when that series of contempts may, taken
together, warrant punishment in excess of six months and when the
contempts are saved up, tried, and sentenced together. It is easy to
lose perspective when confronted by these problems, but it should
be remembered that this issue involves nothing more than affording
a jury trial to those charged with contempt where the contempts
have been "saved up" for the end of the main case, if indeed this
"saving up" is itself permissible. 207 It should be remembered, tooparticularly in a trial with wide political and social impact-that
"[m]artyrdom does not come easily to a man who has been found
200
guilty as charged by twelve of his neighbors and fellow citizens."
203 CONTEMPT: TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONTEMPT CITATIONS,
OF THE CHICAGO CONSPIRACY

204
205
206
207
208

SENTENCES, AND RESPONSES

10, at 39-44 (1970).

434 Pa. 478, 255 A.2d 131 (1969).
See id. at 488, 255 A.2d at 136 (separate opinion of O'Brien, J.).
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
See Harper & Haber, supra note 157, at 29-45; Section II(c) supra.
Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 216 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
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IV
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CONTEMPT

A. General Rules
Most courts distinguish between civil contempt proceedings and
criminal contempt proceedings. 2 9 In some instances, the distinction is
built into statutes.210 In any event, the distinction is important for
several reasons, one of which is that if the proceeding is criminal in
nature, then the constitutional safeguards for criminal trials will apply;
211
in a civil case this is not so.
The distinction is usually based on the purpose for which the
contempt sentence is meted out. If the contempt proceeding is a civil
one, its purpose is remedial-that is, its purpose is to compel obedience
to the court's order, or, failing that, to get some substitute relief for
the benefit of the opposing party. 212 On the other hand, if the contempt
proceeding is a criminal one, its purpose is to vindicate the court's
authority. The relief is punitive, much as any other criminal sentence
is punitive. 213 Occasionally courts say that contempt proceedings are
neither civil nor criminal, but are sui generis. 214 This is accurate
enough if not misunderstood. Such statements do not mean that the
classification of contempt cases as civil or criminal is abandoned;
rather, they mean only that there are instances in which special rules
must apply to contempt cases. For example, even a criminal contempt
case need not be initiated by indictment or information,213 and a
juvenile may be punished for contempt not only in juvenile courts,
but in other courts as well.216 Special problems of this sort aside, the
classification of contempt cases as civil or criminal remains the standard
approach.
There are many examples of civil contempt sentences. A defendant
209 See, e.g., Ex parte Griffith, 278 Ala. 344, 178 So. 2d 169 (1965), cert. denied, 582

U.S. 988 (1966); In re Bozorth, 88 N.J. Super. 184, 118 A.2d 430 (1955).
210 E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5-1 (Repl. 1969) ("contempt" means criminal contempt);
id. § 5-8 ("as for contempt" means civil contempt).
211 See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
212 Vanderkooi v. Echelbarger, 250 Ind. 175, 235 N.E.2d 165 (1968); Winter v. Crowley,
245 Md. 313, 226 A.2d 804 (1967); Godard v. Babson-Dow Mfg. Co., 319 Mass. 345, 65
N.E.2d 555 (1946).
213 See, e.g., State v. Mancari, 43 Del. Ch. 236, 223 A.2d 81 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Shiflet v.
State, 217 Tenn. 690, 400 S.W.2d 542 (1966).
214 See Jencks v. Goforth, 57 N.M. 627, 261 P.2d 655 (1953).
215 See Section II(A) supra, as to summary and plenary trials.
216 Young v. Knight, 329 S.W.2d 195 (Ky. 1959); Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1004 (1961).
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refuses to make a conveyance as ordered in a specific performance
suit; he is in contempt and may be jailed until he signs the deed
required. 217 A defendant refuses to pay alimony as ordered or to
permit a former spouse the right to visit children as provided in a
decree; he is in contempt and may be jailed until he complies or shows
a willingness to do so.218 A defendant continues to trespass in violation
of an injunction; he is in contempt and may be jailed until he shows
a willingness to obey.21 9 In all these cases the contempt sentence is
coercive and remedial in the realistic sense that it is aimed at forcing
the defendant to comply with the decree by relieving him of a sentence
if he does so.
There are likewise many examples of criminal contempt sentences.
A defendant commits an outburst in the courtroom during a trial; he
is in contempt and may be sentenced to a definite period in jail.220
A lawyer insults the judge during the trial; he is in contempt and may
be fined. 22' A defendant violates an injunction; he is in contempt and

may be fined or imprisoned for a definite time, such as thirty days. 222
It is enough to justify the criminal proceeding that the court's authority
is flouted, and it is enough to identify the proceeding as a criminal
223
one if the sentence is definite and punitive rather than coercive.
Any contempt may be punished by criminal sanctions, but some
contempts may not be punished by civil sanctions. For example, in
the case of an injunction that forbids a May Day sit-in, a violation
of the order is not remediable, although it is surely punishable. The
plaintiff who sought to prohibit the May Day sit-in cannot now get
what the court ordered. Imprisonment in such a case will be neither
coercive nor remedial since it will not force the defendant to comply
with the order that has already been conclusively violated.
As these examples clearly show, the classification is of the contempt proceeding or the sentence, not of the act of contempt; that is,
a given contemptuous act may be subjected to both civil and criminal
sanctions and both sanctions may be imposed in a single proceeding,
217 Seventy-Six Land &Water Co. v. Superior Ct., 93 Cal. 139, 28 P. 813 (1892); see
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).

218 Goetz v. Goetz, 181 Kan. 128, 309 P.2d 655 (1957) (wife refused to give husband
visitation rights prescribed by court order; coercive imprisonment would be proper, but
not criminal sentence).
219 See Cliett v. Hammonds, 805 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1962).
220 Mayberry Appeal, 434 Pa. 478, 255 A.2d 181 (1969).
221 See Champion v. State, 456 P.2d 571 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969).
222 Brown v. State, 89 Okla. Crim. 443, 209 P.2d 715 (1949) (reflecting statutory
limits on determinate, criminal contempt sentences).
223 E.g., Demetree v. State ex rel. Marsh, 89 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1956).
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provided proper constitutional protections are afforded. 24 The court
may wish to vindicate its authority by levying a criminal sentence; at
the same time, it may wish to coerce compliance with its decrees for
the benefit of the other parties. If the court does both, it will be using
both criminal and civil contempt powers.
A corollary to this notion is that a criminal contempt proceeding
may grow out of a civil case, or a civil contempt proceeding may grow
out of a criminal case. 225 For example, a defendant in a civil action
in equity may disrupt the courtroom and the judge might summarily
fine or imprison him for contempt to vindicate the court's authority.
This would be a criminal contempt sentence. 226 On the other hand, if
a defendant in a criminal case disrupted the court during the trial
and refused to answer questions, the judge might remand him to
custody until he expressed a willingness to permit orderly processes to
continue and to answer questions. This would be a coercive-and
hence civil-contempt sentence. 227
As all these examples indicate, the coercive feature of the civil
contempt sentence is reflected in its indeterminate nature. The contumacious party need not stay in jail for any definite term; he may get
out at will. He need only purge himself of his contempt by complying
or showing a willingness to comply with the court's order. This is
classically expressed in the aphorism that the person imprisoned for
civil contempt carries the keys to the jail in his own pocket. 228 The
hallmark of the criminal sentence, on the other hand, is that it is
determinate. At least in theory, no amount of repentance will remit the
criminal sentence. Thus, although even a civil sentence may involve
imprisonment, there is an important difference in the two kinds of
sentences.

As already indicated, there is no theoretical barrier to the use of
both civil and criminal contempt powers simultaneously, though pro224 United States v. UMW, 30 U.S. 258 (1947); State v. Our Chapel of Memories,
Inc., 74 N.M. 201, $92 P.2d 347 (1964). See Songer v. State, 286 Ark. 20, 864 S.W.2d 155
(1963), where the court affirmed a contempt conviction on the ground that if it was a

civil contempt it was correctly imposed and that if it was a criminal contempt review by
certiorari was so limited that an affirmance was required.
225 In re Hege, 205 N.C. 625, 172 S.E. 845 (1934). Occasional implications to the contrary are usually qualified or contradicted later. See, e.g., State ex rel. Anderson v. Daugherty, 137 Tenn. 125, 191 S.W. 974 (1917).
226 E.g., Mayberry Appeal, 484 Pa. 478, 255 A.2d 131 (1969).
227 Ex parte Griffith, 278 Ala. 344, 178 So. 2d 169 (1965), cert. denied, 882 U.S. 988
(1966) (inquiry into ethics of attorney's practices); cf. Uphaus v. Wyman, 860 U.S. 72 (1959)
(in attorney general's one-man investigation of subversive activities in New Hampshire,
coercive contempt used to force contemnor to turn over records of World Fellowship, Inc.).
228 In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902).
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cedural demands may put practical limits on such an operation. The
sentences would necessarily be meted out separately, and the constitutional demands for criminal trials would necessarily be observed
throughout the hearing. It would probably be difficult to obtain much
coercive effect from an indeterminate sentence during the period when
the contumacious defendant is in jail on the determinate criminal
sentence. As a practical matter, then, courts using a coercive civil contempt sentence seldom seem to combine it with a determinate criminal
contempt sentence. The usual technique is to seek the dominant purpose of the proceeding and to classify accordingly. Occasionally courts
express the rule more stringently and say that if any part of the
contempt sentence is punishment for an affront to the law, the contempt
229
must be classified entirely as a criminal one.
In any event, although both criminal and civil sanctions are
theoretically available for the same acts of contempt, courts may not
validly hold a civil contempt hearing and then impose a determinate
criminal sentence. In Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 230 Mr.
Gompers and other labor leaders were enjoined from boycotting the
plaintiff, Bucks Stove, or including it on any "Unfair" list. Defendants did certain acts in violation of this injunction, and Bucks Stove
petitioned the court to hold them in contempt. The trial court issued
an order requiring the defendants to show cause why they should not
be held in contempt, and there was a hearing on the issue. Bucks called
defendants to the witness stand as adverse witnesses and sought to prove
the alleged contempt by their testimony. When the hearing was concluded, the trial court found that acts of contempt had been committed
and sentenced the defendants to several months in jail. The Supreme
Court reversed these convictions. It pointed out, among other things,
that the case was tried as a civil case and was so regarded by the parties.
Indeed, since the defendants were called to testify against themselves,
the contempt hearing had to be a civil one, or else the constitutional
protections applying to criminal cases were violated. Since the case was
a civil one, the criminal sentence-determinate and non-coercive231
could not properly be meted out.

229 Godard v. Babson-Dow Mfg. Co., 319 Mass. 345, 65 N.E.2d 555 (1946). The court
said in part:
If the penalty is not imposed wholly for the benefit of the aggrieved party, but
in part at least is punishment for the affront to the law, the contempt is deemed
criminal. If, on the other hand, the power of the court is used only to secure to
the aggrieved party the benefit of the decree . . . then the contempt is deemed
civil.
Id. at 347, 65 N.E.2d at 557 (emphasis added).
230 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
231

Id. at 444.
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The basic rules, then, are purportedly simple: (1) one distinguishes
a criminal contempt proceeding from a civil contempt proceeding by
the purpose involved, usually revealed by the sanction applied; if the
purpose is coercive or remedial, the contempt proceeding is a civil one,
if purely punitive, the proceeding is a criminal one; (2) criminal contempt hearings must, by and large, comply with the rules for other
criminal trials, with an exception in some instances as to jury trial
requirements. Two broad areas of qualification must now be reached.
First, there are a few deviant tests of the distinction between civil and
criminal contempt cases which must be considered. Second, the difficult
problem of applying the rules stated above must also be examined.
B. Deviant Statements of the Distinction
In Gompers, the leading American case on contempt, the Supreme
Court laid down the basic distinction already mentioned: a criminal
contempt proceeding is purely punitive while a civil contempt proceeding is, mainly at least, coercive. However, the Court implied that
the distinction might turn at times on other matters, or at least that
other matters might be used as evidence on the issue. The Court
suggested, for example, that the character of the proceeding might be
determined, at least in part, if a private party commenced it rather than
the state's attorney. 28 2 This kind of evidence-if evidence it is-has not
gained much eminence in contempt cases, though it occasionally crops
up. If the main test is the coercive or non-coercive function of the hearing, then it hardly seems important to know how the hearing was
commenced. On the other hand, how the contempt hearing was commenced, and by whom, as well as the procedures by which it was tried,
are all relevant to the question whether the alleged contemnor was
fairly apprised of the charges or claims against him. If proper notice is
what is important-and it will be suggested later that in part it is-then
the question of who commenced the contempt hearing will indeed be
relevant. And so will questions of how the papers are styled, what
testimony was produced, and what privileges were accorded the parties.
The Gompers case is also the source of another deviant test for
distinguishing civil and criminal contempt. The Gompers Court said:
[IMmprisonment for civil contempt is ordered where the defendant
has refused to do an affirmative act required by the provisions of an
order which, either in form or substance, was mandatory in its
character...
On the other hand, if the defendant does that which he
has been commanded not to do, the disobedience is a thing accom282 Id. at 446.
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plished. Imprisonment cannot undo or remedy what has been done
... [and in such a case] imprisonment operates, not as a remedy
coercive in its nature, but solely as punishment for the completed
2
act of disobedience. 3
The quoted passage is accurate enough, and entirely consistent
with the same Court's basic distinction between coercive and punitive
sanctions for contempts. This language merely means that the sanction
is necessarily a criminal one if nothing is left to coerce. Where the
defendant has violated a single order and is under no continuing
obligation, it is clear enough that only a punitive sanction is possible
since no imprisonment can "undo or remedy what has been done."
An illustration used earlier makes this point: if the defendant is
ordered not to engage in a May Day sit-in, but does so anyway, his
conduct is complete and the order is irremediably broken. Any sanction
can only be punitive and hence "criminal." The distinction between
mandatory orders and prohibitory ones is only illustrative of this point.
For instance, a prohibitory order might enjoin trespasses for all future
times. If a defendant so enjoined violates the order once, there is still
something left to coerce; a civil contempt would therefore be appropriate since it could be used to compel compliance for the future, even
though the past trespass cannot be remedied specifically. Furthermore,
to the extent that compensatory fines are used in contempt proceedings,2 34 even a past act can, in some sense, be remedied. The distinction
between mandatory and prohibitory orders in Gompers, then, was not
intended to be a major test; rather, it was merely indicative of cases
in which contempt sanctions could be coercive and hence civil. 2 5
Still another deviation occurs. Courts sometimes speak of the
difference between civil and criminal contempt as a difference in
whether the contemnor violates an order made for the benefit of an
adverse party or whether he is disrespectful of the court.2 38 This is
probably a case of loose language rather than a real attempt to use a
different measure of contempt. It is entirely clear that the violation
of an order made for the benefit of an adverse party can be punished
233 Id. at 442-43.
234 See Section VII(C)(2) infra.

285 Most cases are in accord with this result. Eg., Drake v. National Bank of Commerce, 168 Va. 230, 190 S.E. 302 (1937). In State ex rel. Anderson v. Daugherty, 137
Tenn. 125, 191 S.W. 974 (1917), the court used the basic Gompers distinction, but said
civil contempts arose "in a civil case." This seems to be a matter of misunderstanding
Gompers, and on certain facts it is carried forward in Tennessee today. Shiflet v. State, 217
Tenn. 690, 400 S.W.2d 542 (1966).
2386 See Holt v. McLaughlin, 357 Mo. 844, 210 S.W.2d 1006 (1948); Brown v. State, 89
Okla. Crim. 443, 209 P.2d 715 (1949); cf. State v. Jackson, 147 Conn. 167, 158 A.2d 166

(1960).
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241

as a criminal contempt, that is, with a determinate sentence and in a
criminal-type trial. It is also clear that disrespect of the court can be
handled coercively, that is, by civil contempt to force the contemnor
to behave in court. It is, then, fairly uninformative to suggest a difference based on the purpose of the order in the main case. Courts that
say things of this sort often end up with self-contradictory statements:
Contempts may be civil or criminal. In a civil contempt the contemnor violates a decree or order of the court made for the benefit
of an adverse party litigant. In a criminal contempt a court's process is violated or disobeyed and disrespect of the court is mani-

fested.

237

The barest analysis reveals how useless the statement is to discriminate
between two kinds of contempt. Violation of a decree made for the
benefit of an adverse party-a specific performance decree, for example-is said to be a civil contempt; disrespect for the court or violation
of its process is said to be criminal. But violation of a decree made for
the benefit of an adverse party certainly qualifies as violation of the
court's process and as disrespect as well. The net result is that the conduct referred to can be either criminal or civil, and definitions of this
kind do not help us distinguish the two at all.
The deviant tests are not very important because they seldom if
ever directly affect results of cases; courts do not follow the deviations
even when they state them. 238 The deviant tests do, however, tend to
confuse an already confused subject.
C.

Consequences of the Distinction

As already indicated, the classification of a contempt case as
criminal or civil has a number of important consequences. If the case
287 State ex rel. Oregon State Bar v. Lenske, 243 Ore. 477, 480, 405 P.2d 510, 512
(1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 943 (1966).
238 In State ex rel. Oregon State Bar v. Lenske, id., an attorney had been suspended

and by fair implication an order had been entered ordering him not to engage in further
practice of law. The court defined the difference between civil and criminal contempts
with the language quoted in the text accompanying note 237 supra. However, it classified
the proceeding as a criminal contempt, though apparently the contempt arose out of
disobedience of an order of the court in a suit by the Oregon State Bar (a party litigant).
Furthermore, as often happens, nothing whatever seems to have turned on the question
whether the contempt was civil or criminal.
In Brown v. State, 89 Okla. Crim. 443, 209 P.2d 715 (1949), a closely similar definition
of criminal and civil contempt was adhered to, and the court said that disobedience of
an injunction was a criminal contempt because disobedience of a court order shows disrespect and tends to obstruct justice. This illustrates the ease with which the definition
can be manipulated. Again in Brown, as in Lenske, this deviation made no difference.
The trial court clearly had a criminal contempt conviction in mind, for it sentenced the
defendant to one year in the penitentiary. The appellate court held this in error because a
statute limited the punishment for criminal contempts.
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is a criminal one, almost the entire panoply of criminal safeguards
comes into play. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, 239 the party
charged cannot be required to testify against himself,240 cannot be put
in double jeopardy, 241 and cannot be tried without appropriate notice
of the charge. 24 Inferentially at least, he is entitled to counsel and to
compulsory process for bringing in his witnesses. 243 He is now entitled
to a jury trial if the criminal sentence is a potentially serious one.244
As with other crimes, intent is an element of criminal contempt, and
it must be proven before criminal punishment can be inflicted,245
though intent to violate the court's order is not an issue in a civil
contempt proceeding. 246 The problem of intent and inability to comply
with court orders is, however, a complex one, and it is treated more
fully elsewhere. 24 7 The classification of a contempt hearing as a criminal
one may also affect the right of appeal or the route that an appeal
takes. 24 1 At least in some criminal contempt cases, the state should be
a party to any appeal proceedings. 24 9 The criminal classification will also
239 Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 266 US. 42, 66
(1924); Hood v. United States, 326 F.2d 33, 34 (5th Cir. 1964); Cancellieri v. De Modica, 57
NJ. Super. 598, 603, 155 A.2d 167, 170 (1959).
240 Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911); Parker v. United
States, 153 F.2d 66, 70 (Ist Cir. 1946). The privilege against self-incrimination may apply
in a civil trial if the testimony sought to be elicited is incriminatory on some criminal

matter.
241 In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943); State v. Mancari, 43 Del. Ch. 236, 223 A.2d 81
(Sup. Ct. 1966). In Bradley, the Court attempted to change the sentence by returning a
fine paid and imposing a sentence of imprisonment. This was held impermissible in a brief
opinion with a citation to Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874). The Lange case,

on somewhat similar facts, but not involving contempt, held that a new sentencing of
this sort violated the double jeopardy clause, commenting: "[O]f what avail is the constitutional protection against more than one trial if there can be any number of sentences
pronounced on the same verdict?" Id. at 173.
242 "Due process of law, therefore, in the prosecution of contempt, except of that
committed in open court, requires that the accused should be advised of the charges and
have a reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or explanation." Cooke v.
United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925); accord, Yates v. United States, 316 F.2d 718 (10th
Cir. 1963): "[D]ue process requires that such notice-in this case the order to show cause
-should contain enough to inform him of the nature and particulars of the contempt
charged." Id. at 723 (footnote omitted).
243 See United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 364 n.30 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
244 Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
245 United States ex rel. Porter v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 163 F.2d 168 (7th
Cir. 1947).
246 McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187 (1949).
247 See Section VI infra.
248 E.g., State v. Jackson, 147 Conn. 167, 158 A2d 166 (1960).
249 Welborn v. Mize, 107 Ga. App. 427, 130 S.E2d 623 (1963).
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invoke the pardoning power of the state, which, of course, would not
2 50
exist in civil cases.
There are disadvantages for the party charged if his contempt case
is classified as a criminal one. Any fine levied is not dischargeable in
bankruptcy.2 51 Moreover, he may be held in criminal contempt for
violating an order that is later reversed since it may be important to
vindicate judicial power even when it is erroneously exercised.25 2 In
at least some cases, this same principle applies when the court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter, and a criminal contempt sentence
253
may stand even though there was no jurisdiction.
Civil contempt cases are not altogether different, of course. Even
in civil cases, apart from the summary contempts in open court, some
sort of hearing and notice is ordinarily required, though the form of
hearings may be somewhat less significant here. But proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is not required as it is in criminal cases, 254 and,
though no doubt res judicata rules will apply to civil contempt cases,
255
the double jeopardy provisions will not.

Perhaps the most important result of the distinction between civil
and criminal contempt is the rule that if a contempt procedure is
criminal in nature, the sentence must be a determinate one, while if
it is civil in nature, the sentence must be coercive. It is true that the
nature of the contempt is sometimes determined from the nature of
the sentence, and the contempt is called a criminal one if the sentence
is determinate. In other cases, however, this cannot be done. For
instance, the court may already have decided that the contempt is a
250 See Beale, Contempt of Court, Criminal and Civil, 21 HAv. L. REV. 161, 168

(1908).
251 Parker v. United States, 153 F.2d 66 (1st Cir. 1946) (civil contempt fine dischargeable, criminal contempt fine not).
252 Mathison v. Felton, 90 Idaho 87, 408 P.2d 457 (1965), is illustrative. Defendant was
restrained from interfering with public access to a road. When he allegedly continued to
interfere, he was held in contempt and two sanctions were imposed; first, he was fined
$500; second, he was sentenced to jail with a provision for suspension of the sentence
should he comply. The injunctive order was reversed, and it was determined there were
no public rights in the road. The fine was, however, affirmed on the ground that even an
erroneous order represents judicial authority that may not be flouted. The coercive portion of the sentence was set aside since, on reversal of the main judgment, there was
nothing left to coerce.
253 The conventionally stated rule is that one is free to violate a "void" order and
is not in contempt in so doing. Shapiro v. Ryan, 233 Md. 82, 195 A.2d 596 (1963); see
Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 1059 (1950). Where the "bootstrap" principle applies, however, there
may be criminal punishment for contempt even of certain orders made without jurisdiction
of the subject matter. United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); see Dobbs, supra note 132.
254 E.g., Songer v. State, 236 Ark. 20, 364 S.W.2d 155 (1963).
255 See City of Macon v. Massey, 214 Ga. 589, 106 SXE.2d 23 (1958).
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criminal one, perhaps because the state initiated the proceeding and
because fifth amendment rights were claimed and allowed. In such
a case, the contempt hearing having already been denominated a
criminal one, the sentence must be determinate. 256 By the same token,

if the proceeding is determined to be a civil one, the sentence must be
25 7
coercive, and it must be lifted when its coercive feature terminates.
Courts often blur the distinction between determinate and indeterminate sentences. One device that blurs the distinction-some might
say obliterates it-is the sentence that is determinate in form, but that
is suspended on condition of compliance. 258 This was the device used

in Jencks v. Goforth,259 a case which, in its time, drew a good deal of
comment. In that case, the New Jersey Zinc Company brought an
action against a union and associated individuals to enjoin trespassing
and blocking of roads. The injunction was first issued as a temporary
restraining order, and then, after a hearing, was made permanent. Two
days later, the company claimed violations had taken place and filed a
motion for a show cause order. After another hearing the trial judge
found the defendants had violated the injunction and held them in
contempt. He fined them $4,000 each and sentenced individuals to
ninety days in jail, with the proviso, however, that half the fine and all
the jail sentence would be remitted or suspended if no further violations took place in the succeeding year. Further violations did take
place, and accordingly the suspension was revoked and the original
sentence imposed-but long after the controversy between the company
and the union had been settled. The New Mexico Supreme Court held
all this to be a proper civil contempt sanction. "As of the day this particular decree was entered, and it is that day which controls, the decree
was truly coercive" because each defendant could have avoided the
punishment stated by complete future obedience. 260 The court reiter261
ated this position in a subsequent review of the same case.
These decisions received some criticism at the hands of law review
writers. 262 It was suggested that the governing date should be the date
on which the suspension was revoked, not the earlier date on which
the sentence was first suspended. The reasoning here would no doubt
256 Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911); see 67 HARv. L. R.v.
889 (1954); 89 MINN. L. RE.v. 447 (1955); 1 U.C.LA.L. RELV. 220 (1954).
257 Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966); 39 MINN. L. REv. 447 (1955).
258 See 67 HARV. L. REv. 889 (1954); 39 MINN. L. REv. 447 (1955).
269 57 N.M. 627, 261 P.2d 655 (1958).
260 Id. at 636, 261 P.2d at 661.
261 Local 890, Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 58 N.M. 416, 272
P.2d 822 (1954).
262 See note 256 supra.
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be that the date on which punishment is actually meted out is the more
realistic date for assessing whether it is coercive or not, and that,
once the dispute between the parties is over, the sentence could hardly
be coercive. 0 3 On the other hand, it must not be overlooked that the
suspended sentence, conditioned on compliance in the future, is certainly coercive at the time it is first handed down. There is no obvious
reason why one must look only to the date when the suspension is
revoked and the sentence actually enforced to test its coercive effect.
Yet it may be wrong to attempt a solution based purely on logic
here. There is no ready basis for the selection of one premise over
another or of one date over another. It seems clear enough that a
suspended sentence must have coercive effect; but it also seems clear
that, once the parties' dispute is at an end, any punishment rendered
for a purpose that is then non-coercive will be apt to leave the punished
party with a sense of injustice, and it may seriously impair the on-going
relations of the parties themselves. The suspended sentence technique,
then, seems to be a dubious one, particularly if there are other coercive
alternatives available. Nevertheless, courts appear to use this264 or
similar techniques without much forethought.2 6 5
The consequences of the distinction between civil and criminal
contempt are, then, quite significant, but the application of the distinction is often difficult and the differences are often blurred.
D. Analysis and Proposals
The confusion surrounding the criminal-civil distinction is an
unfortunate one, and costly as well, for it prevents effective use of
contempt powers within constitutional bounds. Actually, the effort
by reviewing courts to label the case as a criminal or as a civil one is
often an exercise in futility. One can reason that a case is a criminal
one and hence that the criminal law protections must be afforded
the accused. 266 One might equally well reason that, since criminal law
procedural safeguards were not afforded, the case must have been a
263 39 MINN. L. R:-v. 447, 450 (1955).
264 E.g., State ex rel. Lay v. District Ct., 122 Mont. 61, 198 P.2d 761 (1948). Here, the
sentence was five days in jail and a $200 fine (payable by serving time in jail at the rate of

$2 a day). This was suspended on condition that the defendant make certain child-support
payments to the plaintiff, his former wife. In this situation, the suspended sentence technique may be justified on the ground that the alternatives are less effective than they are
in cases like that mentioned in the text.
265 See Section VII infra, on sanctions for contempt, and particularly the discussion
of the in terrorem fine, notes 389-91 and accompanying text infra.
266 E.g., State ex rel. Sandquist v. District Ct., 144 Minn. 326, 175 N.W. 908 (1919).
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civil one.267 Or one might reason, not from the procedure but from
the sentence meted out, that the case was criminal or civil and that
the procedure should be adjusted accordingly.
The fact is that most of this is not only confusing, it is also unnecessary. In each case supposed, a reviewing court could reverse, whatever
classification is used, simply because procedure and sentence were not
compatible. It is enough to say that a determinate ("criminal") sentence
cannot be meted out where criminal-type protections are not afforded
in the procedure. It is not necessary to say more.
The process of classification of contempt hearings into civil and
criminal cases has probably made matters worse rather than better.
The classification process, if it worked at an ideal level, would serve
to remind judges, lawyers, and parties to consider the following:
1. There are options in dealing with any contempt found; sanctions may be coercive or they may be non-coercive and punitive.
2. If there is a risk that a punitive, non-coercive sanction may be
imposed, the party charged with contempt should know of this in
advance.
3. If there is a risk that a punitive, non-coercive sanction may be
imposed, the hearing must be conducted largely according to the rules
of criminal procedure-contempt must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, the party charged must have an opportunity to confront accusers, the party cannot be forced to testify against himself, and so on.
4. If the criminal procedures are not used, a determinate sentence, such as imprisonment for a given number of days or a fine of a
set amount, is not proper.
These considerations are important because they go to basic rights.
They also go to matters of good judgment. (For instance, the trial
judge needs to be very much aware of his options in sentencing if he
is to be effective.) If the classification of contempt hearings into civil
and criminal did indeed uniformly remind judges, lawyers, and parties
of these factors, the process would be a highly satisfactory one. But the
classification scheme breaks down in confusions, and courts are apt
to talk of contempts themselves (rather than the hearings) as criminal
or civil, and in the same opinion may adopt both the basic test of purpose and some deviant variation on it. Sanctions for contempt are often
not meted out thoughtfully and effectively, partly because of this confusion between civil and criminal. In short, the abstract distinctions
between civil and criminal contempt have not worked very well.
267 See Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 COLum. L. REv.
780 (1943).
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Of course, it is not possible to abolish the substance of the
rules involved. We could not constitutionally provide by statute an
arrangement whereby the contempt hearing could be tried on a preponderance-of-evidence standard and then result in a two-year determinate sentence. Nor would we want to do so. Yet we can avoid the
definitions and confusion built into the distinction between criminal
and civil contempt punishments and hearings by developing an operational definition rather than an abstract one. In other words, by
providing in a statute exactly what is to be done rather than by
describing a theory.
A statute might, for instance, begin by requiring the trial judge
to state whether coercive or non-coercive sanctions or both were possible
results of any contempt hearing. This would serve, first, to remind
the judge of the options available to him and to warn the party charged
exactly what was in jeopardy at the hearing. Second, such a statute
might set forth a rule that if non-coercive (punitive) sanctions are
possible, criminal procedure must be followed. This would serve to
remind all parties, and the trial judge, what procedures are necessarily
involved. Third, the statute could set forth the rule that coercive
sanctions may be used in any case where they are an announced
possibility, and that non-coercive sanctions may be used only where
the procedure at the hearing complies with that in other criminal
cases. (A modified rule might be necessary for direct contempts.) Once
these rules are set out-and they are simple and direct-the statute
could serve as a guide to judgment as well as to fairness, and it would
certainly serve to avoid the confusions surrounding the present distinction between civil and criminal hearings.
Although the simple statute just outlined would likely suffice in
most cases, there are probably a few cases in which the protections
normally afforded in criminal cases should be insisted upon, regardless
of whether the sentence is coercive or non-coercive. In some states,
injunctions have been used to enforce criminal laws, especially those
that are vaguely associated with "nuisances" that can be abated. Illegal
liquor sales, for example, have been enjoined in some cases. In such
a situation, the alleged illegal liquor seller would be subject to criminal
proceedings in which the prosecution would be required to prove
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. If he is enjoined from his illegal activity
and later is charged with violation of the injunction as a contempt of
court, the same standard should be applied-that is, he should not
be convicted of contempt of court for illegal liquor sales any more
readily than for the statutory crime of illegal liquor sales. The prose-
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cution in either situation should have the burden of proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, and it should not evade this burden by
dealing with the liquor violation as a "contempt" rather than as a
"crime" under the statute. Even if the proposed sentence is a coercive,
civil one, courts should not lose sight of the essential criminal character
of the proceeding; the label of the case as one of civil contempt should
not allow an undermining of basic safeguards. It is perhaps with this
problem in mind that courts refuse, in most cases, to enforce criminal
laws by injunction. 268 The Massachusetts Supreme Court specifically re-

jected the introduction of "criminal equity" cases into the jurisprudence of Massachusetts on the ground, among others, "that it substitutes
for the definite penalties fixed by the Legislature whatever punishment
for contempt a particular judge may see fit to exact .

If injunc-

"..."269

tions are to issue at all to control crimes-whether called nuisances or
not--criminal law standards ought to be invoked when contempt is
alleged for violation of the injunction. Although their grounds are
not always clear, some courts seem to agree with this proposition.
They have classified the hearings on alleged violations of antiliquor
or antiprostitution injunctions as "criminal" contempt hearings, with
the result that the prosecution has the burden of proving guilt beyond
27
a reasonable doubt.

0

This does not mean that every contumacious act constituting a
crime should always be given a criminal-type contempt hearing. The
criminal aspects of an enjoined act may be quite secondary to the
enforcement of a private right. If a group of persons are enjoined
from forceful occupation of a bank, but allegedly violate this injunction, there are no doubt criminal acts alleged. Yet if the bank seeks
268 It is commonly said that courts will not, in general, enjoin the commission of
crimes, but that they will enjoin acts amounting to crimes, if they consist of public

nuisances or invasions of private property interests. State v. Robertson, 63 N.M. 74, 313
P.2d 342 (1957) (court could abate public nuisance of lewdness and prostitution at a given
place, but could not enjoin defendant from committing such acts in general); Village of
Blaine v. Independent School Dist. No. 12, 265 Minn. 9, 121 N.W.2d 183 (1963) (injunction
may go to protect "property rights," including a utility franchise, so that holder of
franchise may enjoin illegal operation by competitor).
269 Commonwealth v. Stratton Finance Co., 310 Mass. 469, 474, 58 N.E.2d 640, 643
(1941). Other grounds were: it deprives defendants of jury trials, it is often an attempt
to circumvent the "supposed shortcomings of jurors," and it may induce a practice of
"government by injunction."
270 Demetree v. State ex rel. Marsh, 89 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1956); Shiflet v. State, 217
Tenn. 690, 400 S.W.2d 542 (1966); State ex rel. Anderson v. Daugherty, 137 Tenn. 125, 191
S.W. 974 (1917). In Anderson, the court said that even though such a contempt might arise
in private litigation, it might "in a very true sense 'raise an issue between the public and
the accused.'" Id. at 127, 191 S.W. at 974.
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a coercive contempt sanction, the contempt hearing is surely appropriately considered to be a civil one rather than a criminal one. This
seems quite unlike the case in which conduct is enjoined for "public"
purposes, as in the liquor violation cases, and it may well be, as one
writer suggested, that "the mere substitution of the government for
the private contempt plaintiff would seem to call for at least some
of the restrictions evolved to protect the criminally accused."2'7
Another possible solution is a broader one that would tend to
solve several other problems of contempt. This solution would proscribe the use of contempt prosecutions, except in private, coercive
contempt cases, whenever the acts charged would amount to statutory
crimes. In other words, if an act is a crime, it would, under this
proposal, be prosecuted under criminal statutes and not under contempt laws. Parallel limits are to some extent already in force in civil,
coercive contempt cases and these might be clarified. For instance,
statutes or constitutional requirements may limit the use of civil, coercive contempt to enforce payment of money debts when ordinary
execution is available.2 72 This, of course, is quite closely related to the
idea that criminal contempt should not be used as punishment when
ordinary criminal punishment is available. These two notions, taken
together and clarified, might well solve many of the contempt problems, and would certainly minimize the criminal-civil classification
problem.
V
PERSONS SUBJECT TO THE CONTEMPT POWER

A. General Rules
If someone disrupts a judicial proceeding or obstructs the process
of the court, he is in contempt and subject to the court's contempt
power whether he is a party to the litigation or not. A very different
situation arises, however, where there is no disruption, obstruction,
or even insult. If a court issues an injunction or other decree, it is
clear that parties to the suit are bound once they are notified of
the order. It is not so clear who, other than the parties themselves,
271 Comment, Civil and Criminal Contempt in the Federal Courts, 57 YALE L.J. 83,

102 (1947).
272 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5-8(2) (Repl. 1969) authorizes civil contempt for nonpayment of
any sum of money ordered by a court "in cases where execution cannot be awarded for

the collection of the same." Related is the problem of imprisonment for debt, discussed

in Section VII (B)(3)(a) infra.
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may be bound. For example, a court may enjoin close-order picketing
of the plaintiff's plant. The named defendants are bound by the
order and subject to the contempt power if they do not obey. Suppose,
however, an entirely different group of persons who were not parties
to the injunction suit substitute themselves for the original picketers.
If they have notice of the injunction, are they bound by it? Are
they in contempt if they commit acts which, had they been committed
by the named defendants, would constitute contempt? The answers
are not altogether certain.
As a matter of due process, one is ordinarily not bound by any
proceeding of which he had no notice and in which he had no
opportunity to appear. An injunction that bound persons not parties
would, of course, run counter to this proposition. Furthermore, an
injunction that attempted to bind nonparties would look very much
like legislation and not very much like a judicial decree. If one pierces
the form of words, a decree that says no one shall trespass upon the
plaintiff's property is similar in substance to a statute that prohibits
trespass-except that the punishment and the procedures for punishment may be harsher in the case of the judicial decree. When an
injunction can run not only against parties but against all the world,
the tendency is to "govern by injunction" rather than by legislation.
This tendency was wittily criticized by Chief Justice Fuller, who said:
"'Brother B. would codify all laws in an act of two sections: 1st, All
people must be good; 2d, Courts of equity are hereby given full power
and authority to enforce the provisions of this act.' ",273
There are thus two problems if an injunction or other decree is
given effect against nonparties. First, it may violate due process to
hold in contempt a person who was not a party to the suit and who
had no formal opportunity to take part in its decision. Second, it may
run counter to our form of government to permit courts to legislate
for all persons in rem, including those persons who are not parties
to the suit.
The earlier cases seem to have taken this approach. In Iveson v.
Harris,274 it was clear to Lord Eldon that

it is [not] competent to this Court to hold a man bound by an injunction, who is not a party in the cause ....
I should hesitate very much to proceed against him for
breach of the injunction.275
273 Quoted in Gregory, Government by Injunction, 11 HARV. L. Rav. 487, 510 (1898).
274 32 Eng. Rep. 102 (Ch. 1802).
275 Id. at 104. In Fellows v. Fellows, 4 Johns. Ch. 24 (N.Y. Ch. 1819), Chancellor
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On the other hand, if this approach is applied without deviation,
a party prohibited from carrying on some conduct might defeat the
injunction by getting another to act in his stead. This fear was expressed in Silvers v. Traverse,278 where, pursuant to a state statute, an
injunction that forbade liquor sales by a certain party on stated premises
also barred liquor sales by any person, whether a party or not. Mr.
Silvers, who was not a party to the case, allegedly sold liquor on the
premises and was charged with violating the injunction. The court
held that Mr. Silvers could properly be held for violating the order,
since the purpose of the statute was to burden the tainted premises, and
if the statute were construed otherwise, the injunction could be subverted by a pro forma transfer of the property to some person who was
not subject to the injunction. The fear that the court's decree could
be thwarted unless it applied to the world at large led a number of
courts to reject the older view and to bind persons who were not parties
in a number of situations. Sometimes this rejection has seemed to be
a wholesome one, and it is possible to find broad statements endorsing
the use of the injunction to bind the world. One authority asserted the
general rule to be that anyone who violates an injunction of which he
has knowledge is guilty of contempt, provided only that he was within
2 77
the class the judge intended to restrain.

In spite of this broad statement and similar ones in some cases, the
law dearly does not permit the application of injunctions to every
person who has knowledge of them.

278

It is true, however, that certain

persons may be bound by an equitable decree even though they are not
27 9 Most comparties. But these persons belong to very limited classes.

monly the nonparties who are bound are agents and those who aid
and abet violation, but the successor in interest may also be bound by
the decree. Beyond this, some courts have taken the view that once
jurisdiction is acquired over a res, that res may be protected against all
persons, whether parties or not. Finally, persons otherwise represented
in the proceeding, as in class suits, are bound.
In spite of their willingness to bind nonparties, courts have not been
willing to dispense with notice to them that an injunction has issued.
As a result, one who is not a party to the suit will not be held in conKent said in part: "The Court has no right to grant an injunction against a person whom
they have not brought, or attempted to bring, before the Court, by subpoena." Id. at 25.
276 82 Iowa 52, 47 N.W. 888 (1891).
277 Annot., 15 A.L.R. 386, 387 (1921).
278 Chase Natl Bank v. City of Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431 (1934); Kean v. Hurley, 179
F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1950); Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930).
279 See Note, Binding Nonparties to Injunction Decrees, 49 MiNN. L. RErv. 719 (1965).
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tempt for his "violation" of the decree unless he has actual notice of
it.280 A few cases have reached a contrary result where the "in rem"
theory is used, but these are distinctly a minority and they create serious
constitutional doubts. 281 The notice need not be a formal one; it is
not necessary to serve a copy of the decree upon nonparties, but they
28 2
must have actual notice of its contents.
B. Agents, Abettors
It seems reasonable to bind an agent or servant by an injunction
against the master, subject to the rule that he must have notice of the
decree before he can be held in contempt. So long as the agent acts for
the principal, it is entirely right to hold him in contempt if he violates
the decree, and there seems to be no current dissent from this position.
The proposition, of course, includes all forms of vicars-partners, co2
owners, agents, and servants.

83

Two qualifications must be stated. First, the agent may show he
did not violate the decree or did not have notice of it. Second, he may
show that he acted, not as an agent, but for himself. This was the situation in Alemite ManufacturingCorp. v. Staff,2 4 where one who was a
servant of A, and bound by an injunction against A, later left his employment and independently violated the injunction. The court held
that he could not be found in contempt because he was bound by the
injunction only as A's servant and not as a private person.
One may aid and abet another's violation of the injunction even
though he is in no formal sense an agent or servant. But, though
formal agency is not an element of the abettor's liability here, he does
resemble an agent in the sense that he acts with knowledge that he aids
another's violation of the injunction. His own act is not forbidden by
the injunction, but if his act aids the violation of the decree by one
who is bound, and if the aider knows this, he is liable. 28 5
280 Walker v. City of Birmingham, 279 Ala. 53, 64, 181 So. 2d 493, 504 (1965), aff'd,
388 U.S. 307 (1967) (to hold a nonparty for contempt, "it must be shown dearly that he
had knowledge of the order for the injunction in such a way that it can be held that he
understood it, and with that knowledge committed a wilful violation . . . .'); State ex rel.
Lindsley v. Wallace, 114 Wash. 692, 195 P. 1049 (1921); see Note, supra note 279; 46
HAnv. L. REv. 1311 (1933).
281 See, e.g., Silvers v. Traverse, 82 Iowa 52, 47 N.W. 888 (1891); text accompanying
notes 301-06 infra.
282 E.g., Crucia v. Behrman, 147 La. 144, 84 So. 525 (1920) (counsel for plaintiff informed nonparty of injunction; held nonparty was bound by it and subject to contempt
sanction).
283 E.g., State ex rel. Kruckman v. Rogers, 124 Ore. 656, 265 P. 784 (1928) (partners).
284 42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930).
285 This situation is somewhat analogous to that in State v. Haines, 51 La. Ann. 731,
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There are many examples of the liability for aiding and abetting.
When Mr. Weiss is enjoined from operating premises for illegal liquor
sales or prostitution, Mr. Weiss is liable if he continues to operate,
and so is Fifi Belondon if she aids him by engaging in the forbidden
sale or service on the premises. 280 Or when Dr. Reich is enjoined from
selling a certain product, he is liable for contempt if he continues to
sell it, and so is the purchaser who buys it knowing of the injunction. 28 7
In both cases the abettor might well have independent interests of his
own. Fifi Belondon may enjoy her work or may engage in it for personal
profit; Dr. Silvert may wish to purchase the forbidden "energy accumulators" to further his own research, not to aid Dr. Reich in violating
the injunction. But, although such independent purposes are permissible when the party is not aided, they are not permissible when he is
and when this fact is known by the abettor.
Such illustrations seem to represent established practice. Yet there
are problems. At some point the "aid" furnished by the contemnor to
the party defendant is surely an insubstantial factor in the injunction's
violation. Surely, for instance, mere verbal approval or even verbal
encouragement would not be enough to warrant holding the nonparty
as an aider and abettor. But what of a loan of money made for the
purpose of allowing the party defendant to violate the injunction, or,
if not for that purpose, with the certainty that it would be so used?
At some point, too, the nonparty's independent interest may outweigh the need for broad enforcement of the decree. Suppose that A
has several times claimed some form of ownership in Blackacre, and B,
the person in possession, procures an injunction that bars A from
trespassing, claiming, or supporting the claims of any other persons.
Now suppose that 0 is in fact the true owner and has good title documents on which to base his claim. If he has knowledge of the injunction against A, must he refuse a gift or loan of money from A aimed
at financing his lawsuit and paying his attorney's fees? .O's interest, even
if his claim proves inadequate, is legitimate and of a high order. The
incidental aid it may give to A's violation of the injunction seems so
25 So. 372 (1899), where the court decided that the defendant could not be held for a rape
upon his own wife, but that he would nevertheless be liable as principal if he aided and
abetted the same act by another.
286 Weiss v. State ex rel. Cardine, 455 P.2d 904 (Wyo. 1969).
287 Reich v. United States, 239 F.2d 134 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1004
(1957). The facts are not abundantly clear from the opinion, but it appears that Dr.
Silvert, who was not a -party to the injunction suit, had purchased one of the forbidden
devices and had helped arrange shipment to himself. Petitioner's Reply Brief on Petition
for Certiorari at 5, Reich v. United States, 352 U.S. 1004 (1957).
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insubstantial in comparison that 0 might well feel justified in accepting money from A.
Of course, 0 might seek to intervene in the injunction suit and
secure an exception from the injunction. However, this would merely
add to the burden of litigation for all parties, including B, the very
party the injunction is aimed at protecting. And, if intervention is
denied, O's attempt might not be a defense to a later contempt pro2s8
ceeding.
Much work needs to be done to refine both the conceptual tools
and the policy analysis of this problem. Clearly, not every nonparty
should be held for every act that in some way aids a party's violation
of the injunction. Just as clearly, some nonparties should be held. We
can speak vaguely of nonparties who are "identified" somehow with
the party, and we can speak just as vaguely of nonparties who are not
identified but who, on the contrary, have independent interests of their
own. But these terms are so broad that they represent little more than
a conclusion that one ought or ought not to be held subject to the
injunction. The steps that lead one to such a conclusion remain yet to
be charted.
C. Class Actions, Successors, and Injunctions in Rem
In many instances, persons who are not parties are nevertheless
represented by persons who are. Sometimes this representation is so
formalized that its function is obscure, but it is certainly true that when
a corporation or association is sued as an entity, the corporation in a
very real sense represents the stockholders. In a number of other cases
representation is permitted under the name of "privity. ' ' 289 The trustee
or the fiduciary may be sued; if so, the judgment binds him and indirectly binds the cestui que.2 0 The same may be true with class
actions-some persons may represent a very large class, with the result
that the entire class is bound.2 1 In all these cases the normal res judi288 Application to intervene was denied in United States v. Wilhelm Reich Foundation, 17 F.R.D. 96 (D. Me. 1954), af'd mem. sub nom. Baker v. United States, 221 F.2d 957
(Ist Cir. 1955). "The fact that the applicants may subject themselves to contempt proceedings if they act in concert with the named defendants in violating the terms of the decree
does not," the court said, justify intervention. Id. at 101. The applicant for intervention
later apparently bought a product the party defendants had been enjoined from selling
and was held in contempt, even though intervention had been denied. Reich v. United
States, 239 F.2d 134 (lst Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1004 (1957).
289 Ben Constr. Corp. v. United States, 312 F.2d 781 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (controlling stockholder and corporation in privity).
290 See REsATE MENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 80(4), 85(1) (1942).
291 See Lance v. Plummer, 353 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 929
(1966); FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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cata rules would make a judgment binding upon those represented. If
the representation is adequate, the same result should obtain with an
29 2
injunction decree of which the represented person has notice.
The successor in office to a person who has been enjoined is a
special instance of one who has been represented at a hearing, and who
is bound by the decree. School board members who are enjoined to
desegregate schools are personally bound by the decree, and so should
be their successors since the successors were fully represented in the
original hearing.29 3
But there are other kinds of successors whose situations are different. Successors in interest to tangible property are in some sense "in
privity" with their predecessors. As to the state of the title of the property, they are ordinarily bound by prior litigation, either through res
judicata rules or through the operation of recording statutes. Are they,
however, bound by injunctive regulation of the use of the property
merely on the ground that they are in privity? In an Arkansas case,294
one Flannery was enjoined from operating a snooker parlor in the
town of Paris, Arkansas, on the ground that it was a public nuisance.
Flannery sold his equipment to Rogers for almost $3,000, and Rogers
opened the business in a different building. The lower court held
Rogers in contempt of court, though he had not been a party to the
proceeding. The supreme court reversed, saying that the purchase of
the property was not shown to be a subterfuge, and that, in the absence
of subterfuge, Rogers was entitled to the use and enjoyment of the
property that he had purchased, at least until he, too, was enjoined from
its use.

29 5

Several cases appear to reach opposite results by emphasizing the
privity between vendor and purchaser. But at least some of the cases
that bind the purchaser by a prior injunction can be distinguished
from the Arkansas case. In a Nebraska decision, Wilcox v. Ashford,290
a landowner obtained an injunction restraining Frank Skinner from
entering upon or attempting to take possession of land belonging to
plaintiff. The injunction also ran against "all persons claiming through
or under" Skinner. Thereafter, Skinner deeded the land to his daughter
292 Note, supra note 279, at 731.
293 See Lucy v. Adams, 224 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ala. 1963), aff'd, 328 F.2d 892 (5th Cir.
1964), where the court held that an injunction restraining a named person, who was dean
of admissions of a university, from denying Negroes the right to enroll and pursue
courses bound his successor in office, who had knowledge of the decree. See also Wright v.
County School Bd., 309 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Va. 1970).
294 Rogers v. State ex rel. Robinson, 194 Ark. 633, 109 S.W.2d 120 (1937).
295 Accord, Big Four, Inc. v. Bisson, 132 Mont. 87, 314 P.2d 863 (1957).
298 131 Neb. 338, 268 N.W. 81 (1936).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56M13

and her husband, and they took possession. The daughter was held in
contempt for. violating the injunction to which she was not a party.
The court justified this simply on the ground that "one who has knowledge of an injunction and is in privity with the party enjoined is bound
thereby." 29 7 Perhaps the Wilcox decision can be justified even by one
who agrees with the Arkansas decision. If a judgment is in the chain of
title, it at least settles the title question, and, that being settled, any
occupation of the land by one with knowledge of the injunction is apt
to be in bad faith. But more important, the contempt sanction imposed
in Wilcox was coercive only; it aimed solely at enforcing the original
decree by getting the false claimant off the land and held her only until
she left. Thus, in substance, though not in form, the Wilcox decision
29
operates much like a new injunction against the new defendant,
and, though a more formal approach might be more satisfying, the
informality of Wilcox is at least justifiable in a way that criminal
punishment would not be.
The "privity" approach, holding successors in interest bound by
the injunction affecting property, seems undesirable for criminal contempt, even though it may be justified in a Wilcox-type situation for
civil contempt. It is perfectly appropriate to bind successors in interest
by earlier judicial decisions affecting the state of title or incumbrances,
and both the law of res judicata29 9 and the recording statutes may do
this.300 But an injunction with respect to property does more than
adjudge title; it regulates conduct. Furthermore, the penalties for failing to observe the state of title and the penalties for conducting oneself
in violation of an injunction aimed at another are vastly different. It is
one thing to subject a man to economic loss-or the risk of economic
loss-when he fails to check the title to land that he buys. It is quite
another thing to subject him to criminal punishment merely because
he has bought and operated a business that was condemned when
owned by another.
Perhaps the source of the difficulty is the substantive impropriety
of a decree that bars Smith from operating a business in a proper manner because Jones had operated a similar business improperly at some
earlier time. If Smith is a mere subterfuge, a front man for Jones's forId. at 340, 268 N.W. at 82.
298 In Hindi v. Smith, 73 N.M. 335, 388 P.2d 60 (1963), the court emphasized privity
and held a purchaser bound by an earlier decree. A new injunction was issued on this
basis by the lower court and affirmed on appeal; the contempt power was not involved.
299 RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 89 (1942).
00 When the judgment goes in the chain of title, or when a Us pendens is used, constructive and binding notice is afforded all purchasers as to the state of the title.
297
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bidden business, of course he can be punished. If not, and the business
continues to be a nuisance, then Smith, too, can be enjoined. But if
neither of these suppositions is true, to punish Smith for Jones's earlier
misconduct is surely improper. Thus, it seems preferable to use aiding
and abetting rather than the rules of privity to bind successors in
interest.
Even more troubling than the privity theory for holding strangers
to the decree is the in rem theory. In certain limited kinds of cases,
courts have used the power to seize property-usually tangible-and
adjudicate title to it, or even to subject that property to the claims of
the owner's creditors, in the so-called quasi in rem cases. 30 ' These cases
are authorized only so far as they deal with title to property, or incumbrances on title. They do not deal with regulation of conduct. In
1891, however, the Iowa Supreme Court ignored the distinction between the adjudication of title and the regulation of conduct and held
that an injunction decree padlocking a place of business as a nuisance
and prohibiting all persons from selling unlawful liquor therein was
an in rem decree binding all persons, including those who were not
parties and those who were wholly unaware of the injunction.3 02 Kansas
has followed the same theory,30 3 and so, in a dictum, has the state of
Washington.3 °4 Several federal court decisions have also impliedly given
some support to this view.30 5
A number of criticisms can be leveled at these cases, including the
criticisms already mentioned about the "privity" cases involving successive ownership. It seems substantively improper to punish Smith
because an injunction has gone against Jones for some other conduct
on some other occasion. It seems undesirable to regulate conduct-as
distinct from title-without having the parties whose conduct is regulated before the court. But beyond these points, there are problems that
301 See Tyler v. Judges of the Ct. of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 55 N.E. 812, appeal
dismissed, 179 U.S. 405 (1900). In that case, Holmes, C.J, said inpart:
[A] proceeding in rem dealing with a tangible res may be instituted and carried
to judgment without personal- service upon claimants within the State or notice
by name to those outside of it .... Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the
court over the res.
Id. at 75, 55 N.E. at 813.
802 Silvers v. Traverse, 82 Iowa 52, 47 N.W. 888 (1891).
303 State v. Porter, 76 Kan. 411, 91 P. 1073 (1907).
804 State v. Terry, 99 Wash. 1, 168 P. 513 (1917).
805 Eg., United States v. Dean Rubber Mfg. Co., 71 F. Supp. 96 (W.D. M o. 1946),
indicated that an injunction against distribution of defective prophylactics already in stock
would be an injunction:"in rem." -However, the nonparties against whom enforcement was
sought probably were closely identified with the enjoined party, and the reference to in
rem injunctions hardly seems to be a significant part of the case.
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may transcend those encountered in the privity cases. The in rem theory
would permit enforcement of the injunction by the contempt power
even against persons who had no notice of the decree, since the res
theory is that the whole world is bound by the court's control of the
property. Courts subscribing to the in rem theory have actually embraced this point of view. 30 6 Even if one could justify the denial of a
hearing and an opportunity to present evidence on the merits, it seems
difficult to justify contempt sanctions against one who is not even aware
that a decree has been issued. Presumably, cases taking this extreme
view would raise serious due process issues.
Another problem arises from the old saw that "equity acts in
personam." There is, perhaps, no real reason why equity must act in
personam and not in rem in proper cases. 30 7 Nevertheless, equity normally proceeds by summons, not by seizure of the property involved,
and absent a seizure in advance,308 or at least some reasonable notice to
the parties affected, 30 9 the in rem procedure may not be valid.
In more concrete terms, it may be said that the in rem theory
is probably a case of overkill, a kind of massive retaliation in response
to a trivial problem. The problem is, as the Iowa court recognized in
Silvers, cutting off the power of an enjoined individual to evade the
injunction. In the nuisance cases, at least, this can be done readily
enough without resort to the in rem theory. If a new nuisance is created
by a nonparty using the same premises, he may be enjoined. There is,
no doubt, some slight risk that, once enjoined, he will convey the
property to still some other person, who in turn will have to be subjected to the judicial processes. But the risk of an indefinite number of
evasions is small, and in any event the judicial process seems capable
of dosing an indefinite number of successive nuisances if need be. And
if there is actual evasive action, aiding or abetting, or an agency relationship, then this itself will be a sufficient basis for binding the nonparty. The in rem theory, then, seems wholly unnecessary and undesirable.
306 See Silvers v. Traverse, 82 Iowa 52, 47 N.W. 888 (1891) (the action is "notice to
all the world" and no other notice needed); State v. Porter, 76 Kan. 411, 91 P. 1073 (1907).
But see Newcomer v. Tucker, 89 Iowa 486, 56 N.W. 499 (1893).
307 Statutes sometimes authorize in rem decrees in equity transferring real property.
E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-228 (Repl. 1969). Notice, however, that this is a title adjudication
and an enforcement of the title, not a decree like an injunction that regulates conduct.
308 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
309 Tyler v. Judges of the Ct. of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 55 N.E. 812, appeal dismissed, 179 U.S. 405 (1900).
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D. The Limits Under Rule 65(d)
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted by statute or otherwise in many states,310 lay down in rule 65(d) this limit on injunctions:
[The injunction] is binding only upon the parties to the action,
their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon
those persons in active concert or participation with them who re-*
ceive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.311
Where this rule is in force, it presumbly forbids the use of the in
rem theory since that theory would dispense with the requirement of
notice specified in rule 65. Whether the rule would equally forbid use
of the privity theory in its more liberal form is not clear. It seems arguable that it would. The Supreme Court, interpreting the rule, seems
to have emphasized the necessity for aiding and abetting or active
concert:
The term "successors and assigns" in an enforcement order of
course may not enlarge its scope beyond that defined by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Successors and assigns may, however,
be instrumentalities through which defendant seeks to evade an
order or may come within the description of persons in active concert or participation with them in the violation of an injunction.
*.. We have indicated that Labor Board orders are binding upon
successors and assigns who operate
as "merely a disguised con12
tinuance of the old employer."3
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has also characterized
rule 65 as one "derived from the common-law doctrine that a decree
of injunction not only binds the parties defendant but also those identified with them in interest, in 'privity' with them, represented by them
or subject to their control."8 18 This somewhat broader formulation
might tend to support some of the old privity cases under rule 65, but
the Court stopped short of saying that rule 65 incorporates this common
law doctrine, and its emphasis seems to be on the narrower requirement of "active concert or participation" or substantial identity. 1 4
Other cases seem to bear out this more restrictive emphasis of rule 65,815
310 E.g., N.C. GEN, STAT. § 1A-I, rule 65(d) (Repl. 1969).

811 FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d).
812 Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 524 U.S. 9, 14 (1945), quoting Southport Petroleum
Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942).
813 Id.
814 Id.; see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
815 See Lance v. Plummer, 853 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 929
(1966); Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 490 (1964).
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and it seems likely that mere privity without concert, vicarious action,
identity, or representation will not be enough.
E. Conclusion
There is a need for detailed study of the problems presented when
nonparties are sought to be bound by an injunction. Even if we assume
that rule 65 clearly governs and limits the application of an injunction
to those in "active concert," this term is not self-explanatory. Furthermore, even if one is in active concert with a named defendant, rule 65
does not exclude the possibility that he may, as a nonparty, have a
sufficient independent interest to justify his acting until he is personally
enjoined.
On this point-what constitutes an adequate independent interest
-much thought is needed. The nature of the problem can be illustrated hypothetically as follows:
X plans a demonstration in a bank to indicate its opposition to
the bank's all-white hiring policy. The bank, hearing of the plan, seeks
and obtains a temporary restraining order forbidding this demonstration on its property. In the meantime, the local chapter of Z independently plans a similar demonstration in the same bank as a protest of
the bank's support for the Vietnam War. This is not known by the
bank, and no injunction runs against Z. The injunction against X,
however, forbids any trespass or demonstration on bank property, and
Z learns of this. Nevertheless, Z carries out its planned demonstration.
Such a situation is complex. 816 In the hypothetical case outlined,
Z probably could not be bound by the injunction if X members did
not violate it, since Z could not be regarded as being in concert or
participating with X where X did not participate at all. 31 7 If, however,
X proceeded to demonstrate in the bank, any similar action by Z may
fairly be regarded as concert and participation, even though the purposes may be slightly different. In such a case, does the independent
basis of Z's plan-the fact that its purpose is not to assist X-relieve it
of liability under the injunction? If so, would the case be a different
one if the Z demonstrators share X's purpose more closely, that is, if
the Z demonstration were also a protest against all-white hiring policies
instead of a protest against the War?
316 A reading of the bank-demonstration cases makes the hypothetical easy to
believe. See People v. Poe, 236 Cal. App. 2d 928, 47 Cal. Rptr. 670 (1965) (protest against
bank's alleged discriminatory hiring policies by blocking entrance "to: bank; claim of
justification on grounds that bank, was in fact discriminatory); Curtis v. Tozer,' 874

S.W.2d 557 (Mo. 1964) (similar).
317 United Pharmacal Corp. v. United States, 806 F.2d 515 (Ist Cir. 1962).
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These questions cannot now be answered with confidence. Yet
they deal with basic rights, with free speech, and with the fundamental
notions of fair play involved in the requirement that a person must
have his day in court before he can be punished.
VI
INTENT AND ABILITY

To COMPLY

A. Intent
It is sometimes said that in criminal contempt proceedings the
alleged contemnor must be shown to have wilfully or intentionally
violated the court order.818 The same "wilfulness" is not said to be
required in civil contempt cases since the purpose of those cases is to
give the opposing party the relief to which he is entitled, and the contemnor's state of mind is not, therefore, important.819 An apparent
exception to this occurs in some alimony cases, where, although the
contempt proceeding is civil, wilful disobedience is a prerequisite to
any sanction.8 20 This exception is probably, however, an inaccurate
formulation of a rule that is of special importance in money decree
cases: inability to comply with a decree is a good defense. 21
This simple dichotomy, however, is a little too facile. The same
confusion that shrouds other aspecis of contempt covers this one as
well. Although some cases seem to treat the intent element just as
they might treat that element with any other crime, other cases do not.
Thus, it may be that intent must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt
in criminal contempt cases;8 22 then again, it may be that a lack of intent
818 See United States ex rel. Porter v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 163 F.2d 168
(7th Cir. 1947); Chicago v. Hart Bldg. Corp., 116 Ill. App. 2d 39, 253 N.E.2d 496 (1969);
9
cf. Re Bramblevale Ltd., [1 69] 3 W.L.R. 699 (CA.).
819 See McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187 (1949). The Court said in

part:
The absence of wilfulness does not relieve from civil contempt. Civil as distinguished from criminal contempt is a sanction to enforce compliance with an
order of the court or to compensate for losses or damages sustained by reason
Since the purpose is remedial, it matters not with what
of noncompliance ....
intent the defendant did the prohibited act.
Id. at 191 (footnote omitted).
820 See Robertson v. State, 20 Ala. App. 514, 519, 104 So. 561, 565 (1924); Cooper v.
Cooper, 225 Ga. 462, 169 S.E.2d 324 (1969); Moskovitz, supra note 267, at 793.
821 E.g., Garroutte v. Garroutte, 455 P.2d 306 (Okla. 1969), where the court confused
the wilfulness requirement with the affirmative defense of inability to comply.
822 See In re Rice, 181 F. 217 (C.C.M.D. Ala. 1910): "This proceeding is highly
punitive and criminal in its nature, and respondents are entitled to the benefit of the
Id. at 227. In
reasonable doubt. The criminal intent here turns upon the sdenter ....
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to commit contempt is an affirmative defense to be proven by the
person charged. 23 In some instances, intent or wilfulness is immaterial,
and one can be convicted even though he has no intent.8 24 Another
possibility is that although intent must be proven by the prosecution,
it need only be shown by a preponderance of the evidence rather than
beyond a reasonable doubt.325 These points have not been clearly
resolved as a matter of general practice, and many cases are decided
without the slightest reference to the problem of intent or bad faith.
Indeed, in some situations criminal contempt punishment is upheld
even though the contemnor has acted in complete good faith, as where
he is advised by counsel that the injunctive order against him has been
superseded by an appeal. 326 However, this extreme form of criminal

liability for good faith acts is rejected by some courts. 32 7
There is also difficulty in interpreting the wilfulness requirement.
As Joseph Moskovitz pointed out many years ago,328 the contemnor's

United States ex rel. Porter v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 163 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1947),
the court said in part: "We are of the view that the intent with which the overcharges
were made is an essential element of the contempt charged and that the burden was
upon the plaintiff to establish such element beyond all reasonable doubt." Id. at 174.
Accord, Chicago v. Hart Bldg. Corp., 116 IM. App. 2d 39, 253 N.E.2d 496 (1969).
323 See Note, The Intent Element in Contempt of Injunctions, Decrees and Court
Orders, 48 MICH. L. REv. 860, 866 (1950). A number of cases by inference, if not by dear
statement, put the burden upon the contemnor to show his lack of intent. In some of
these, however, the ancient and now largely discredited doctrine of purgation by oath
is still used. This doctrine permits any person charged with contempt to avoid all liability
for contempt by simply denying his contempt under oath. He may, in such a case, subject
himself to a formal perjury prosecution, but he absolves himself automatically from
contempt, and as a practical matter this probably is effective to absolve him of any other
liability. Where this doctrine still exists, with its liberal exit for the contemnor, it is not
surprising to see that the contemnor is left with the burden of negating his intent if that
is his defense. See, e.g., Allison v. State ex rel. Allison, 243 Ind. 489, 187 N.E.2d 565 (1963);
Tusing v. State, 241 Ind. 650, 175 N.E.2d 17 (1961).
324 Offutt v. United States, 232 F.2d 69 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 988 (1956).
325 A typically ambiguous statement is:
In order to constitute criminal or public contempt, it must appear that the
alleged act of disobedience has been expressly forbidden; that there has been a
violation of the plain terms of the order, and that the violation was willful or
intentional rather than inadvertent or by mistake. . . . [I]t should appear, with
reasonable certainty, that it has been violated.
In re North, 149 Misc. 572, 574, 267 N.Y.S. 572, 574 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 240 App. Div. 937, 267
N.Y.S. 1021 (3d Dep't 1933).
326 Ladner v. Ladner, 206 So. 2d 620 (Miss. 1968) (10-day jail sentence); Green v.
Griffin, 95 N.C. 50 (1886) (contemnor's good faith reliance on trusted counsel found as a
fact by the court trying the contempt; nevertheless, fined $250).
327 In re Faulisi, 7 Misc. 2d 704, 162 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Sup. Ct. 1957); cf. In re North, 149
Misc. 572, 267 N.Y.S. 572 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 240 App. Div. 937, 267 N.Y.S. 1021 (3d Dep't
1933) (attorney's advice plus ambiguity of decree showed lack of wilfulness).
328 Moskovitz, supra note 267, at 794.
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act might be regarded as wilful only if the defendant intended both to
violate the injunction and to express defiance in doing so. His act might
be regarded as wilful if he merely intended to violate the injunction,
even though he had no desire to express contempt for the court's
authority. Or, the act might be regarded as wilful if he merely intended
to do acts that later turned out to violate the decree' Still another possibility is that the particularly bad quality of the contemnor's act, rather
32 9
than his intent as such, would be determinative of his "wilfulness."
There is no clear agreement, or even analysis, on these points. It seems
unreasonable to impose criminal penalties in the last situation, where
the contemnor commits acts that disobey the injunction, but without
realization that disobedience is involved. In such a case, civil contempt
might be appropriate since no intent at all should be or is required
there. Yet in some instances, disobedience alone has been enough to lead
to criminal contempt penalties, even though the defendant did not
realize the disobedient quality of his act.33 0
Probably much of the difficulty here stems from the failure to
distinguish between civil and criminal contempt punishments. A frank
recognition that criminal contempt is criminal, and that intent is
therefore a prerequisite to criminal punishment, would be welcome.
It remains to be said that on occasion courts have dispensed with
the intent requirement altogether and have said that even the good
faith of the contemnor is no defense, if his acts are violative of the
decree. Courts that have extended the scope of liquor injunctions to
nonparties3s have also held that the good faith of the violator was no
defense. 32 Here again, this seems unjustified, and probably is explicable
in historical, social, and geographical terms that would have little bearing in times less concerned with the propriety of liquor sales and with
a Middle-Western version of late-Victorian manners.
So far discussion has centered on the violation of court orders, but
criminal contempt sanctions may be imposed as well for disruption
of judicial processes, obstruction, or even for insult or critical publications. Cases of this sort present special problems. In many of them,
summary contempt procedures are used since the contempt, if it exists,
.J.
514, 522-24 (1957).
This occurs most notably in the advice-of-counsel cases. See cases cited in note 326
supra. See also In re Rice, 181 F. 217, 223 (C.C.M.D. Ala. 1910), where the court indicated
that innocent intent is no protection when there was an intent to commit the act that
320 See Note, Criminal Contempt, 32 IND.

380

constituted a violation of the injunction.
See text accompanying notes 276-77 supra.
Silvers v. Traverse, 82 Iowa 52, 47 N.W. 888 (1891); State v. Porter, 76 Kan. 441,
91 P. 1073 (1907).
331
332
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is committed in the courtroom. In these circumstances especially, it is
easy to overlook the intent requirement, and even if it is not overlooked, its application is difficult.
One difficulty in applying the intent requirement is that, in at
least some of the cases, the intent to insult or to be disrespectful seems
to be a part of the affront being redressed; yet this may turn on nothing more substantial than a cast of eye or tone of voice. What is arrogance in the mind of the judge may be spirited advocacy in the mind
of the attorney. Words never used by educated middle-class citizens in
a formal setting may be the everyday language of many people who
appear in court. In these conditions intent to insult or otherwise disrupt should not be readily inferred. The moderation of the New Jersey
court which countenanced an expression "descriptive of excrement"
that was not in fact disruptive of the proceeding is to be applauded. 3 3
And the California rule requiring something more than tone of voice
to support a contempt conviction when the words themselves are not
contemptuous is likewise a sound protection from abuse.33 4
There are, nevertheless, cases in which courts seem unaware of the
intent requirement in these summary contempts. A Mrs. DuBoyce was
fined fifty dollars and sentenced to fifteen days in jail because her
"attitude throughout the trial was argumentative and arrogant" and
because "her complete misconception of judicial procedure" made trial
difficult. 335 Of course, with no more information than this, it is quite
possible to believe that Mrs. DuBoyce intentionally disrupted the trial.
But it is also possible to believe that intent was lacking, and no details
are given in the opinion to indicate that such an intent existed. Indeed,
"her complete misconception of judicial procedure" seems to be the
explanation for her conduct, and although coercive penalties would be
warranted in such a case to force compliance with judicial procedures,
criminal punishments for a "misconception" seem unwarranted without any showing of intentional violation.
In other cases, courts have deliberately discarded the intent requirement for certain courtroom contempts. In Offutt v. United States,836
Judge Fahy said that if the contemnor's remarks were insolent and insulting in a way that constituted "misbehavior" in the course of a trial,
338 State v. Jones, 105 N.J. Super. 493, 253 A.2d 193 (1969).

834 In re Hallinan, 71 Cal. 2d 1179, 459 P.2d 255, 81 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969). For a discussion of this case, see notes 80-84 and accompanying text supra. But see Garland v. State,
101 Ga. App. 395, 416, 114 S.E.2d 176, 190 (1960): "A court may be insulted by the most
innocent words uttered in a peculiar manner or tone."
335 In re DuBoyce, 241 F.2d 855 (3d Cir. 1957).
386 232 F.2d 69 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 988 (1956).
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"there would be no need to make special inquiry into intent, except as
to mitigation."3 37 In Judge Fahy's scheme of things, intent is not an
element of contempt of this kind, though "misbehavior" is. He explained further that "when the conduct in question is not clearly
blameworthy . . . there is no contempt unless there is some sort of
wrongful intent."' 38 Perhaps the end result is the same as if intent or
wilfulness were required, since "misbehavior" would ordinarily warrant
an inference of intent where the misbehavior is "clearly blameworthy."
But as a clear statement of the rules, Judge Fahy's formulation does
not seem a happy one. It can be used all too easily to impose a kind of
strict criminal liability without fault. Quite aside from that, it could
serve to seriously impede effective advocacy of lawyers and subvert the
independence of the bar if lawyers were subject to contempt charges
based on zealousness and no more. 3 9 Finally, Judge Fahy's formulation of the rules may have a serious procedural effect. If intent is not
recognized as an element of these contempts, summary proceedings may
suffice where otherwise a full hearing would be required to develop the
340
intent element.
A more rigid insistence on the intent requirement for criminal contempt punishment is needed. This may be especially important when
we realize that people in courtrooms often do not share the cultural
assumptions of the judge. Often they may hold a genuine "misconception of judicial procedure." At times they may be goaded into
contemptuous behavior because they do not understand the legal
machinery and have not inherited, as the law courts have, a set of
formalities from a bygone era. If such persons are to be held in contempt at all, surely it should be only on a showing of wilful or intentional misconduct.
B. Ability To Comply
The question of one's ability to comply with a judicial order presents a slightly different problem from that involved in one's intent.
Of course, it is true that if the contemnor had no ability to comply
337 Id. at 72.

338 Id.
339 The Watts and Caldwell cases show that where the contempt of lawyers consists

of advice to clients, cross-examination or other action, even if mistaken and disturbing, which purports to be on behalf of a client, then the actual evil intention
is a crucial element of the contempt or relevant to the degree of guilt and consequent extent of punishment. The policy is dear: to protect honest lawyers against
punishment for excessive zeal and thus preserve the independence of the bar.
Harper & Haber, supra note 157, at 21.
340 See Section II supra.
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with the order, he cannot be said to have wilfully violated it. For the
most part, however, where wilful violation is required, the burden is
upon the prosecution to show wilfulness or intentional violation, although it is usually assumed that one has the ability to comply unless
he proves affirmatively to the contrary. In other words, the lack of
ability to comply is usually treated as an affirmative defense, while
the presence of intent or wilfulness is a part of the prosecution's prima
facie case. 34 1 This rule is often reflected more in practice and assumption than in clear statement, and it is not a universal one for there are
to comply, at
cases that seem to require affirmative proof of ability
342
least in decrees ordering the payment of money.
Unlike the intent issue, lack of ability to comply is a defense not
merely in a criminal case but also in a civil case. 34 3 If the inability to
comply was self-induced, as where a husband ordered to pay money to
his wife flushes it down the toilet, a coercive sanction may become impossible but a punitive sanction is still permissible.3 44
One serious problem arises where a contemnor undertakes to prove
his inability to comply with the decree. Since in most instances he has
the burden of proof, it is quite possible that he will fail to establish inability to comply to the court's satisfaction. His own testimony may
be all he can readily adduce; it is difficult to get corroboration of one's
inability to obtain money. Thus, the contemnor may be placed in jail
on an indefinite, coercive sentence, even though there is no way he
can comply with the decree. In this respect, the situation resembles
most other dispute-of-fact situations-there is always a risk that the
trier of fact will misjudge the truth. But in the coercive contempt
situation, that misjudgment can result in a literally interminable jail
sentence. It may very well be that a legislative adjustment is needed to
remedy this situation. Several alternatives might be considered: shifting the burden of proof (or persuasion) once the inability-to-comply
341 In re S.L.T., 180 So. 2d 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Carey v. Carey, 132 Ind.
App. 30, 171 N.E.2d 487 (1961); Mowery v. Mowery, 50 Tenn. App. 648, 863 S.W.2d 405
(1962); see Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 591 (1957).
342 Noorthoek v. Superior Ct., 269 Cal. App. 2d 600, 75 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1969):
In order to support an indefinite commitment . . . there must be a finding,
based upon evidence, that the contemner has the present ability.... Proof that
[contemnor] had the ability to pay reasonable support, month by month, is not
proof that [he] is now able to pay a lump sum of $4,000.
Id. at 609, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
343 E.g., Ex parte Fiedler, 446 S.W.2d 698 (rex. Civ. App. 1969).
844 E.g., Gossett v. Gossett, 34 Tenn. App. 654, 241 S.W.2d 934 (1951). The court said
in part: "[T]he Chancellor would not have been justified in committing respondent until
the whole delinquent amount should be paid, because he could earn nothing while incarcerated and so far as his own earnings go he would have remained in jail forever." Id.
at 659, 241 S.W.2d at 936-37.
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issue is raised by the defense; or putting the burden on the moving
party in the first instance. Other possibilities include the use of definite,
criminal sentences where serious doubt is raised, the introduction of a
jury into civil contempt cases of this sort, or limiting the enforcement
of money decrees by the contempt power and requiring instead use of
execution. This last solution only affects money decrees, but as these
involve the most serious ability-to-comply problems, it may be a good
one. In any event, changes are needed.
VII
SANCTIONS FOR CONTEMPT

A. In General
As already indicated, contempt may be punished in several ways,
but one rule controls the choice of sanction in any case: if the proceeding is a criminal one, the sanction must be determinate, such as a jail
sentence for a specific length of time; if the proceeding is a civil one,
the sanction must be a coercive (and indeterminate) one that will be
lifted immediately upon the contemnor's compliance with the court
345
order.
Subject to this rule, sanctions for either civil or criminal contempt
may be quite varied. Imprisonment is a common sanction in both civil
and criminal contempt proceedings, with a determinate or indeterminate sentence as may be appropriate. 30 Fines are also commonly used
as sanctions in contempt, with a distinction between a punitive fine payable to the state in a criminal proceeding 347 and a remedial or compensatory one payable to the injured party in a civil contempt proceeding.3 48
These common sanctions are not the only ones available. In certain
circumstances, the contemnor may be denied the right to appeal or
even the right to prosecute a civil claim so long as he remains in contempt.349 There is no clear theoretical barrier to other sanctions, at least
in civil contempt proceedings, providing they are designed to be coercive or remedial. 350 Each kind of sanction presents problems, however,
and these are discussed individually.
345 See generally Section IV supra.
346

See, e.g., People v. Nowicki, 17 Mich. App. 525, 170 N.W.2d 187 (1969).
i1. App. 2d 39, 253 N.E.2d 496 (1969)

347 E.g., Chicago v. Hart Bldg. Corp., 116

($5,000 fine plus additional fine equal to profits made by contemnor through his contempt).
E.g., Grunberg v. Louison, 343 Mass. 729, 180 N.E.2d 802 (1962).
E.g., National Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Arnold, 348 U.S. 37 (1954).
850 E.g., Lance v. Plummer, 353 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 929
348
349

(1966) (auxiliary deputy deprived of badge).
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B. Imprisonment
1. CriminalPunishment
Imprisonment is, of course, most closely associated with the determinate criminal sentence. When the criminal contempt proceeding

meets the procedural requirements, there are seldom problems in imposing such punishment.
In some states, and in the federal system, there is no statutory
maximum on the sentence, and the court imposing the sentence sets
its own maximum.3 51 As a practical matter, the recent federal requirement of a jury trial for contempt cases involving sentences over six
months may operate as an effective ceiling on sentences in all but the
most unusual cases, and perhaps this was one purpose of the Supreme
52
Court in establishing the jury right.
Punishment for criminal contempt has been restricted by statute.
For example, in a number of states it is limited to thirty days imprisonment plus a fine not in excess of 250 dollars,3 r3 and similar limits are
imposed in other states.3 54 These provisions seem desirable as a protection against arbitrary use of judicial power.
2. Civil Sanctions
Imprisonment is also commonly used in civil contempt cases. In
such cases the contemnor is held until he purges himself of contempt
and then released; alternatively, he may be given a definite sentence
that is then suspended on condition that he refrain from further contemptuous acts. In either event, the sentence tends to coerce compliance
and by full compliance imprisonment will be avoided.
In most cases this creates few problems. The contemnor may
comply with the decree before he ever reaches jail, or he may comply
with it soon thereafter. Where the act required of him is an affirmative
one that can be accomplished in jail-signing a deed, for instanceit is easy enough for him to get out. Where the act required by the
351 People v. Stollar, 81 Ill. 2d 154, 201 N.E.2d 97 (1964), cert. denied, 380 US. 912
(1965) (no statutory limit; 18-month sentence imposed on mother-guardian for misuse of
guardianship funds). The state may limit the sentence as to some kinds of contempt but
not as to others. See State v. Edwards, 252 Ore. 325, 446 P.2d 659 (1968).
352 Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966); see Section III supra, on the right to
a jury trial in contempt cases.
353 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5-4 (Repl. 1969); N.Y. JuDicARY LAw § 751 (McKinney Supp.
1970); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 256.06 (1957).
354 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-863 (1956) (six months and $1,000); ARx. STAT. ANN.
§ 34-902 (Repl. 1962) (ten days and $50); CAL. Civ. PRo. CODE § 1218 (West Supp. 1969)
(five days and $500).
k -1
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court's decree must be performed outside the prison, a problem occurs
since the contempt cannot be "purged" so long as the sentence remains.
But the problem may be more theoretical than real. Ordinarily, an
expression of willingness to perform the act will be sufficient to procure
release by the sentencing judge.355 A similar problem may exist where
the injunctive order is prohibitory in nature, so that there is no way
the contemnor can, while in jail, demonstrate his willingness to avoid
future violations. He can, however, express to the judge an intention
of future compliance, and on this basis will usually be allowed to demonstrate his good faith outside the prison. Of course, the contemnor
may abuse the court's trust by violating the order yet again, but it
seems better to risk his doing so than to keep him in jail on a civil
contempt sentence after he expresses a desire to comply with the
order.350 If he commits a further violation, a new contempt proceeding
can be instituted, and, indeed, a criminal contempt punishment would
be possible if it were thought desirable. This being so, courts have
been quite ready to release contemnors on their simple expressions
of readiness to comply in the future, and so long as this is true, the
potential problem here appears minor.
3. Enforcement of Money Decrees
a. Imprisonment for "Debt." Not every money judgment is enforceable by contempt power, not even theoretically. The normal
judgment at law-in the usual contract or tort suit, for example-is
an in rem judgment, more a declaration of a debt than an order to the
defendant to pay it. The defendant is not in contempt when he does
not pay such a judgment because it does not order him to do anything. Such a judgment is enforced through other methods, usually
through execution on the defendant's property, a sale of the property,
357r
and an application of the proceeds to the debt.
Occasionally, however, courts exercising equity powers issue in
personam decrees ordering a defendant to pay money. For example,
a defendant may be ordered to perform a contract to purchase real
855 "[l]fthe contemnor indicates his willingness in good faith to perform, he would
be entitled, and will be allowed, to leave the jail in order to do so." City of Vernon v.

Superior Ct., 58 Cal. 2d 509, 519, 241 P.2d 243, 249 (1952).
856 See Cliett v. Hammonds, 05 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1962), where a contemnor was
released on a promise of future compliance and then again violated an injunction against
interference with another's property. She was again held in contempt and again given an
opportunity to purge herself.
857 See N.C. GN..,STAT. § 1-302 (Repl. 1969). See generally Cook, The Powers of
Courts of Equity, 15 COLUM. L. REv. 37 (1915).
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estate and to pay the contract price for it,3 58 or ordered to pay alimony
or child support. 35 9 Such orders, being directions to pay and not mere
declarations of a debt, are within the general class of orders enforceable
by civil contempt powers.
The potential use of contempt power to enforce payment of money
raises several problems including the specter of imprisonment for debt.
Imprisonment for debt is, of course, forbidden by most state constitutions, either in absolute terms 360 or with limited exceptions. 361 These
prohibitions may make contempt imprisonment, whether civil 362 or
criminal3 63 in nature, constitutionally impermissible if based on "debt."
What constitutes a "debt" is, however, another matter. A simple
contract debt is a "debt" that cannot be enforced by an order to pay and
a contempt imprisonment. 364 This rule is not to be subverted by first
imposing a "fine" upon the recalcitrant debtor and then imprisoning
him for failure to pay it. The imprisonment in such a case, though based
on failure to pay the fine rather than the debt, is nevertheless grounded
in the debt.3 6 5 When the money claim is something other than simple
contract debt it may not be a "debt" at all, even though it is assuredly
a legally enforceable claim. It is commonly held that alimony and child
support claims arise not from debt but from a status or an obligation
imposed by law, and therefore may be enforced by contempt imprisonment 36 6 provided the requisite ability to pay exists.367 But not every
358 E.g., Fiorito v. Yaskulski, 16 App. Div. 2d 867, 228 N.Y.S.2d 598 (4th Dep't 1962).
359 E.g., Mowery v. Mowery, 50 Tenn. App. 648, 363 S.W.2d 405 (1962).
360 GA. CONsT. art. I, § 2-121; MIss. CoNsr. art. 3, § 30; N.M. CONsr. art. II, § 21;

TENN. CONsT. art. I, § 18 (in civil cases); TEx. CONsr. art. 1, § 18.
361 Many states specifically permit imprisonment where the debtor is guilty of fraud.
E.g., ARiz. CONSr. art. 2, § 18; ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 16; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 15; COLO. CONSr.
art. II, § 12; FLA. CoNsr. art. 1, § 11; IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 15; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 22;
IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 19; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 16; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 21; MINN.
CONSr. art. I, § 12; NEB. CONsT. art. I, § 20; NEv. CONsT. art. 1, § 14; N.J. CONsr. art. 1, § 13;
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 15; S.C. CONSr. art. 1, § 24; WYo. CONSr. art. 1, § 5.
Others permit imprisonment of absconding debtors. ORF. CONST. art. I, § 14; UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 16; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 17.
862 See People ex rel. Sarlay v. Pope, 230 App. Div. 649, 246 N.Y.S. 414 (3d Dep't 1930)
(remedial sentence of a civil fine with jail sentence until paid; violation of the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt).
363 Wojahn v. Halter, 229 Minn. 374, 39 N.W.2d 545 (1949) (determinate fine and
commitment to jail was violation of constitutional prohibition).
364 See, e.g., Holden v. Holden, 245 N.C. 1, 95 S.E.2d 118 (1956).
365 See People ex rel. Sarlay v. Pope, 230 App. Div. 649, 246 N.Y.S. 414 (3d Dep't 1930).
366 E.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 241 Md. 416, 216 A.2d 914 (1966); Lamb v. Lamb, 83 Nev.
425, 433 P.2d 265 (1967); Annot., 30 A.L.R. 130 (1924).
367 Where there is no ability to pay, serious federal constitutional issues may be
raised. In Strattman v. Studt, 20 Ohio St. 2d 95, 253 N.E.2d 749 (1969), the Ohio Supreme
Court held that a statute permitting imprisonment for failure to pay a fine was a violation of indigents' equal protection rights since a $3 credit against the fine for each day of
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money order in a divorce decree is "alimony" or "child support"; some
of the orders represent debt claims that cannot be enforced by imprisonment. A requirement of a divorce decree that the husband pay
off certain creditors, for example, may be regarded as a "debt," 36 8 as

may a requirement that the wife repay monies wrongfully taken from
the husband.36 9 In such cases the order to pay money cannot be constitutionally enforced by imprisonment, even though support and alimony orders may be so enforced.
Other money obligations not contracted for may also be enforced
by jail sentences. Where a money claim arises from fraud, many state
constitutions specifically permit enforcement of the claim by imprisonment, 370 and quite probably the same result would obtain without any

constitutional reference to fraud since it can be argued that claims based
on fraud are not "debts." A number of cases so hold, thus removing the
constitutional protection against imprisonment.3 71
A breach of fiduciary obligation may likewise result in a money
obligation that is not technically a "debt." Such a breach resembles
fraud in that it involves wrongdoing apart from breach of contract, and
it resembles alimony and child support duties in that it usually results
from a special relation between the parties supported by law and public
policy. Here again there is a money obligation enforceable by contempt
and imprisonment in spite of constitutional provisions. 372 This rule is
subject, as it must be, to the rule against punishment when the contemnor is unable to pay. Other money obligations may likewise escape
the constitutional limitation on imprisonment, 73 but the family supconfinement was grossly unfair. In Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), the United
States Supreme Court took a similar position. Chief Justice Burger wrote:
We conclude that when the aggregate imprisonment exceeds the maximum
period fixed by the statute and results directly from an involuntary nonpayment of
a fine or court costs we are confronted with an impermissible discrimination that
rests on ability to pay ....

Id. at 240-41. In addition, an imprisonment, otherwise permissible to enforce alimony,
might become a forbidden imprisonment for debt under state law if the contemnor has no
ability to pay. Horton v. Horton, 222 Ga. 430, 150 S.E.2d 630 (1966). As to ability to pay
generally, see Section VI(B) supra.
368 Thompson v. Thompson, 282 Ala. 248, 210 So. 2d 808 (1968).
369 Proffit v. Proffit, 105 Ariz. 222, 462 P.2d 391 (1969).
870 Note 361 supra.
371 See, e.g., Nunn v. Smith, 270 N.C. 374, 154 S.E.2d 497 (1967) (imprisonment under
body execution statute, N.C. GEN. STAT § 1-311 (RepI. 1969), would be justified if action
was one in which defendant might have been arrested, e.g., fraud, otherwise not).
372 People v. La Mothe, 331 Ill.
351, 163 N.E. 6 (1928) (trustee); In re Clift's Estate,
108 Utah 336, 159 P.2d 872 (1945) (executor).
373 Taxes, for example, might be considered as obligations distinct from "debts." Cf.
Cincinnati v. Degoyer, 16 Ohio Misc. 229, 232, 241 N.E.2d 769, 771 (Hamilton County Mun.
Ct. 1968).
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port, fraud, and fiduciary breach cases are no doubt the most significant
ones.
It is sometimes suggested that the constitutional rule against imprisonment for debt is really meant only as protection for those unable
to pay and that, accordingly, it would be permissible to imprison those
who are able to pay and could avoid jail by meeting their obligations.3 7 4
This reasoning, if followed, would apply not only to special cases of
fraud, alimony, or the like, but also to simple contract debts. Then the
only question would be the contemnor's ability to pay, and the question
whether his obligation arose out of contract or in some other way would
no longer be relevant. New York, under a statutory scheme for collection of a judgment debt in installments from income,3

75

has upheld the

constitutionality of this notion, saying that the constitutional provision
is not violated if the contemnor is able to pay and he wilfully violates
376
a court order to do so.
Whatever the constitutional validity of this position may be, it
seems unwise from a practical point of view. Although it would be
easier to avoid the question of whether a given obligation is a "debt"
or not, in this instance the cost of avoiding the question is too high.
Part of the cost is injecting the judiciary into the private lives of citizens
and forcing courts to supervise budgets in a way that seems inconsistent
both with individual freedom and judicial behavior. The question
of ability to pay becomes even more significant than it is now and more
difficult to resolve. It is one thing to judge ability to pay child support,
but it is quite another to judge ability to pay a series of installments on
the television set. Furthermore, simple debt claims, arising as they
ordinarily do out of voluntary transactions, can be secured if the creditor deems it desirable, and hence this serious invasion of private life
seems unwarranted.
Perhaps an even more important objection to imprisonment of
anyone who is purportedly able to pay a debt, but does not do so, is
that it is often uncertain whether he is in fact able to pay. Leaving aside
difficulties in determining what "ability" may mean, it is still possible
that the contemnor is truly unable to pay but that the court does not
believe him. As a result, he may be jailed indefinitely, the judge believing he can pay when in reality he cannot. This is a threat to personal
liberty that warrants the traditional protective construction of the
imprisonment-for-debt clauses.
374 See 63 HAv. L. REv. 1444, 1446 (1950).
375 Now N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw §§ 5210, 5226, 5251 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1970).

876 Reeves v. Crownshield, 274 N.Y. 74, 8 NE.2d 283 (1937).
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* Another problem arises .with consent decrees. If a husband in a
divorce suit agrees with his wife on certain alimony or child support,
and if this agreement is then incorporated in the divorce decree, is it
to be regarded as essentially a contract because the parties agreed upon
it, or as alimony because the court ordered it? The difference, of
course, is crucial to the enforcement of the order by imprisonment.
Where the agreement actually becomes a part of the decree, some courts
have enforced it by contempt imprisonment as alimony or child support.3 7 7 Other courts treat such a decree as "nothing more than a con-

tract between the parties" which is not punishable by contempt unless
the decree affirmatively states that contempt is a possible remedy for
378
violation.
A variation on this problem occurs where the obligation that
underlies the consent decree is not simply a contract, as it is in the
alimony cases, but is instead based on fraud, breach of fiduciary obligation, or some other claim. For instance, suppose a trustee is charged
by the trust beneficiaries with having breached his trust in some fashion,
so that he owes the beneficiaries or the trust itself the sum of 10,000
dollars. Suppose the trustee willingly stipulates to his breach in the
sum of 5,000 dollars and a consent decree is entered by agreement of
the parties for that sum. In such a case the decree would be based not
on a contract debt, but on a fiduciary obligation. If one looks behind
the stipulation, it would seem that contempt imprisonment would be
permissible as it is in other cases of fiduciary breach; if one stops with
the stipulation, one sees only a "contract" debt that is not enforceable
by imprisonment. 79 The latter approach-to stop short at the stipulation and see it as a contract-has the merit of simplicity. But if there is
a sound basis for the enforcement of alimony and fiduciary obligations
through imprisonment, that policy is subverted where the nature of
the stipulated obligation is ignored. For this reason, it would seem
desirable to look behind stipulations on which court decrees are based,
and if a stipulation is clearly based on a non-debt obligation, the use
of contempt should be permissible.
b. Execution as an Alternative. Statutes in several states forbid
the use of contempt imprisonments to enforce money judgments that
can be enforced in other ways. Civil contempt is authorized under such
877 Scheldrup v. Gaffney, 243 Iowa 1297, 55 N.W.2d 272 (1952). See generally H.
CLARK, JR., THE LAW or DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 553-56 (1968).
378 35 N.C.L. REv. 405 (1957); cf. Holden v. Holden, 245 N.C. 1, 6, 95 SXE2d 118, 122

(1956).
379 See Wojahn v. Halter, 229 Minn. 374, 39 N.W.2d 545 (1949), noted in 63 H1"v.

L. R v. 1444 (1950).
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statutes only in cases where execution cannot be awarded for the collection of the sum.380
Statutes of this sort no doubt express a wise policy, but the expression is unfortunately vague. Do these statutes apply only to debts
or do they apply to other money obligations where imprisonment has
traditionally been permitted? Courts use contempt in alimony and other
cases where a literal reading of the statute would seem to require execution. 381 Does the statute apply where execution can be awarded but
cannot be fully satisfied? Does it apply where execution can be awarded
in a sister state, but not at home? Such statutes should be more precise
in requiring the use of execution; for example, execution might be
the only means of debt collection afforded where an inability to pay is
claimed, regardless of the nature of the money obligation.
C.

Fines
1.

Criminal

The determinate criminal fine raises few problems. It may be limited in amount by statute, 38 2 just as imprisonment may be, but there
are few other limitations. It seems reasonably clear that the court should
not punish a failure to pay the fine by a jail sentence, unless a jail
sentence would be appropriate in the first place. For instance, if the
contemnor cannot be imprisoned for failing to pay a debt, the policy of
this rule should not be subverted by first imposing a fine he cannot pay
and then imprisoning him for failure to pay.33 3 Beyond this, even where
a jail sentence might be proper in the first place, the practice of requiring one to "work off" unpaid fines by serving jail time is unconstitu38 4
tional under some circumstances.
380 See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.1701(5) (1962); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5-8(2) (Repl. 1969).
381 There seems to be little interpretation of these statutes. In Carnahan v. Carnahan,
148 Mich. 390, 107 N.W. 73 (1906), the trial court held that the husband in a divorce action
was equitably entitled to a fund held by the wife on deposit in a foreign country. The
wife was ordered to pay this over to the husband as a part of the property division. The
order was disobeyed and the woman found guilty of contempt and punished coercively.
The Supreme Court of Michigan upheld this determination, saying:
This is not a decree for the payment of money in the ordinary sense. It is not
subject to the exemption law. The decree requires delivery of the specific thingi.e., the fund-in contradistinction to the payment of a debt, and a writ of execution is not appropriate in such a case.
Id. at 897, 107 N.W. at 75.
382 E.g., N.Y. JuDicARY LAW § 751 (McKinney Supp. 1970); N.C. Gm. STAT. § 5-4
(Repl. 1969).
383 People ex rel. Sarlay v. Pope, 230 App. Div. 649, 246 N.Y.S. 414 (3d Dep't 1930).
384 Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 253 (1970); Strattman v. Studt, 20 Ohio St. 2d 95, 258
N.E.2d 749 (1969). Statutes may go further. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 23-24 (Repl. 1965) provides
for the release of any prisoner committed for fine if he takes an oath of insolvency.
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2. Civil
The civil fine, which is paid to the opposing party, may serve as
recompense for losses sustained because the contemnor violated a court
order. Two problems arise with this kind of civil sanction. First, can it
be coercive or remedial, as it must be if it is to be civil rather than
criminal? Second, if the civil fine is merely damages, should the damage
claim be heard in a separate suit with a jury?
If defendant, under a judicial order to convey Blackacre to plaintiff,
refuses to do so and instead conveys it to another person, defendant is
in contempt and may be fined. If the fine is compensatory, it will probably equal plaintiff's loss of bargain and incidental expenses. Although
such a fine is not at all coercive, it is completely remedial and hence a
civil sanction; it furnishes the injured party a substitutionary remedy
that is easily distinguishable from punishment.
Thus, federal and some state courts have used or permitted the
compensatory fine as a civil contempt sanction, 85 sometimes including
expenses of presenting the contempt case as well as losses resulting
directly from the contumacious conduct. 8 6 Other courts, for reasons
not altogether clear, have rejected the compensatory contempt fine.
Illinois has taken this position, apparently because it regards all contempt sanctions as criminal or quasi-criminal in nature. 38 7 North Carolina, in rather early cases, ruled that a contempt fine must be paid to the
state because "[w]e know of no law" authorizing otherwise. 388 Here
again, the court may have had in mind the criminal rather than the
civil character of contempt, but with the distinctions that have been
developed between the two kinds of contempt in the past 100 years,
such cases have little authority.
If civil contempt fines are indeed remedial or coercive, there seems
to be no logical objection to their use in a civil contempt case, at least
where a court concedes that contempt may have civil as well as criminal
sanctions. But it is clear that an objection does lie if, when assessed, the
385 United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); Parker v. United States, 126 F.2d 870
(Ist Cir. 1942); Schoenthal v. Schoenthal, 138 So. 2d 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Grunberg v. Louison, 343 Mass. 729, 180 N.E.2d 802 (1962). Some states provide for compensatory
contempt fines by statute. E.g., N.Y. JuDicIARY LAw § 778 (McKinney 1968).
386 See Lyon v. Bloomfield, 355 Mass. 738, 247 N.E.2d 555 (1969).
387 See Eberle v. Greene, 71 Ill. App. 2d 85, 93, 217 N.E.2d 6, 10 (1966). Nebraska
arrived at a strange compromise that refused to permit a compensatory fine but did allow
the injured party expenses in the contempt action, including an attorney's fee. Kasparek v.

May, 174 Neb. 732, 119 N.W.2d 512 (1963).
88 Morris v. Whitehead, 65 N.C. 637, 638 (1871) (dictum); In re Rhodes, 65 N.C. 518,
519 (1871) (dictum).
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fine is neither remedial nor coercive; for that reason the in terrorem
fine may present certain problems. 8 9
The in terrorem fine is not coercive at the time it is collected. If a
defendant is enjoined from trespassing on the plaintiff's property he
may, after one violation of the decree, be held in contempt and threatened with a fine of 100 dollars for each further trespass. At this point,
the in terrorem fine is coercive; it tends to motivate compliance with
the decree. But if for any reason the defendant proceeds to trespass
again, the fine is collected when the violation of the decree is complete.
At the time of collection, then, it is not coercive, and, since the fine was
fixed at a sum in excess of the plaintiff's probable damages in order to
make it an effective threat, the fine is not an accurate reflection of those
damages and hence not remedial. Being neither remedial nor coercive
at the time of collection, it has a status analogous to that of the suspended jail sentence for a definite term-it is coercive when threatened
but not when applied.8 90
However, the in terrorem fine probably does not have the potential
for arbitrariness that imprisonment has, and its use has been permitted
by several courts. 91 Its primary use is in a business competition context where it can be a very effective means of securing compliance,
and perhaps it may be justified where the analogous in terrorem prison
sentence may not be.
Another variation on the compensatory fine is the unjust enrichment fine. A compensatory fine is measured by the plaintiff's loss; an
unjust enrichment fine is measured by the defendant's gain. The two
may be identical, but they need not be. The defendant may, for instance,
violate the plaintiff's patent or trademark, or engage in some form of
unfair competition in violation of an injunction without causing the
plaintiff any loss at all. The defendant might have sold to a market in
which the plaintiff did not compete, for example, with the result that the
plaintiff has no economic losses. If the defendant's conduct in such a
case is tortious, the plaintiff could probably bring a separate tort suit
and invoke unjust enrichment principles by waiving the tort and suing
in assumpsit. 892 This would allow the plaintiff to recover the defendant's
889 Such a fine is usually a fixed amount, payable for each violation of the court's
order. E.g., Sunbeam Corp. v. Golden Rule Appliance Co., 252 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1958)
($2,500 for each future violation of order). The .French astreinte operates in much the same
fashion. See note 2 supra.
890 Jencks v. Goforth, 57 N.M. 627, 261 P.2d 655 (1953). See also the discussion of the
suspended jail sentence, text accompanying notes 258-63 supra.
391 See Sunbeam Corp. v. Golden Rule Appliance Co., 252 F.2d 467 (2d Cir, 1958);
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Sun Vacuum Stores, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1961).
892 See Corbin, Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit, 19 YALE L.J. 221, 225-27 (1910).
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illegal gains, even though the plaintiff himself lost nothing.8 93 Given
this possibility, the question arises whether the equity court might
impose an unjust enrichment fine measured in the same way, that is, by
the defendant's improper profits. Such a fine would not be coercive
since it would necessarily be measured only after violation and could
not therefore motivate the defendant's compliance with the decree. But
neither is it in the strictest sense remedial; since it is based on the
defendant's unjust gain, it does not compensate the plaintiff for loss.
Thus viewed, the unjust enrichment fine lacks the remedial or coercive
character necessary to support a civil contempt, though such a fine might
well be justified as a criminal contempt sanction because of its noncompensatory, punitive nature. 9 4
On the other hand, the unjust enrichment fine might be regarded
as essentially remedial in the broad sense that it pays the plaintiff for
the defendant's violation of the decree and provides an economic basis
for payment. It is to be distinguished, certainly, from an arbitrary figure
of the kind typically used in criminal contempt cases. Furthermore, as a
matter of policy, there is no good reason why the unjust enrichment
measure, readily available in a separate lawsuit, should not be the measure of contempt fines. In a patent infringement case, the Supreme
Court has permitted such a fine.3 95 Nevertheless, some judges have been
concerned. One Second Circuit opinion 96 expressed the view that an
unjust enrichment fine would be warranted only where it was apt to
reflect the actual losses of the plaintiff. The Third Circuit went further
and held that unless there was substantial loss to the plaintiff, unjust
89 7
enrichment was not an appropriate measure of a contempt fine.

It is difficult to assess the state of the law on this point. Many cases
do say, albeit rather casually, that the plaintiff's actual losses are the
measure of the compensatory fine. Some judges have apparently taken
this to mean that an unjust enrichment measure is improper, but it
393 See Douthwaite, The Tortfeasor's Profits-A Brief Survey, 19 HASTINGS

LJ.

1071

(1968).
394 In Chicago v. Hart Bldg. Corp., 116 IIl. App. 2d 39, 253 N.E.2d 496 (1969), a
fiduciary who had violated his trust was subjected to a criminal contempt fine of $5,000
plus the sum equal to his net profits derived from the breach of fiduciary duty. Assuming
a dvii contempt fine could also be levied, could it be measured in the same way? If it
could, would there be any bar to claiming two unjust enrichment fines, one criminal and

one civil, where the complaining party is the state that receives the criminal fine because
all criminal fines are payable to it, and the civil one because it is the complaining party?
395 Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448 (1932).
896 Sunbeam Corp. v. Golden Rule Appliance Co., 252 F.2d 467, 470 (2d Cir. 1958).
397 National Drying Mach. Co. v. Ackoff, 245 F.2d 192, 193 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 832 (1957). See also Singer Mfg. Co. v. Sun Vacuum Stores, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 738, 742
(D.N.J. 1961).
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seems likely that the "actual loss" formulation is meant to exclude a
punitive fine rather than an unjust enrichment fine. 98 As a matter of
policy the unjust enrichment fine does not seem more objectionable
than any other civil fine, provided it reflects a measure of recovery
available to the same plaintiff in a separate action.
So far discussion of the civil contempt fine has turned on the nature
and measure of the fine. A different kind of problem is introduced
when the jury trial issue is raised. As already indicated, with the exception of certain criminal cases, contempts are not tried before a jury.
When a jury is not provided, it may be argued that no sanction should
be applied in a contempt proceeding that can be applied equally well in
an ordinary lawsuit. Since both unjust enrichment or pure "compensation" damages can be recovered in a suit at law, if the contempt sanction
does no more than award a comparable money recovery, it is arguable
that the case should be tried before a jury. There is some suggestion of
this in California,399 but it is possible to hold the jury's role in high
regard and still feel that this position is erroneous. Once the case is in a
posture to be dealt with by an in personam order-that is, the posture
in which the old equity courts would take cognizance of it-the jury has
already been excluded. The very decision to issue an order enforceable
by contempt is in most states a decision to exclude the jury from the
process. That being so, there is every reason to proceed with whatever
effective enforcement the court can muster.
However, the role of the jury in civil contempt cases in states where
an equity jury is afforded may be a more difficult question. In North
Carolina, where juries are used in equity cases, 400 it seems incongruous
to eliminate the jury from the contempt trial. It is true that the jury
should not fashion the sanction for contempt, and it is equally true that
the jury has no role at all in trying petty criminal contempts or contempts that occur in the course of a trial. But in a state where a jury
trial in equity is accepted, the jury could easily have a role in trying
disputed fact questions.
D.

Denial of Right To Litigate

Contempt sanctions may also include denying a litigant some of the
normal rights or privileges of litigation. This may be done by striking
pleadings, refusing to permit appeals, or otherwise limiting his partici898 See United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 302-07 (1947); Schoenthal v. Schoenthal,
138 So. 2d 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
899 HJ. Heinz Co. v. Superior Ct., 42 Cal. 2d 164, 266 P.2d 5 (1954).
400 See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 11(1). For a discussion of all states allowing jury trials
in equity suits, see Hecke, Trial by Jury in Equity Cases, 31 N.C.L. REv. 157 (1953).
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pation in the trial while he remains in contempt. This can be an extreme and dangerous sanction, and its use as a criminal punishment for
contempt is probably unwarranted.401 For such a purpose, fines and
imprisonment are entirely adequate, and the denial of litigation privileges should be used only coercively.
At least for some purposes, a distinction must be drawn between a
court's refusal to give affirmative relief to a contumacious litigant and
its refusal to permit him to defend himself. In Hovey v. Elliott,40 2 the
trial court ordered the defendant to deposit a disputed sum with the
court, pending determination of the claims. Defendant, who held the
money, refused to do this, and the trial judge punished the contempt by
striking defendant's answer. A default judgment was accordingly entered
against defendant. The Supreme Court of the United States overturned
this judgment on the ground that defendant had been denied a hearing
required by due process of law.
The principle of Hovey extends to all sorts of defensive rights: the
court cannot, for example, deprive a defendant of the right to appear by
counsel 4 3 or the right to testify.40 4 But the principle of Hovey does not
extend equally to those who seek affirmative relief. A defense is regarded
as a matter of right that cannot be modified, while an offense is regarded
as a privilege: "[A] distinction must be drawn between [the contempt
of] a contemnor who seeks a privilege of the court and that of one who
comes in as of right to answer an attack against him." 405 By using this
reasoning, a number of cases have held that in proper circumstances
one may be denied affirmative relief as a means of coercing compliance
406
with some court order.
401 National Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Arnold, 348 US. 37, 44 (1954).
402 167 U.S. 409 (1897).

403 Ward v. Ward, 70 Vt. 430, 41 A. 435 (1898).
404 Kirchner v. Kirchner, 5 N.J. Super. 341, 69 A.2d 30 (1949).
405 Id. at 344, 69 A.2d at 31.
406 Garrett v. Garrett, 341 IM. 232, 173 N.E. 107 (1930). In this case a husband apparently had been convicted of contempt for refusing to pay support to his wife and had
been jailed. He was released from jail by mistake and defended the divorce action, which
he lost. He then sought review by writ of error. The Supreme Court of Illinois denied
him review, regarding it as affirmative relief to one who remained in contempt. See Annot.,
49 A.L.R.2d 1425 (1956) (dismissal of appeal); Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 580 (1950) (striking
pleading).
The distinction between refusing affirmative relief and denying an opportunity to
present a defense is not quite the same as the distinction between plaintiff and defendant.
What is important is whether one is attacking or defending. Thus, although a defendant
cannot be denied an opportunity to defend himself in the trial court, he may be denied the
right to attack the trial court's judgment on appeal if he remains in contempt. National
Union of Marine Cooks $.Stewards v. Arnold, 348 US. 37 (1954); Soderberg v. Soderberg, 63
Cal. App. 492, 219 P. 82 (1923) (defendant's motion to vacate denied while defendant re-
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There are important qualifications to this distinction, however.
The Hovey case was decided in 1897; in 1909 the Court was faced with
a similar situation in Hammond PackingCo. v. Arkansas.40 7 In that case,
the Hammond Packing Company, an Illinois corporation, was subject
to certain Arkansas statutes. The Arkansas Attorney General brought
an action against Hammond, and Hammond answered and also filed
several other pleadings and motions. The Attorney General then sought
and got an order permitting him to examine Hammond's records in
Chicago and certain of Hammond's personnel. Hammond respectfully
refused to comply with this order, contending that it violated constitutional rights. The Arkansas court, however, overruled this contention,
and, when Hammond refused to comply with the order, the court under
specific statutory authority, struck its answer and entered a judgment
against it for 10,000 dollars as penalties. The Supreme Court upheld
this procedure in spite of its apparently contrary ruling only twelve
years earlier in Hovey. The Supreme Court first said that the due process
requirement of Hovey, if applicable at all, was no less applicable where
a statute authorized striking an answer than where it did not.40 8 The
Court then distinguished Hovey on different grounds. Hovey, the Court
said, was a case of punishment by striking a pleading, and that was
unconstitutional. Hammond, however, was a case where the legislature
created the factual presumption that if evidence validly required was
not produced, then the answer probably was not meritorious. 40 9 It was
not clear how the Court discerned the presumption, which was not
mentioned in the Arkansas law,4 10 nor was it clear how the Court could
be sure that no such presumption existed in Hovey; on this point the
opinion is blatant fiction. As a result, it is quite difficult, perhaps impossible, to determine the exact constitutional status of Hovey. There is
authority that limits the power of a court to strike defensive pleadings
in cases where, as in Hammond, such a sanction is authorized by the
legislature. 411 Hammond might also be interpreted as an early groping
toward the rule that courts may deny certain privileges of litigation
412
coercively, but not punitively.
mained in contempt); Garrett v. Garrett, supra (defendant's appeal denied while in contempt).
407 212 U.S. 322 (1909).
408 Id. at 350.
409 Id. at 850-51.
410 Section 9 of the Arkansas act (now ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-109 (Repl. 1957)), merely
directed the court to strike the answer when the defendant refused discovery.
411 Walter Cabinet Co. v. Russell, 250 Ill. 416, 95 N.E. 462 (1911).
412 The Hammond case referred to the order in Hovey as a punishment in attempting
to distinguish it. 212 US. at 850.
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 87413 and similar state legislation
specifically authorize the sanction approved in Hammond for a refusal
to make discovery. Not only may pleadings be stricken; a default judgment is specifically authorized, and, short of that, designated facts may
be taken as admitted. The rule draws no distinction between defensive
and other pleadings, and some cases have applied the rule against defenses as well as against affirmative claims, entering default judgments
against defendants who refuse to make discovery.414 This assumes that
the rule is valid and that little is left of Hovey. That may be the case,
but the Supreme Court has never really clarified the point. It has said
that Hammond "substantially modified" Hovey without saying how or
what was left of Hovey.415 At the same time, the Court seems to have
thought that defensive pleadings were entitled to greater protection
416
than affirmative claims, a view that certainly harkens back to Hovey.
Whatever the constitutional status of rule 37 may be, courts have
warned that it must not be applied with abandon. The default judgment sanction for either plaintiff or defendant "is the most severe sancdon which the court may apply, and its use must be tempered by the
careful exercise of judicial discretion to assure that its imposition is
merited." 417 It is not to be used, for example, where the party violates
a discovery order in good faith; 41 8 nor is the penalty to be used for
harassment: "Excessive or fruitless use of the [sanction] ... is imper419
missible."
Once again it must be said that the law of contempt is uncertain
with respect to the standards that may control a court's exercise of
discretion. We can say readily enough that pleadings should not be
stricken recklessly as a punishment for contempt, but it is quite difficult
on the basis of existing rules to say anything much more meaningful.
We have little legal lore to guide us, even on the question whether the
sanction must be related in some substantial way to the conduct that
413 FE. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(i), (iii).
414 United States v. 3963 Bottles, More or Less, of Enerjol Double Strength, 265 F.2d

332 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 860 U.S. 931 (1959).
415 Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 209 (1958).
416 Id. at 209-11.
417 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 332 F.2d 602, 614 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

808 U.S. 248 (1964) (dismissal of counterclaim with prejudice).
418 Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 US. 197 (1958). "The presumption utilized by
the court in the Hammond case might well falter under such circumstances"--that is, where
the party made a good faith effort to comply. Id. at 210.
419 Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283, 293 (5th Cir. 1969), where a discovery notice referred to depositions to be taken beginning on Wednesday and continuing
from day to day until completed. The deposed parties refused to appear on Saturday and
were penalized costs and attorney's fees under rule 37(d). This was reversed.
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called it forth. If a pleading may be stricken because the defendant
refuses to make discovery, can it also be stricken if he refuses to pay
alimony? If he is guilty of perjury? What is to be done if a trustee or the
manager of a class action is guilty of a contempt that would normally
invoke rule 37-are the persons represented to suffer a default? The
only sound recommendation that can be made is that much more must
be done to make the law of contempt a tolerable and fair enforcement
device.
E.

Other Sanctions

The forms of sanctions for contempt have never been limited, much
less rigidified. Indeed, this may be one area of the law where a little
more rigidity, in the sense of certainty, would be welcome. One of the
possibilities for developing sanctions is illustrated in Lance v.
Plumme. 420 An auxiliary deputy sheriff who served without pay was
accused of harassing Negroes in violation of an injunction by which he
was bound. When the trial judge found the deputy had in fact harassed
them, he held the deputy in contempt and ordered him to turn in his
badge. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit approved the sanction with the
qualification that he should be permitted to have his badge back if he
repented his past misconduct and purged himself.
The court's sanction seems proper enough; it will aid the plaintiffs in getting part of that to which they are entitled-freedom from
official harassment. But it is illustrative of the potential power of the
contempt sanction to invade, without predetermined limits, the private
lives and behavior of those within the court's decree. This kind of
power-often used wisely and within appropriate limits, as in Lance
itself-is so subject to abuse that any society based on law needs to know
its limits.
CONCLUSION

Even if no reform in the law of contempt were desirable, legislative
action could help to clarify the confusions and uncertainties, and to
furnish, in statutory form, a guide to lawyers and judges beset by bewildering layers of contempt lore. The hodgepodge of case law, constitutional law, and statutory regulation has yielded no unified structure.
Judges, who confront contempt problems only occasionally, often come
to each new case without understanding built on past learning. It is
little- wonder that confusion exists. A comprehensive statute would
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clarify the major substantive and procedural requirements and protect
against arbitrary action as well. But more than this, reform is needed in
the law of contempt. This article makes clear some of the directions it
might take.
One area for reform lies in the description of the crime of contempt.
It often is an impalpable crime, composed of "misbehavior," "insult,"
or an "embarrassment to the court." These terms would not withstand
the charge of vagueness in any other crime, and they should not be
accepted in contempt cases if they can be improved upon.
A second area for reform lies in the procedural protections accorded
in contempt cases. In criminal contempts-and any courtroom misbehavior-the judge who acts as a prosecutor by initiating the charge
should not, except where real necessities require it, be the judge who
tries the case. The criminal contempt sanction should be invoked only
when the prosecutor has sustained a prescribed and well-understood
burden of proof on the substantive element of intent. Even in civil
contempts, the question of who has the burden of proving ability to
comply deserves clarification. In some cases the sanctions should be
prescribed and limited.
A third area for reform lies in utilizing the alternatives to contempt.
Judges must be permitted-even required-to conduct orderly trials.
On the other hand, the criminal contempt punishment involved in
keeping trial orderly should ordinarily be quite limited; for instance,
a disrupter could be jailed twenty-four hours or simply removed from
court. The use of criminal contempt for this purpose need not result
in jail sentences of twenty-five years. When it seems worthwhile to go
beyond a simple punishment to keep trials orderly, the alternatives of
ordinary criminal prosecution seem desirable. This involves two
changes. First, it should be required that if conduct amounts to a crime
punishable under statute, the contempt power may not be used (except
for limited purposes of orderly trials). Thus, for example, perjury
should not be punishable by contempt procedures. Second, conduct
deemed worthy of punishment should be made criminal by statute. The
net result of this would be to furnish statutory standards more consistent with Anglo-American ideas of justice and to limit the use of criminal contempt powers for misbehavior in court, so that the powers do not
exceed their purposes.
None of this would affect the power to punish criminally the disobedience of a court order, although even here the punishment should
be specified in advance. Nor would any of this affect the power to punish
civilly, either to prevent disobedience of a court order or to compel
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proper behavior of a disrupter. (Indeed, the use of civil, coercive contempt powers should be encouraged here as a preferable alternative.)
The problem of reform and clarification is not only a local one. It
needs attention in all states and in the federal system as well. The concepts of contempt are uncertain partly because every state court feeds
to some extent upon the uncertainties and aberrations of others. The
conceptual fog could be cleared best by a unified, if not a uniform,
approach at all levels.

